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This dissertation investigates how the Chinese state governs the business of strategic 
industries and explains the sources and patterns of the variation in economic 
regulation. Drawing on the conventional analytic frameworks of regulatory state but, 
at the same time, challenging their passive treatment of the Communist Party in the 
study of Chinese political economy, I propose a model of soft and hard regulation to 
better understand complex patterns of centralized regulatory regime. Taking two 
strategic industries, the automobile manufacturing and telecom service, as crucial 
comparative cases, I present three-fold arguments:  
First, as the model of soft and hard regulation suggests, we need to consider a 
range of industrial sectors and relax the existing analytic framework that heavily 
focuses on the independence of the regulator in order to enhance our understanding of 
the regulatory regime in China’s industrial economy. It would be flawed to conclude 
  
that the nature of the Chinese state is transformed into a minimalist regulatory state, 
by overlooking the political control of the party as well as only relying on the 
conventional analytic frame and empirical sectors for the study of regulatory reform. 
The party organ is deeply enmeshed in both government and enterprises, and 
exercises considerable influence on the regulatory control over the leading state firms 
and sectors.  
Second, my findings of the centralized regulatory oversight in the auto 
industry explicitly demonstrate the ways in which the Chinese central government 
regulates strategic but decentralized industry. It is often invisible and loose compared 
with centralized strategic sectors. Therefore, this would contribute to further 
specifying the forms of central control over cases that have a long history of 
decentralization policies. 
Third, while existing literature has emphasized highly fragmented authority 
and bureaucratic struggles as the main political logic, this dissertation study argues 
that there is a strong central state effort to create a cohesive political power in order to 
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A NOTE ON NAME 
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I. The Puzzle on China’s Industrial Regulation 
 
 
It was the summer of 2005 when I slowly started to interview Chinese officials and 
scholars working in the major state research institutions (i.e., the Development 
Research Center and the Chinese Academy of Social Science) in Beijing. After 
several interviews, however, I decided not to tell the potential interviewees that I was 
comparing China’s state policies and regulations in the automobile and telecom 
service industries unless they insistently asked me. Even though I had explained why 
I was comparing these two sectors, for the Chinese industrial “economists,” it did not 
make sense at all to compare two very different sectors. They thought that inherent 
sectoral distinctions necessarily required disparate governmental policies and 
governing mechanisms to manage and regulate the industries. They held that 
“needless to say, government policies are different because the auto is manufacturing 
and competition sector (jingzheng hangye) while telecom service is a natural 
monopoly (longduan).”  
Yet the automotive and telecom service sectors in China share two key 
common points: both are strategically significant “commanding heights” and “pillar” 
industries in the national economy; and the creation of large state firms has been 
particularly emphasized and encouraged by the central leadership. In other words, the 




competitive in both domestic and global markets under central control. Hence, 
sectoral differences are insufficient to account for the forms of regulation in China. 
While some view the recent market liberalization and denationalization of 
ownership as a remarkable change in the Chinese political economy, both the 
automobile manufacturing and telecom service industries are still dominated by state 
ownership. To begin with, in the case of the auto industry, path-dependent policies of 
decentralization in the sector have allowed local authorities to enjoy discretionary 
power by retaining enterprise ownership. Since the auto industry is a major resource 
for local revenue and employment, most local governments have established their 
own medium or small scale auto firms and factories. According to one researcher in 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), as of 2005, 2,443 auto 
enterprises, which include all type of vehicles, such as passenger and commercial cars 
and trucks, are registered, and 21 provinces and cities produce cars.1 As such, China’s 
auto market is exceedingly fragmented. Despite these historically strong local 
components, the fragmented market structure, and much recent foreign investment, 
however, there is central regulatory control from the party-state directly monitoring 
major local auto businesses.  
At the same time, if we look at another strategic industry, the telecom service 
sector is similarly dominated by public ownership. But, whereas automobile 
manufacturing consists of central/local state firms and private producers, all telecom 
service carriers are centrally-owned. As a consequence of strong central ownership, 
tight central regulation holds in the telecom service sector: it is supervised by a 
                                                 
1 “Four Problems Challenge China’s Auto Industry,” Renmin Ribao (November 29, 2005) FBIS 




central public agency, and the business management of telecom service is 
substantially controlled by comprehensive central power at the core. In contrast with 
the auto industry, there are no foreign-invested telecom service firms yet, even after 
new regulation that allows foreign telecom carriers to invest in China’s telecom 
sector. 
In fact, existing literature that has emphasized the influence of sectoral 
differences argues that each industry tends to be regulated according to sector-
specific characteristics, because different sectors have different forms of embedded 
industrial organization and development needs and policies.2 For instance, in the 
automotive industry, under the policy of decentralization, the market was opened 
quite early to foreign investment in order to attract more capital, and competition 
among manufacturers is more market-oriented than in a natural monopoly sector. On 
the other hand, the telecom service sector, as one of the crucial infrastructure 
industries, has been monopolized and nationalized in the name of national security 
and public interest in both advanced and developing countries. For China’s telecom 
service sector, even after regulatory reform, the market is still dominated by a small 
number of central state-owned carriers, and the entry of private and foreign capital is 
strictly controlled by the central government based on numerous regulations.  
Indeed, the mode of economic governance is heavily influenced by sectoral 
characteristics. Yet what is more interesting is that, despite significant sector 
differences, centralized regulatory governance is commonly identified in both the 
                                                 
2 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), p. 81; D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the 
Developmental Prospects of States (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 23; Adam 
Segal and Eric Thun, “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Local Governments, Industrial Sectors, and 




automotive and the telecom service industries in China. Here puzzles surface: first, 
why is central state regulation commonly employed in China’s auto and telecom 
industries, in spite of significant differences in sectoral and institutional 
characteristics? At the same time, the patterns of central regulation are varied in 
practice. As another puzzle, how are the patterns of central control over the auto and 
telecom service sectors varied? What makes diversity in regulatory practice if 
different? What are the forms of regulation? Does the level of ownership, such as 
central or local state ownership, generate different forms of regulation within one 
sector? If so, what gives rise to such variations under the seemingly constant context 
of central regulation? What can we learn about the manners and sources of regulation 
in the Chinese industrial economy through the practices in the auto and telecom 
sectors?   
This research ultimately attempts to unveil the underlying political logic of 
central regulation in strategic industries in China.3 In doing so, automobile 
manufacturing, one of the most decentralized state sectors, offers an excellent 
comparative case with the highly centralized telecom sector, in showing how the 
central party-state maintains regulatory power over large local state firms. 
Interestingly, my major finding shows that strong local components do not 
necessarily lead to a deficiency of central control as is often readily assumed. The 
method of central oversight over local state firms is soft and invisible compared with 
the manner of regulation in central state firms. Moreover, the forms of central 
oversight within the sector are also varied between central and local state auto firms. 
                                                 
3 Here “strategic industries” means sectors that are dominated by state assets and have crucial fiscal or 




Central state auto enterprise, similar to telecom service carriers, is tightly controlled 
by central regulatory power, while central control over local state auto firm is 
relatively soft through indirect and informal channels. Hence, mixed forms of 
regulation hold in China’s automobile business. 
This introduction chapter proceeds as follows: I first briefly address the 
potential contribution of this study. I then introduce the research design for this 
dissertation and explain dependent variables, key explanatory variables, and working 
hypotheses. I also discuss my case selection: why I chose the automobile and telecom 
service sectors. The chapter proceeds to explain my research methodology and 
processes in the field, and presents the major findings and key arguments in this 
dissertation. It then briefly offers an outline of the dissertation.     
 
 
II. Potential Contribution of this Study 
 
This dissertation study attempts to explain how the Chinese state governs the business 
of strategic industries and to explain the sources and patterns of the variation in 
economic regulation. Previous studies on the regulatory state in China have been 
largely confined to “traditional” industries using a “conventional” framework that has 
evolved from the experiences of Western countries.4 I hope that this study may have 
                                                 
4 Here, traditional industries include infrastructure or financial service industries, and conventional 
framework means the independent regulatory agency-focused approach. OECD, Regulatory Policies in 
OECD Countries: From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance (Paris: OECD, 2002), p. 91; 
Fabrizio Gilardi, “Institutional Change in regulatory Policies: Regulation through Independent 
Agencies and the Three New Institutionalism,” edited by Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, The 
Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham; 




the following four potential contributions to the Chinese political economy. First, on 
the theoretical level, if diverse patterns of regulatory governance are here to stay, the 
literature that assumes that the regulatory state will supersede a strong interventionist 
state fails to explain the complexities in economic governance in China. This also 
means that the globalization literature, which hypothesizes the idea of regulatory 
convergence encouraged by international regimes and institutions, does not relevantly 
reflect variations across issue areas. In the context of China, since the industrial 
sectors studied here are heavily influenced by the institutional context from which 
they develop, they share some similarities. Hence, a firm division between an 
interventionist and a regulatory state tends to be simplistic. Rather, as they actually 
exist, there are more complexities than are captured by the established two 
contending views. I hope this comparative case study may shed light on some useful 
implications for both comparative and Chinese political studies. 
Second, when regulation is defined as “standard-setting, supervision, and 
monitoring by means of the public authority”5 rather than external market control in 
the name of the public interest through formal procedures and agencies, we can find 
more divergent practices of regulation in the Chinese industrial economy. Central 
regulation in the decentralized auto industry shows how the patterns of regulation can 
be varied depending on the level of state ownership. This also means that while a 
conventional approach to regulation tends to focus on public versus private 
ownership, the practice of regulation in China demonstrates that much diversity is 
identified within public ownership depending on central or local state firms. In order 
                                                 
5 Shaoguang Wang, “Regulating Death at Coalmines: Changing Mode of Governance in China,” 





to explain how decentralization (decentralized issue area) is actually regulated by the 
central authority, I propose a model of soft/hard regulation. Given that the existing 
rich literature on decentralization has not predicted or explained the fact of 
soft/invisible central regulation in the decentralized issue area, I hope to reflect the 
complex and dynamic mechanism of regulation in China.   
 Third, a comparative case study of the auto and telecom industries in China’s 
economic regulation not only fills the empirical gap by expanding the case into the 
decentralized strategic sector, but also contributes to building on the theory of the 
regulatory state by addressing diversity in the patterns of regulation. In the Chinese 
industrial economy, we know well that the ultimate regulatory power, in areas such as 
market entry, is still retained by the center, and that there are deeply penetrated 
central party-state hands in the business of the local economy, though the degree of 
influence varies depending on regions and sectors. Yet the forms of central control 
over decentralized state firms and industries have been less systematically specified 
and compared with centralized state firms and industries. Hence, the auto industry 
provides a useful opportunity to compare the mechanism of central regulatory 
structure in a decentralized industry with that in the centralized telecom service 
sector, and helps in better understanding the complexities in China’s regulatory state.   
 Finally, central oversight over the automotive and telecom sectors fleshes out 
the increasing power of comprehensive state commissions at the core. As the existing 
literature of fragmented policy decision-making and implementation has emphasized, 
there are still bureaucratic struggles between central and local governments in the 




leadership has been making an effort to revamp and create comprehensive national 
power by integrating previously diffused and overlapped authority into the center. 
Their relative importance varies across the issue areas: while the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is a sort of macroeconomic regulator 
in automobile manufacturing, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), as the actual supervisor of telecom carriers, is rapidly 
expanding the scope of its authority. As such, this study may contribute to explaining 
how the recent centralized regulatory power may exercise control in the context of the 




III. Research Design 
 
In this dissertation, there are two main research questions that I attempt to explore: 
first, why, despite significant differences in inherent sectoral characteristics, 
governing structure, ownership forms, and the roles of foreign investors, does 
“centralized regulatory control” emerge in key strategic industries in China? Second, 
under the centralized regulatory mechanism, how are the patterns of the regulatory 
state varied across as well as within the sector, and what are the sources of the 
variation? This study is concerned with not only identifying the manner and causes of 
central state regulation over strategic industries, but also capturing the complexities in 
China’s regulatory governance designed by the party-state. In order to answer these 
questions, the following steps are taken. First, I choose two of the most strategically 




manufacturing and telecom service sectors. I then juxtapose the two cases in order to 
identify the specific pattern of regulation in each of the sectors, and try to sort out the 
key variables that spell out the creation of the varied forms of regulatory control from 
the center.  
 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable that I attempt to examine is the pattern of the regulatory 
system in China’s strategic industries. By defining regulation as “the mechanism of 
control which is rule-based behavior,”6 regulatory institutions are not necessarily 
limited to state-designated public agencies and procedures, as the conventional 
studies show.7 In China, regulatory authority is designed to monitor the business of 
state firms as well as to enhance competition and efficiency in markets. Focusing on 
two strategic industries, I explore whether/how the Chinese central leadership 
exercises control over the decentralized auto industry. If so, how are the patterns of 
central oversight distinct from the centralized telecom service sector?   
While I will discuss this in more detail in the following section, divergent 
central-local state relations across sectors and localities have contributed to creating 
the varied patterns of central oversight for the local economy. The forms of 
centralized regulation can be loose/invisible, tight/formal, or a mixture of both, which 
I characterize as a soft/hard regulation model in this dissertation. I try to capture the 
                                                 
6 Philip Selznick, “Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation,” in, edited by Roger G. Noll, 
Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); John 
Francis, The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993) 
7 Giandomenico Majone, “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe,” West European Politics, 
Vol.17 (1994): 77-101; Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); Steven K. Vogel, Freer 
Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reforms in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca; London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996); Marc Allen Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition (Baltimore: Jonhns 




ways in which the central party-state supervises the decentralized state firms in key 
industries. As I referred to earlier, although we know that the central party-state still 
maintains decisive regulatory power (i.e., market entry) in managing the local 
industrial economy, most decentralization literature has focused on characterizing 
various types of local state in the local economy and has rarely explained 
whether/how central regulation is actually implemented or with what purpose. Hence, 
the soft and hard regulation model that I propose in this dissertation offers a useful 
explanation for the sources and patterns of the variation in central regulatory control 
over China’s strategic industries. In measuring each pattern, based on both the large 
body of literature on regulation in general and my observations in field research,8 I 
identify three indicators to distinguish loose and invisible central oversight (soft 
regulation) from tight and formal central control (hard regulation). They include: 1) 
monitoring and enforcement powers; 2) rule-making authority; 3) policy 
implementation. In developing these indicators, first I juxtapose each soft versus hard 






                                                 
8 Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood, A Reader on Regulation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones, and Tony 
Travers, Regulation inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-Busters (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); Philip Selznick, “Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation,” 
in, edited by Roger G. Noll, Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985); William W. Bratton et al., International Regulatory Competition and 






Table 1-1. Measuring the Patterns of the Regulatory System 
Forms of Central Regulatory System Indicators 
Monitoring and enforcement: by informal 
channels of central party-state 
Rule-making power: shared between central 
and local authorities 
Loose/Invisible Central Oversight 
(“Soft” Regulation) 
Policy implementation: much leeway (i.e., 
price, market entry, industrial policies) 
Monitoring and enforcement: by specialized 
public agencies and procedures  
Rule-making power: concentrated in the 
central regulatory powers                                  
Tight/Formal Central Oversight 
(“Hard” Regulation) 
Policy implementation: very strict (i.e.,  
price, market entry, and industrial policies) 
 
1) Monitoring and enforcement: In terms of conventional ideas, regulation means that 
a “public agency monitors and promotes compliance with an authoritative set of 
rules.” However, in China’s key industries, there are also informal channels from the 
center to supervise the business of local major state firms. Since this mechanism is 
informal, its regulatory oversight is invisible and looser than regulation from the 




of formal authority to monitor local state firms. I measure invisible central oversight 
and its influence through interviews in local state firms in the field. 
2) Rule-making power: One of the major tasks of regulation is setting rules and 
standards.9 While rule-making authority in the form of soft regulation is inclined to 
be shared between central and local authorities, regulatory power in hard regulation 
highly concentrated in central public authorities. Thereby, even though the ultimate 
decision in most cases is made by the central government, the degree of regulation in 
the shared rule-making system is inevitably less tight than in the monopolized 
regulatory power system.    
is 
3) Policy implementation: In China’s regulatory system, although the central 
government dominates the key decision-making authority, policy implementation 
shows some variance. For instance, in the regime of hard regulation, price, market 
entry, industrial policies, and their compliance are tightly supervised by the central 
regulatory power, while there is much more leeway in a soft regulation regime in 
implementing various central policies and regulations, due to strong local 
components.  
 
Explaining Centralized but Varied Forms of Regulation 
 
Drawing on the literature of China and Comparative Politics, I identify two main 
factors that potentially facilitate the convergence of central oversight in the Chinese 
industrial economy: political and economic concerns. Economic concern here means 
multiplier effects on the national economy, the creation of large state-owned 
                                                 




enterprise groups, and the control over market entry marked by each issue area. In 
other words, the Chinese central leadership keeps regulatory control over industries 
whose development has spillover effects on the growth of other related sectors. Not 
only to enhance competitive edge and market efficiency, but also to achieve 
economies of scale, Beijing has encouraged incorporation of existing scattered 
inefficient firms into large-scale corporate groups. Political influence is related to the 
protection of the vested interests of the ruling party-state and the creation of powerful 
comprehensive state authorities at the core. Determining political influence is not 
straightforward. I try to measure it by tracing the views and policies from the central 
leadership, and by interviews with officials, scholars, and entrepreneurs in business.    
The patterns of central regulation are varied not only across industries, but 
also within sectors. I do not entirely refute the influence of sectoral characteristics on 
diversity in regulation. But rather than entirely attributing influence to the factor of 
inherent sectoral differences, I identify three major explanatory variables that give 
rise to diversity in the forms of central regulation in the context of central regulatory 
powers. They include the differences in 1) historical trajectory, 2) governing 
structure, and 3) the role of foreign investors. The variable of governing structure 
consists of local state autonomy (central-local relations), bureaucratic relations within 
the center, and forms of ownership. As such, while central regulatory power 
commonly holds in China’s strategic industries due to similar economic and political 
concerns as pointed out, the differences in developmental history, governing 
structure, and the role of foreign investors in each sector have contributed 




    
Historical trajectory: I employ this variable to estimate whether/how a different 
history of industrial evolution has an effect on the varied forms of regulation. The 
importance of the historical factor was indicated in Alexander Gerschenkron’s classic 
work on the industrialization process.10 Following his thesis but further examining 
the influence of industrial history on the styles of regulation cross-nationally, Stev
Vogel argues that “a nation’s regulatory regime reflects its history of 
industrialization.”
en 
                                                
11 Given that industries within one country also have undergone 
different pathways, this study attempts to show how different development histories 
influence the creation of varied forms of central regulation in China.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The varied forms of regulation are facilitated by different 
historical evolution across issue areas 
 
Governing structure: This variable is intended to delineate various governing 
structures defined by industrial sectors in China, and to assess how they relate to 
forms of regulation. They can be divided into centralized and decentralized systems, 
depending on the degree to which decision-making power has been transferred to 
local governments and local state firms.12 In the sense that “decentralization has 
profound influence on the ways government functions,”13 the type of governing 
 
10 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962) 
11 Vogel (1996: 23) 
12 Decentralization is defined here as “decentralization means that decision-making powers are 
transferred downward from some central point.” Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in 
Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 175. 




structure can be a relevant factor in distinguishing the mechanism of regulation in 
China. I hypothesize that there are three key political and economic institutions that 
organize governing structure and affect the creation of regulatory patterns: local state 
autonomy, inter-governmental relations, and ownership forms. 
 
Central-local state relations (Local state autonomy): As “every province has 
distinctive relationships with the center,” central-local state relations vary across issue 
areas. While much of the previous literature has been occupied with either debating 
the influence of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations14 or characterizing 
the role of the local state in a market-transition economy,15 less effort has been made 
to specify the forms of central regulation in the decentralized issue areas. While fiscal 
decentralization has contributed to increasing the autonomy and incentives of local 
states in managing and planning the local economy, some scholars argue that “higher 
levels strengthened their control over appointment and evaluation.”16 Furthermore, 
since central-local interactions are varied depending on regions as well as issue areas, 
the patterns of central oversight are assumed to be inevitably divergent. Hence, I 
                                                 
14 There is a large body of literature. As the most representative works, see, Christine P. W. Wong, 
“Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-
Mao China,” The China Quarterly, No. 128 (December, 1991): 691-715; “Fiscal Reform and Local 
Industrialization: The Problematic Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China,” Modern China, Vol. 18, 
No. 2. (April, 1992): 197-227; Dali L. Yang, “Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local 
Relations,” in Edited by David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, 
and Regionalism (London; New York: Routledge, 1994); Shaoguang Wang, “The Rise of the Regions: 
Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State Capacity in China,” in Edited by Andrew G. Walder, 
The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Jae Ho Chung, “Beijing Confronting the Provinces: 
the 1994 Tax-sharing Reform and Its Implications for Central-Provincial Relations in China,” China 
Information, Vol. 9, No. 2/3 (Winter 1994-95)   
15 Jean C. Oi, “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy,” China Quarterly No 
144 (December 1995): 1132-1149. 
16 Maria Edin, “Local State Corporatism and Private Business,” Journal of Peasant Study, 30, No. 3-4 




include this variable to capture specific patterns and sources of central regulation in 
China’s strategic industries.   
 
Hypothesis 2-1: Divergent central-local relations across issue areas facilitate the 
creation of varied patterns of central regulation  
 
Inter-governmental authority relations: In China, authority relationships among 
bureaucratic agencies are dynamic across issue areas as well as localities. They can be 
characterized as horizontal versus hierarchical depending on the manner and 
procedures of policy decision-making and implementation. In a hierarchical structure, 
since political power is concentrated on a small number of state bodies, bureaucratic 
infighting resulting from conflicting interests can be more effectively controlled than 
in a horizontal system, where the authority of state agencies is likely to be equivalent 
and shared. For instance, the regulatory powers in China’s telecom business are 
concentrated on the hierarchically structured three central bodies: SASAC, the 
NDRC, and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). Even though the MII is the 
specialized regulator responsible for encouraging market-oriented competition for the 
sector, SASAC and the NDRC may exercise direct control over telecom firms. 
Regardless of oppositions from the MII or the NDRC, SASAC as substantial 
regulator in the telecom service business is capable of structuring the market by 
merging the service carriers into gigantic corporations. This variable is used to assess 
whether/how inter-governmental relations influence the creation of patterns of central 




Hypothesis 2-2: Authority relationships among bureaucratic agencies influence 
the shaping of patterns of central regulatory oversight 
 
Forms of ownership: I hypothesize that the form of ownership is the most influential 
factor, in that it critically affects the degree of central regulation and determines the 
type of state regulation. Ownership forms here are specified as central state-owned, 
local state-owned, private, and foreign-invested. Thereby it gives rise to varied 
patterns of regulation in China’s strategic industries. Enterprise ownership may grant 
or constrain the political and economic authority of a state institution. According to 
Steven Solnick, “Property rights determine more than just the distribution of the 
assets or resources in question. In a fundamental sense, they frame the issues of 
power and control central to any hierarchical relationship.”17 Its significance is 
particularly outstanding in the Chinese industrial economy, where the structure of 
property rights is complex across sectors and regions. 
    
Hypothesis 2-3: The variation in central regulation is facilitated by ownership 
form across as well as within the issue area 
 
Role of the foreign investor  Control over foreign investment has been the Chinese 
central government’s key source of regulation.18 Particularly, the entry of foreign 
                                                 
17 Steven L. Solnick, “The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A 
Neoinstitutional Perspective,” World Politics 48, No. 2 (1996), p. 214. 
18 Barry Naughton, “Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in the 
Reform Process,” In edited by Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics, 
and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p 249; 
Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era (Cambridge: 




investment is one of “the primary means of central government controls.”19 While 
there is an argument that regulation from the center neither captures nor accounts for 
the variation in the effective use of FDI across localities,20 my focus is not the 
regional variation in development outcome using foreign investment, but the variation 
in the forms of central regulatory control that foreign investment can bring about. I 
hypothesize that more foreign investors (i.e., shareholders in foreign-invested state 
firm) are likely to make central control loose due to shared authority. Moreover, the 
involvement of the foreign investor in Chinese industries varies exceedingly across 
the sectors. Hence I use this variable to assess whether/how the involvement of a 
foreign investor makes a difference in the shaping of varied forms of regulation 
marked by issue areas.     
 
Hypothesis 3: The variation in the forms of central regulation is facilitated by 








This dissertation explores the patterns of regulation in China’s strategic industries, 
and analyzes causal conditions that generate diversity in economic regulation. In 
doing so, this study compares two economic sectors in one country. The study of a 
                                                 
19 Eric Thun, Changing Lanes in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Governments, and Auto 
Sector Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 52; 63 




single country is beneficial in that it makes it possible “to hold constant the 
macroeconomic environment and the policy framework set by the central government 
while having variation at the sub-national level.”21 Cross-sectoral comparison is 
useful in illuminating varied forms of state regulation in the market, because “state 
involvement and desired role varies systematically across sectors due to the 
differences in the technological and organizational characteristics.”22 In the field of 
Chinese political economy, a large body of literature has taken either an industry-
specific or an industry-comparison approach to identify a complex institutional 
landscape across various issue areas.23  
With a view to exploring the complex patterns of regulation in China’s 
strategic industries, I choose two strategically significant but widely disparate 
industries: automobile manufacturing (specifically, the passenger car) and 
telecommunication service. According to Arend Lijphart, “cases may be selected for 
analysis because of an interest in the case per se or because of an interest in theory-
building.”24 Drawing on this, I believe that case selection of the automobile 
manufacturing and telecom service industries can contribute to advancing existing 
                                                 
21 Thun (2006: 42) 
22 Evans (1995: 93). In addition, Jones and Mason also have suggested that “sectoral characteristics 
like economies of scale and the relative importance of technology help create “institutional advantage” 
for different kinds of state involvement.” Cited from Evans (1995: 93) 
23 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Thun (2006); Scott Kennedy, The Business of 
Lobbying in China (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2005); Thomas Moore, China in 
the World Market: Chinese Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Segal and Thun (2001); Edward S. Steinfeld, 
Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Enterprises (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Jae Ho Chung, “The Political Economy of Industrial Restructuring in China: The Case of 
Civil Aviation,” The China Journal 50 (July 2003); Margaret M. Pearson, “The Business of Governing 
Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State,” World Politics 57 
(January 2005): 296-322. 
24 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political 




theory of China’s regulatory state by comparing and contrasting these two key 
sectors. The central government has put a great emphasis on the importance of these 
two sectors, arguing that auto manufacturing as a “pillar industry” (zhizhu chanye) 
plays a significant role in facilitating overall economic development due to its 
multiplier effects on other sectors, whereas the telecom service sector is regarded as 
the “commanding heights” (jingji mingmai), which exerts a critical influence on 
people’s lives and on national security. Hence, the cases of the automobile and 
telecommunication service sectors serve to offer an excellent comparison in showing 
how the Chinese state regulates two strategically significant but economically very 
distinct sectors. 
Secondly, I also consider the variation that exists in key explanatory variables 
across as well as within the sector to identify whether/how these variations have an 
impact on the creation of divergent patterns within the central regulatory system. 
Specifically, the auto and telecom service sectors show differences in both foreign 
investments and ownership forms (central/local state-owned or private). While auto 
manufacturing has great activity by foreign investors in the form of joint ventures 
with Chinese state firms (both central and local), there are no foreign invested firms 
or investors yet in the telecom service sector where central state ownership 
dominates.  
Finally, although literature on China’s regulatory state is evolving, most 
studies have been confined to the areas of conventional infrastructure and financial 
service, or the rationalization of administrative organization.25 Given that the forms 
                                                 
25 Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance 




of regulation reflect the relationship between government and industry, we can bette
understand complex patterns of regulation and China’s regulatory mechanism in the 
industrial economy not only by expanding an empirical case into other types of 
strategic industry, but also by relaxing the existing independent regulator model. The 
comparative case studies of the automobile manufacturing and telecom service 
sectors, therefore, can provide a strong example of how China’s two strategic sectors 




Comparative Case Studies 
 
In order to meet these research goals, I use comparative case studies, and specifically, 
in-depth interviews, archival research, and participant observation are employed in 
the research process. The comparative method is appropriate in unraveling “the 
different causal conditions and configurations connected to different outcomes.”26 It 
is also indicated that this explicit emphasis on diversity differentiates the comparative 
method from the broad range of qualitative approaches.27 According to Charles 
Ragin, “Comparative researchers who study diversity tend to look for differences 
among their cases, and examine patterns of similarities and differences across cases 
                                                                                                                                           
“Regulatory Innovation by Leninist Means: Communist Party Supervision in China’s Financial 
Industry,” The China Quarterly 181 (2005): 1-25; Wang (2006); Andrews-Speed et al., “The Ongoing 
Reforms to China’s Government and State Sector: The Case of the Energy Industry,” Journal of 
Contemporary China Vol. 9 No. 23 (2000): 5-20.  
26 Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method (Thousand 





and try to come to terms with their diversity.”28 Hence, not only by exploring 
diversity and the causes creating it, but also by “specifying how diversity is 
patterned,”29 I believe that we can refine and advance the existing theoretical 
framework in studying China’s complex systems of regulation.    
In addition, I also use case studies in conducting the comparative method. In 
effect, as Lijphart has commented, “the discussion of the comparative method is not 
complete without a consideration of the case study method.”30 While a variety of 
views, methodological critiques, and definitions on the case study exist, there is an 
important agreement that the virtue of case studies is to contribute to “theory-
building” by generating propositions.31 Although case studies are inappropriate for 
theory-testing or theory-controlling, they lead comparative researchers to intensively 
examine and deepen the understanding of the cases. Thereby, comparative case 
studies of the automobile and telecom service sectors in China make it possible for us 
to elaborate and refine the existing analytic framework that has heavily relied on the 
independent regulatory model in the study of regulation.  
 
Overview of the Research Process: Data Collection 
 
For my dissertation research, I carried out the field work in mainland China for nine 
consecutive months, from July 2005 to March 2006, and in Hong Kong from April - 
                                                 
28 Ragin (1994: 107) 
29 Ragin (1994: 111) 
30 Lijphart (1971) 
31 Giovanni Sartori, “Compare Why and How: Comparing, Miscomparing and the Comparative 
Method,” In Edited by Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil, Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, 
Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 23; Lijphart (1971), p. 683; Ragin (1994); John Gerring, 
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June 2006. Before the field research, I conducted pilot research in the University 
Service Center (USC) for China Study at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 
January 2005. During that time, I mainly collected statistical data and internal 
government reports (neibu zhiliao), such as Gaige Neichan or Jingji Yanjiu Cankao, 
to trace and understand important points and issues that the Chinese government 
discussed in policy-making and implementation. Access to internal government 
reports is one of the best parts of the USC, because these reports are not accessible in 
China, including in the National Library in Beijing, Beijing University Library, and 
Qinghua University Library. 
 In the field, I planned to focus on the auto industry for the first four months, 
and then move to the telecom service sector. Since most major research institutions 
and telecom firms are located in Beijing, I based myself in Beijing in July 2005. In 
the meantime, I have traveled to several other cities to visit the major auto enterprises. 
As referred to earlier, I used in-depth interviews32 and participatory observation in 
exploring my research questions. Although finding interviewees in China was truly a 
“dark, slow, and painful” process,33 in-depth interviews were crucial for my 
                                                 
32 Questionnaire is attached in the Appendix. 
33 In order to meet more interviewees in the field within the limited time period, I could not rely only 
on someone’s introduction. So, I searched for relevant scholars or officials from Chinese journals and 
newspapers and emailed them. But response was very rare. For the telecom industry, I found many 
relevant scholars to interview in the Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications. First, I 
checked the main research interests of each in the department webpage, then emailed the target 
interviewees, around 10. However, I did not receive a single reply. I was totally frustrated and told a 
German friend working in the Chinese Academy of Social Science. She advised me to write an email 
in “Chinese,” not English. Even though Chinese scholars understand it, they are not willing to reply in 
English! After I emailed in Chinese, most of them replied to me. I fortunately had opportunities to talk 
with them. In addition, whenever I tried to make an appointment, Chinese officials or scholars always 
said “henmang” (very busy), but I could not just wait and wait. As another strategy to meet more 
people, without appointments I went to the Institute of Industrial Economy every Tuesday and 
Thursday when all scholars would be in. While they easily refused to meet when I contacted by 




dissertation in order to understand the aims of government policies, the processes of 
policy-making and implementation, and the dynamic power relations among 
governmental departments as well as between central and local governments, and 
government-state firm relations. I believe that only through a range of in-depth 
interviews, I was able to uncover the centralized regulatory mechanism for the major 
local auto state firms. For the telecom sector, I came to understand which state 
institution holds substantial control over the telecom business.   
In both the auto and telecom service sectors, I conducted in-depth interviews 
with Chinese economic officials and scholars, state firm managers (both Chinese and 
foreigners in foreign-invested firms), economic consultants, and journalists who work 
in the field of the auto and telecom industries. For the auto industry, the most 
important and interesting interviews came from conversations with local 
entrepreneurs. Their responses sharply contrasted with officials and scholars in 
Beijing. Particularly, regarding the role and influence of the central party-state on 
local auto business, while scholars and officials in Beijing emphasized “the theory” 
that the center provides the only macro policy direction, information from managers 
in local state firms who are actually in the business enabled me to better understand 
the mechanism of central regulation in China’s auto industry.     
In the initial stage, I started with one Chinese scholar affiliated with the 
CASS. However, since his institution is not related to my research topic, I had to wait 
until he introduced me to his colleague, who worked in the Institute of Industrial 
Economy. One by one, in a sort of “snow ball effect,” I had more opportunities for 
                                                                                                                                           
minutes” although it usually turned out longer than planned. Getting an interviewee in China without 




interviews. Moreover, since a personal network (guanxi) is particularly significant in 
Chinese society, having someone’s introduction enabled me to meet additional 
people. In order to obtain more interviews, I have always asked interviewees to 
introduce the next person, which was a fairly effective strategy for talking with more 
people.  
While the form of in-depth interviews is open-ended, I tried to keep the 
conversation within the boundaries of my key concern by raising some relevant 
questions. However, some interviewees requested a list of questions ahead of time 
and preferred following the questionnaire exactly. While in-depth interviews are my 
major resource for data collection, I also attended the annual conference and forum in 
the auto sector in Shenyang (November 2005) and Beijing (April 2006). These 
participatory observations were good opportunities to observe how government 
officials and firm managers communicate with each other and whether ideas from 
business are considered in government policy. Even though most firms in the auto 
sector are state-owned, I observed that through these conferences, both government 
and business have the opportunity to explain how certain policies are adopted and to 
hear responses from auto firms. Most importantly, these events provided me with an 
excellent “network” for future interviews, which is the most difficult but critical part 
of field research in China.    
In the auto sector, I focused on three large enterprises: China First Automotive 
Work (FAW) Group Corporation, Shanghai Automobile Industry Corporations 
(SAIC), and Beijing Automobile Industry Corporations (BAIC). Although they are all 




SASAC); SAIC and BAIC are owned by each municipal government. The different 
level of ownership is important in this study, in showing that the forms of central 
oversight within the sector are also varied between central and local state auto 
manufacturers. Thereby, the varied patterns of the regulatory system are found not 
only across industries but also within one sector that has both central and local state 
ownership.  
I was fortunate to be able to obtain interviews with both Chinese and foreign 
managers. Interviews  include: China FAW Group Corporation, FAW-VW, and 
China Auto Industry Research in Changchun; Shanghai Automobile Industry 
Corporation (SAIC) Group, SAIC-GM, SAIC-VW, Chery Enterprise Shanghai 
Office, Geely Auto International Corporation, Shanghai Automotive News, and 
Shanghai Academy of Social Science (SASS), A.T. Kearney (auto consulting firm) in 
Shanghai; Geely Automobile Enterprise Group in Hangzhou and Taizhou; 
Guangzhou-Honda in Guangzhou. In Beijing, Beijing-Hyundai Automobile 
Enterprise, Daimer-Chrysler Auto Enterprise, and China Automobile News are 
included. Valuable information and insights concerning China’s automotive industry 
policies and regulation were also collected from interviews with government officials 
working in the Department of Industry and Economy of the DRC. 
In the telecom sector, because all enterprises and major research institutions 
are located in Beijing, I obtained the most valuable materials during intensive 
interviews from December 2005 to February 2006 in Beijing. Unlike the auto 
industry, since access to Chinese telecom enterprises is extremely strict for a foreign 




in the government research institutions or universities. This includes: the 
Development Research Center of the State Council (specifically, Department of 
Enterprise Research); the Research Center for Regulation and Competition of Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS); Center for Informatization Study of CASS; 
Institute of Industry and Economy of CASS; Institute of Law of CASS; China 
Academy of Telecom Research of MII, and Beijing University of Post and 
Telecommunications (BUPT). In total, I have conducted seventy-two interviews, each 
one and a half to two hours long, with sixty-two individuals across seven cities.  
Prior to interviews with government officials and some renowned scholars, I 
read their articles or other interviews from Chinese economic newspapers and 
journals. At the beginning of the interview, I usually started to ask questions by 
showing my knowledge of the individual’s background. Drawing on these sources, I 
persuaded them to tell me their frank opinions and detailed explanations of some 
ambiguous and complex decision-making process and implementation. In addition, 
concerning how auto industrial policies and regulations are actually practiced at the 
enterprise level, I learned from interviews with entrepreneurs from different firms. In 
doing so, as the interview process continued, accumulated different viewpoints across 
institutions (both academic and business) and localities supplied me with valuable 
comparative points as well as more resources for future interviews. I was able to 
obtain more detail and specific responses. I always compared the accounts of Chinese 
officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars from different institutions and localities on the 






V. Main Findings 
 
Based on a comparative case study of China’s automobile and telecom service 
industries, the major findings in this study are: 
First, China’s key strategic industries are controlled by a centralized 
regulatory mechanism. It has been often assumed that central regulatory oversight for 
the auto industry is rarely addressed and analyzed due to its strongly decentralized 
public ownership and powerful local authority. Yet there is an invisible system of 
central regulation for the business of major local state firms in order to secure the 
vested interests of the party-state. This invisible regulatory body, organized by the 
central party-state, directly monitors not only the management of crucial assets and 
budgets in local auto state firms, but also the implementation of national industrial 
policies and rules at the local level. For clarification, my concern in this study is not 
to evaluate the effect of central oversight, rather to identify the mechanism of 
regulatory control in China’s industrial economy.   
Second, under central oversight, there are varied forms of regulatory control 
over China’s strategic industries. In order to better understand these varied patterns of 
regulation, I propose a model of soft and hard regulation in the context of central state 
oversight. “Soft regulation” is characterized as relatively loose regulatory power from 
the center by an invisible controlling mechanism, while “centralized hard regulation” 
refers to the tight and direct central supervision of assets and personnel management 




cases into strategic but decentralized sectors, but also by relaxing existing analytic 
frames that have centered on the independent regulatory agency, I find a form of soft 
regulation in the auto industry. On the other hand, hard regulation emerges in the 
telecom service sector. Hence, diversity in patterns of regulation reflects the complex 
relationship between government and industry in China. 
Third, the auto and telecom service industries exhibit different patterns of 
central regulation not simply because of inherent sectoral differences, rather because 
of the considerable differences in historical evolution, governing structure, the roles 
of foreign investors, and the level of ownership across as well as within one sector. 
Therefore, emphasis on sectoral differences from the conventional view is insufficient 
to capture and explain the diversity and complexity in China’s emerging regulatory 
regime. Particularly, the level of public ownership, central or local, is crucial in 
determining the pattern of regulation from the center. Local state ownership provides 
local governments with the formal authority to carry out substantial discretion in 
supervising the business of local state firms, which inevitably constrains the authority 
of central oversight. Central state ownership allows the center to exercise tight and 
direct regulatory power. Hence, mixed central and local forms of public ownership in 
the auto industry significantly contribute to formulating diverse patterns of central 
regulation even within the sector.    
Fourth, comprehensive state institutions at the core, such as the NDRC and 
SASAC, are empowering, holding substantial power in regulating the auto and 
telecom service industries. While the 1998 and 2003 government restructuring 




central control from these two comprehensive national commissions is increasingly 
strengthened. The auto and telecom service industries particularly show the case. In 
the telecom service sector, I find that SASAC, not the MII, exercises substantial 
control over the telecom service business by holding the right of personnel and 
supervising the management of assets and budgets. Moreover, although the reform in 
the telecom sector encourages market competition, price and market entry are very 
strictly supervised by SASAC under the direct control of the State Council. On the 
other hand, the NDRC plays a major role in regulating automobile manufacturing, 
and SASAC is less powerful in the auto than in the telecom service industry because 
of strong local components. Despite decentralization policies, the central NDRC 
retains the authority to structure the market by controlling market entry, both 
domestic and foreign firms, and the approval of key projects, such as the 
establishment of new assembly firms or joint ventures with foreign firms.       
Finally, one of the key factors that make the practices of China’s regulatory 
governance distinct is the continued significant role of the Party in both government 
and business. This shows that even though the Chinese state has been actively 
pushing forward market-oriented reforms, it does not necessarily lead to the diluted 
influence of the Party in economic governance. In both the auto and telecom state 
firms, the party committee (dangwei) is deeply penetrated into the boards of directors 
and exerts a critical influence on making key managerial decisions. These include the 
personnel of top executives and monitoring the business management of the firms. 
Top executives and senior managers are dominated by members of the party 




Department of Organization of the Central Party Committee. Both senior officials of 
regulatory bodies and executives of major state-owned firms are first recommended 
by the Organization Department of the Party, for they know exactly who is the most 
appropriate to protect crucial state assets.  
 
Drawing on these findings, I propose the following three arguments: First, as the 
model of soft and hard regulation suggests, we need to consider a range of industrial 
sectors and relax the existing analytic framework that heavily focuses on the 
independence of the regulator in order to enhance our understanding of the regulatory 
regime in China’s industrial economy. It would be flawed to conclude that the nature 
of the Chinese state is transformed into a minimalist regulatory state, by overlooking 
the political control of the party as well as only relying on the conventional analytic 
frame and empirical sectors for the study of regulatory reform.  
 Second, my findings of the centralized regulatory oversight in the auto 
industry explicitly demonstrate the ways in which the Chinese central government 
regulates strategic but decentralized industry. It is often invisible and loose compared 
with centralized strategic sectors. Therefore, this would contribute to further 
specifying the forms of central control over cases that have a long history of 
decentralization policies. 
Last but not least, while existing literature has tended to emphasize highly 
fragmented authority and bureaucratic struggles as the main political logic, this 




political power in order to secure crucial state assets, which directly relate to vested 
interests of the Party-state. 
 
VI. Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is composed of six chapters. Chapter 2 attempts to view China’s 
practice of industrial regulation in a theoretical framework. I introduce three major 
approaches and carefully review their relevance. I, then propose a model of soft/hard 
regulation to help better understand the mechanism of regulation in the Chinese 
industrial economy. Before discussing the issue of regulation in the context of the 
Chinese political economy, I first introduce the concepts of globalization, 
governance, regulation, and the regulatory state in order to locate this study in a broad 
context. The chapter also presents the definition of regulation and the regulatory state 
for this study.   
Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the forms of regulation in the automobile 
manufacturing and telecommunications service sectors. The first part of chapter 3 
provides a brief historical overview of the developmental process of the automotive 
industry, and introduces administration and ownership structure. It then goes on to 
discuss my findings in three major auto state firms designed to show how level of 
ownership and the continued influence of the party influences the creation of varied 
patterns of regulation within the sector. Once again, I selected one centrally-owned, 




the Shanghai Automobile Industry Corporations (SAIC) Group, and the Beijing 
Automobile Industry Corporations (BAIC) Group.34  
In Chapter 4, I first introduce the old regulatory regime in the telecom service 
sector prior to reform, and then explain internal and external challenges that led the 
Chinese state to push forward the successive reforms in the telecom markets. The 
chapter proceeds to discuss the new regulatory architecture of the sector and proposes 
centralized hard regulation as the specific form of the regulatory state. I demonstrate 
how the central regulatory powers in practice tightly control the sector through two 
policies: price and market entry. Unlike the auto industry with a large number of 
firms, there are only four major telecom service carriers, all centrally-owned. Hence, I 
take all four major firms into account in general rather than focusing on specific 
enterprises.      
In Chapter 5, I attempt to systematically compare the regulatory governance 
of the two cases. After introducing some factors of strategic importance that bring 
about the central regulation in China’s automobile and telecom service industries, I 
explain the underlying political logic that has led the Chinese top leadership to 
centralize regulatory power. The chapter proceeds to analyze what gives rise to the 
varied patterns of regulation, and how these forms are different across as well as 
within the sectors. 
                                                 
34 Over the last decade, the market share of the FAW and SAIC Group together has been over 50 
percent. Also, while the FAW is owned by the central government, the SAIC and BAIC are each 
owned by Shanghai and Beijing municipal governments. This would offer a good comparison for inter-
governments and government and business nexus within the sector. Although the system of holding 
corporations (konggu gongsi) has been rapidly restructuring ownership in the auto enterprise group, 
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 In the Conclusion chapter, I summarize the characteristics of the regulatory 
system in China’s industrial economy and highlight the importance of variations in 
the forms of central regulation, resulting from the differences in the level of 
ownership (central vs. local), the structure of government authority, and the role of 
foreign investments. I also suggest that we need to disaggregate the concept of the 
regulatory state, which has been treated as unitary in order to better capture the 
















The regulatory state is rising as a new benchmark of governance in an era of 
globalization. Some even argue that “we are said to live in the age of the regulatory 
state.”1 While the meaning of the regulatory state varies depending on the focus of 
the subject, regions, and discipline,2 it is generally agreed that the regulatory state 
seeks to underpin the market by means of the authority of rules. The state does not t
to replace the market. However, as Jude Howell has commented with regard t
governance in China, “At the heart of governance processes is the fundamental 
question of ‘who has the right to govern?’; ‘who has power and who has authority,’ 
and how are the two related.”
ry 
o 
                                                
3 This is particularly important in the context of China 
where the relations between the right to govern and the ownership of power are often 
inconsistent and highly complex. 
In order to situate the case of China in a broader context, in this chapter, I 
offer a brief introduction to the study of globalization and its effect on creating the 
regulatory state. Much of the literature states that the rise of the regulatory state is a 
 
1 Christopher Hood et al., Regulation inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-
Busters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3; Majone (1994; 1996); Francis McGowan and 
Helen Wallace, “Toward a European Regulatory State,” Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 3, No. 
4 (1996): 560-576. 
2 Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) 




global phenomenon. Scholars highlight the role of international institutions and 
policy diffusion, because “globalization impacts on institutional landscape of the state 
towards a regulatory reform as well as on policy choices.”4 There are also debates: 
while some argue for convergence of the regulatory state, assuming that variations 
across sectors and nations are temporary;5 others put more emphasis on divergent 
practices of regulation across sectors as well as countries. In the second part of the 
chapter, I closely review a variety of notions of regulation and the regulatory state in 
a global context. In order to distinguish China’s regulatory governance from the 
conventional model of independent regulator,6 I then introduce the work of scholars 
of regulatory state in the field of Comparative Politics. These studies emphasize 
national variations in regulatory practices as a result of different state institutions, 
ideas, and historical pathways of industrialization.  
In the third part, I discuss state regulation in the Chinese political economy. 
After briefly introducing the government reforms in 1998 and 2003, I present three 
concurrent and contending views on the nature of the Chinese state-business 
relations.7 They include: Dali Yang’s minimalist regulatory state, Minxin Pei’s 
decentralized predatory state, and Margaret Pearson’s constrained regulatory state. I 
challenge the first two models’ assumptions on the effects of institutional reforms and 
their “passive” treatment of the Party. Drawing on both Pearson’s work on centralized 
                                                 
4 Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: the Regulatory State 
and the Politics of Negative Co-ordination,” Journal of European Politics, 8 (1), (February 2001), p. 
103. 
5 Jayasuriya (2001); Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 9) 
6 This model is highly based on the experiences and domestic conditions of advanced industrialized 
countries. It is a kind of global standards recommended by the major international institutions and 
regime such as OECD, the World Bank, and the WTO. 
7 While there are other leading literature regarding China’s regulatory state (i.e., Shaoguang Wang), I 




strategic industries and findings from my field work, I propose a soft/hard regulation 
model to capture and better understand the varied patterns of the regulatory state in 
the Chinese industrial economy. The soft/hard regulation model emphasizes that, in 
China, the forms of regulation under the central oversight are divergent not only 
across industries but also within the sector. For the strategically important but locally-
owned state firms, central regulation is invisible and loose, which I call soft 
regulation. This soft/invisible regulation reflects that decentralized state sectors and 
firms are not necessarily parallel to the lack of central control. The central party-state 
extends an invisible but strong hand to monitor the business of core local firms. Hard 
regulation suggests that regulatory control over central state firms is very tight 
through formally designated regulator and central state institutions. Moreover, when 
the sector is dominated by both central and local state firms, mixed forms of 
regulation, soft and hard, arise.  
 
II. Globalization and Governance 
 
While there is no one agreed-upon definition, globalization is in general conceived as 
the increasing trans-border flows of goods, service, information, culture, and people. 
It denotes the expanding scale, growing intensity, speeding up and deepening impact 
of such trans-border flows on inter-societal interaction from the global level.8 In 
particular, economic globalization highlights “enhanced trade and financial 
                                                 
8 David Held et al., Global Transformation: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Stanford: Stanford 




integration”9 facilitated by reduced transaction costs and policy barriers as well as 
technological progress and innovation.10 While globalization has its roots in 
economic exchange,11 it implies much more than a trade-GDP ratio. It also represents 
the increasing exposure of local identities and interests to international and 
transnational forces. Globalization, therefore, is a process rather than an end-goal. 
To date, much scholarly debate has been centered on the effects of 
globalization on the state capacity and sovereignty.12 Some argue that the role of the 
state has been significantly challenged and leaked away by the increasing power of 
private authority and a range of non-state actors across borders.13 Others note the 
continuing salience of states in both political and economic life in globalization.14 
Making an example of Singapore, Peter Evans argues that “successful participation in 
global markets may be best achieved through more intense state involvement.”15 
Contrary to the globalist premise, Evans finds the positive correlation between trade 
                                                 
9 Dani Rodrik, “Governance of Economic Globalization,” In edited by Joseph S. Nye and John D. 
Donahue. Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 348. 
10 Jeffrey Frankel, “Globalization of the Economy,” In edited by Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue. 
Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 45.   
11 Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of 
Nineteenth- Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999) 
12 Sovereignty is broadly defined as “state judicial control over its territory and citizens.” Stephen 
Krasner provides four dimensions of sovereignty: international, domestic, the Westphalia, and 
interdependence. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
13 Susan Strange, "The Defective State," Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995), p.56; Cable Vincent, "The 
Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995), p. 
27; A Clare Culter, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1999); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activist 
Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1998) 
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Globalization and Governance,” PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 32, No. 
4 (December 1999); Robert Wade, “Globalization and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National 
Economy are Greatly Exaggerated,” In edited by Suzanne Berger and Ronald P. Dore, National 
Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.60-88; David M. 
Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political 
Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978); Dani Rodrik, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger 
Governments" (NBER Working Paper no. 5537, April 1996) 
15 Peter Evans, “Eclipse of the State?: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization” World 
Politics, 




openness and increasing role for the state.16 More integration into a global market 
does not necessarily lead to “diminished” or “eclipse” of the state. Rather, strong but 
more sophisticated and competent state authority is required. The real issue is not the 
decline of the role of state, but the institutional shifting of the state and forms of 
public authority corresponding to governing a global political economy. This relates 
to the following issue of governance. 
 
 
The Effect of Globalization on Governance 
 
    
How does globalization affect governance? In this study, governance is defined as 
“the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, which guide and restrain 
the collective activities of a group.”17 The form of governance varies depending on 
the ways in which the state transforms and adapts to the society. The concept of 
governance is becoming popular because it “covers the whole range of institutions 
and relationships involved in the process of governing.”18 Keohane and Nye state that 
“globalization is strongly affecting domestic governance, but it is far from making the 
nation-state obsolete as some predict.”19 The important issue here is the ways in 
which globalization has transformed the institutional landscape of the state. While the 
                                                 
16 Evans (1997: 67) 
17 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Introduction,” In Edited by Joseph S. Nye Jr. and John D. 
Donahue, Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 
p. 12. There are various ways to define governance depending on the subject of the study. Pierre and 
Peters comment that “it has become an umbrella concept for such a wide variety of phenomena as 
policy networks, public management, coordination of sectors of the economy, public-private 
partnerships, corporate governance, and ‘good governance’ as a reform objectives promoted by the 
World Bank and the IMF. Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics, and the State (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 14. 
18 Pierre and Peters (2000: 1) 




state has adjusted to changes in and demands of the global structure, it maintains 
control  by  developing institutional mechanisms for regulation.  
More importantly, globalization has been regarded as the major driving force 
of such policy diffusion as regulatory reform programs that emphasize the 
streamlining government structure and the promotion of transparency and 
competition in the market.20 In effect, a global trend towards the regulatory state as 
the best practice of governance is not irrelevant to bring about institutional shift in the 
forms of public authority.21 Much of the globalization literature assumes a 
convergence of regulatory policy encouraged by the WTO regime and international 
institutions, such as the World Bank or the OECD. The role of these international 
institutions is significant in that they advise policy recommendations that emphasize 
competition, transparency, and accountability for “good governance.” Furthermore, 
the convergence school holds that the divergent patterns of regulation may continue 
due to varying historical legacies and state intervention in the market. Nonetheless, 
these will eventually fade away over time.  
According to convergence thesis, domestic policies ultimately tend to become 
alike due to the growing similarity in structures, processes, and performances. It 
claims that the increasing economic interactions across countries have led to 
                                                 
20 World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 
21 Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms 
for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004); David Levi-Faur, “The Global 
Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism,” The Annals of the American Academy, 598 (March 2005): 12-32; 
Fabrizio Gilardi, “Spurious and Symbolic Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western 
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competition among various models of economic governance.22 The most desirable set 
of institutions arising as a result of international competition diffuse and become 
implemented as a form of good governance.23 As Elaine Kamarck points out 
international economic competition has been one of major driving forces in public 
administration reform movements over the last two decades.24 It has aimed at not 
only enhancing efficiency in administration, but also organizing business-friendly 
market environment in order to attract more foreign investment.25 
                                                
On the other hand, while convergence helps explain the global diffusion of 
regulatory policy, some pay more attention to the diversity, noting that different 
institutional arrangements formulated by domestic political and economic structures 
have shaped divergent national trajectories.26 Pierre and Peters have commented that 
“It is virtually impossible to make any clear generalization about governance to date. 
It must be contextualized.”27 National diversities have been more accelerated because 
countries have different views on the desirable role of government in markets. These 
 
22 Suzanne Berger and Ronald P. Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), pp. 4-5. In the Introduction Chapter, although both Berger and Dore have a 
belief in the national diversity in an age of globalization, they point out three major factors to lead to 
convergence: the triumph of market forces, the result of diffusion of best practice and competition 
among institutional forms, and the internationally negotiated or coerced choice of set of rules and 
institutions.   
23 Depending on the domestic political, economic, and cultural contexts, although there is a great 
variance in policy implementation, Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins evidence the empirically strong 
relationship between competition for capitals and the global diffusion of liberal economic policy. This 
finding is based on 182 IMF – member states from 1967 to 1996. Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins, 
“The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 171 – 189.    
24 Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, “Globalization and Public Administration Reform,” In Edited by Joseph S. 
Nye Jr. and John D. Donahue, Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000), p. 232. 
25 Kamarck (2001: 232) indicated four major driving forces in these global waves of public 
administration reform: global economic competition, democratization, the information revolution, and 
the performance deficit        
26 Robert Boyer, “The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of 
Nations,” In Edited by Suzanne Berger and Ronald P. Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 56-59. 




variations in state involvement have created different practices in regulation.28 It also 
echoes Keohane and Milner’s finding that “internationalization is having profound 
effects on domestic politics, but these effects vary cross-nationally due to different 
institutional as well as political-economic conditions.”29 As such, I suggest that this 
divergent convergence approach is particularly useful in illuminating how China’s 
lingering legacies of Communist institutions, such as state ownership and the Party, 
has contributed to create distinct practices of regulatory state, making complex forms 
of regulation.30 In order to help distinguish the pattern of regulation in China, I first 





III. Regulatory State in Diversity 
 
Defining the Regulatory State 
Regulation has a wide range of connotations: from the narrowest a set of authoritative 
rules accompanied by public agency for monitoring compliance31 to an all inclusive 
concept of governance.32 In the middle of them, regulation can be delineated as “the 
aggregate efforts by state agencies to steer the economy including rule-making or 
                                                 
28 Vogel (1996); Mark Thatcher, “Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in 
Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 9, no. 6 (2002), pp. 954-972. 
29 Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, “Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An 
Introduction,” In edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, Internationalization and 
Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7. 
30 Lance L. P. Gore, Market Communism: The Institutional Foundation of China’s Post-Mao Hyper-
Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
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ownership,”33 not just to correct market failure as the economic theory of regulation 
contends. While the economic theory of regulation argues that regulation occurs in 
order to correct the market failure by monopolized business, its ultimate purpose is 
political so as to promote “the interests of more influential pressure groups as a 
political instrument of redistribution and rent-seeking.”34 In addition, an institutional 
approach to regulation pays particular attention to political control over regulators. 
Terry Moe has pointed out that “oversight power by appointment or strict procedural 
requirements” have been used as the means of political control over regulatory 
agency.35 As such, the problem of political control has been already indicated in 
existing studies.  
What, then, is the regulatory state?  It is an entity which highlights the 
necessity of the state in making markets work better.36 The state still plays a role in 
the market, but its aim of intervention, providing institutional foundations, and the 
power of rule-making is different from the positive state that relies more on the 
authority to tax and spending than market principles.37 This makes it for the form of 
regulation to be associated with “particular patterns of government conduct that may 
be embedded in the nature of state-society relations.”38 However, the terms of the 
regulatory state are defined in different ways across countries. For example, while the 
U.S. emphasizes the “reinvented” role of the state to encourage private economic 
                                                 
33 Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 3) 
34 Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 98(1983): 371-400. 
35 Terry Moe, “Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB,” Studies in 
American Political Development 2 (1987) 
36 Francis McGowan and Helen Wallace, “Towards a European Regulatory State,” Journal of 
European Public Policy, 4 (1996): 560-576 
37 Giandomenico Majone, “From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of 
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activity that protects social and economic objectives, the regulatory state in Britain is 
the “withdrawal” of the state from the key public sectors and underscores the 
importance of privatization and competition in the market.39   
Likewise, although some argue that its characteristics vary at the national 
level,40 the regulatory state tends to emphasize ‘process’ rather than outcome as the 
desirable economic governance. Therefore, competition, transparency, and 
legalization  are encouraged to help underpin the market. The regulator is 
independent from the central government and intervenes in the market by the use of 
“authority, rules, and standard-setting.”41 
 
 
National Diversity in Regulation 
 
In  advanced and developing countries, the state remains central to re-regulate 
business by making more rules and establishing institutional agency.42 As a result, the 
regulatory state is evolving as a new mode of governance, but its patterns of 
regulation widely vary across countries as well as industries. While early studies 
focused on interest groups,43 much research of late takes state institutions and ideas 
as key variables, persuasively showing  how domestic political-economic institutions 
                                                 
39 Colin Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of Post-Regulatory State,” In Edited 
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40 M. Markus Muller, The New Regulatory State in Germany (Birmingham: Birmingham University 
Press, 2002); Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper Innovation 
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and policies under the similar global pressures create national diversity in regulatory 
innovations and practices.44 Furthermore, this dissertation posits that more variations 
are likely to appear in China’s industrial economy where the Communist Party and 
public ownership remain dominant political-economic institutions. In the following 
section, I introduce some major works on regulatory state in the field of Comparative 
Politics and present contending models of regulation.  
Contrasting the historical trajectories of industrialization in Britain and Japan, 
Steven Vogel claims that the policy-making elite’s ideas on the role of government 
and state institutions generate considerable variations in reform across countries as 
well as industries.45 Although Vogel does not refute the influence of global wave of 
deregulation and liberalization, he contends that the major driving force for regulatory 
reform lies in domestic politics, not international competition and pressures. 
Moreover, it is the government, not interest groups, which government initiates and 
controls the process even in the most industrialized countries. The state-led and 
designed reforms have given rise to diverse forms of regulatory state cross-nationally 
and sectorally. Most importantly, Vogel argues that regulatory reform towards freer 
markets and less government through deregulation paradoxically has contributed to 
strengthening the state’s regulatory control over industrial activities. Hence re-
regulation by governments in markets comes on the stage.  
Another strand of extensive study on regulatory state is emerging in the 
Western Europe. Regulation in Europe has been traditionally through public 
ownership, assuming that public ownership would help government effectively 
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regulate the economy for the public interests. Rather than making independent 
regulatory bodies, European countries preferred to assign “important regulatory 
responsibilities to central government department.”46 Changes in the mode of 
governance from interventionist to regulatory state slowly began to appear since the 
late 1970s. Economic globalization and regulatory reforms greatly accelerated in the 
1980s.47 Giandomenico Majone indicates that “statutory regulation by independent 
agencies is rapidly becoming the most important mode of regulation, indeed the 
leading edge of public policy-making in Europe.”48 However, there are some 
difficulties in generalizing a pattern of regulation in Europe, for there are extensive 
differences in historical legacy of industrialization, the goals and methods of 
government regulation in the market, and the relative importance of industrial policy 
among Britain, France, and Germany. Through regulatory reform, while Britain 
shows many similarities with “the American-style regulatory state,” such as 
substantial separation of government from business activities, France and Germany 
appear similar to Japan with respect to the state-led reform and industrial policies.  
Pointing out that the regulatory state is heavily premised upon state capacity, 
Colin Scott argues that the idea of regulation by state institution is incomplete. Scott 
introduces the notion of the “post-regulatory state,” opens up the floor for a variety of 
governing mechanisms, norms, and control processes.49 While the regulatory state 
emphasizes state law and hierarchical control by state institutions including 
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government departments, courts, and independent regulator, the post-regulatory state 
gives much credit to non-state regulation (i.e., business associations or NGO) by non-
state law. While enterprises and NGOs have been treated as the key regulators in the 
regulatory state regime, the post-regulatory state argues that “business and NGOs 
have the capacity to monitor the activities of both government and businesses for 
compliance with norms of their or others’ making.”50  
In sum, the existing literature has contributed to demonstrate how state 
institutions and ideas under the similar external circumstances and pressures construct 
a variety of forms of regulatory states.. Yet these previous efforts  have been confined 
to “traditional sectors” (i.e., public utilities or finance) using “conventional analytic 
framework” that centers on the function of independent regulatory agency and norms 
of liberalization and privatization. In this study, I suggest that when we relax both “a 
range of traditional industry” and “the analytic framework” in the existing regulatory 
state literature, we can find the varied patterns of economic regulation within one 
country or industry. The goals of economic regulation also vary, from correcting 
market failure and promoting efficiency to steering the national economy. In the 
context of China, given that the ownership of assets is retained by the party-state, the 
underlying political logic is to secure their vested interests rather than to protect the 
public interests. For the purpose of this, regulation is defined as “the mechanisms of 
control characterized as rule-based behavior using of institutions for scrutiny and 
enforcement in order to promote specific public objectives.”51 This would help 
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demonstrate how states exercise regulatory control over strategic key industries as 




IV. Regulation in Chinese Political Economy 
 
Before examining the on-going scholarly debates as to the nature of Chinese state in 
governing industrial economy, I introduce the pre-reform regime and the 1998 and 
2003 government reforms so as to present the backgrounds of institutional change. 
These two administration reforms are important, in that, first, they offered an 
opportunity to modify the function of Chinese government from direct intervention 
and planner to indirect regulator. The regulatory state, as we referred to earlier, is 
assumed to mainly charge of coordinating the macro-economic steering. Second, 
these path-breaking government reforms flesh out the central leadership’s intention to 
create a cohesive regulatory power at the core.  
  




The State Council, serving the cabinet in the Chinese political system, was the core 
organizational body that managed the economy. As the top executive arm of the 
Chinese government, it was directed by the prime minister and vice premiers, and a 
number of commissions (weiyuanhui), ministries (bu), administrative agencies 




Council.52 Most commission and ministries organized “own nationwide vertical 
bureaucratic hierarchies, with offices at each subordinate territorial level of 
administration.”53 At the centre, two key state bodies, the State Planning Commission 
(SPC) and the State Economic Commission (SEC), demonstrated  the bureaucratic 
characteristics of the legacies of the planned economy, even though the reform 
toward a market economy was in motion.  
Before the 1998 administrative reform, the SPC, as a planner of the national 
economy, was primarily responsible for managing the macro-economy, setting the 
Five Year Plan, supplying materials, and determining the distribution of resources 
such as investment projects and funds.54 The SPC held the authority to guide and 
coordinate the performance of ministries and other state bodies. At the same time, 
other agencies had to be consulted on a range of issues. The SPC was not, therefore,  
independent from other commissions and ministries. This made it difficult for the 
SPC to engage in decisive and coherent policy making  and implementation.55 While 
the SPC was in charge of making the plans, the SEC mainly played a role of 
“organizing the implementation of the production plans made by the SPC” and 
monitoring the proper implementation of the state plan in industrial production.56 
Above all, state industries were directly managed by a bulk of industrial ministries 
that supplied materials and made production plans.       
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As the market economy matured, the Chinese top leadership recognized the 
need for the change in both the functioning of the government and government-
enterprise relations. During the Deng era, a series of institutional reforms in 
administration that aimed to downsize administrative unit and personnel were carried 
out in 1982, 1988, and 1993.57 Through these reforms, while the number of 
administrative agencies decreased from 86 to 59 to 31, the number of civil servants 
on “the government payroll as a whole increased from 34.65 million in 1992 to 36.73 
million in 1996.”58 Normatively, the notion of “separation of government and 
enterprise (zhengqi fenkai) was the guiding principle of the reforms since 1988 
reform.”59 These early efforts were not successful because state firms depended 
heavily on administrative support and protection.60 Resisting change, bureaucrats 
were “too busy helping their enterprises” that provided the major source of 
revenues.61 As the problems of asset loss, debts, and management inefficiency of the 
major large state firms became serious in the mid 1990s, the former premier Zhu 
Rongji decided to substantially reform the administrative structure of state-owned 
enterprises.      
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Figure 2-1: Territorial and Organizational Structure of State Administration 
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Sources: Lieberthal (2002: 173; 178) 
  
 
The 1998 Administration Reform 
 
While the Chinese central leadership has continuously sought to streamline 
administrative structure and separate government from enterprise since the 1988 
reform, substantial progress was not achieved by 1998. The government restructuring 
program was firmly pushed by pragmatic reformer Zhu Rongji, who assumed office 
as the premier on March 1998. The reform gave rise to a path-breaking result in 
administrative structure. The number of ministries was reduced from 40 to 29, and the 
size of government employee at the central government was slimmed down by 
47.5%, meaning that nearly 16,000 staffs were dismissed out of the total 33,000.62 
Downsizing the personnel was seen to be critical, since government funded salaries of 
administrative staff government was 33 million in 1998.63 At the local level, of the 
1999 reform plan to cut the size of government was also implemented. One provincial 
estimate says that “if the provincial government staff size was cut by half of 20,000, 
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the savings would amount to 3 billion yuan per year.”64 There was reported resistance 
from local officials, particularly counties and township where job opportunities were 
relative few.65 Yet, given the high cost of staffing of sub-national governments, 
structural streamlining was inevitable.66     
Through the 1998 reform, 15 ministries and commissions were eliminated, 
and four state agencies were established.67 Streamlining the bureaucracy was 
particularly remarkable for abolishing or downgrading number of industrial ministries 
that directly managed state industries during the planned economy. The Ministries of 
Coal Industry, Metallurgocal Industry, Machine-building, and Textile were 
downgraded to state administration (guojia ju) under the leadership of the State 
Economic and Trade Commission.68 Central oversight over state sectors was 
maintained, although the principle of “zhengqi fenkai” was concurrently emphasized 
to promote the development of a market economy. Before the 2003 reform, SETC as 
a powerful macroeconomic steering body took charge of 1) industrial policy 
formulation and implementation; 2) oversight the overall management of state firms 
including the design of SOE reform; 3) guiding technical innovation and 
introduction.69 After 2003, SETC’s responsibility for the making, enforcing, and 
regulating of industrial policy was taken over by the NDRC (renamed from SDPC in 
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2003); managerial control and oversight over state enterprises were transferred to 
SASAC.  
One major exception to this was the creation of the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII) in 1998. While I discuss the rise of MII in detail in Chapter 4, it is 
important to note at this stage that this Ministry was established not to intervene in 
the daily business of telecom carriers, as had been the norm in the past, but to 
enhance and monitor competition in the market. Although the MII represented 
industrial bureaucracy, the function of the government was shifting from daily 
management of enterprises to macroeconomic regulator. This was one of the 
important goals of the 1998 state restructuring. The transformation of the former 
planning body SPC into the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) 
also exhibits the changing nature of the government. The SDPC was no longer 
directly involved in the business management of state enterprises. Instead, it became 
responsible for providing the macroeconomic development strategies and direction. 
By eliminating the bureaucratic control, the central leadership tried to accomplish 
substantial progress in separating government from business. Yet in practice, key 
investment decision or personnel of state firms are still determined by the state 
institutions.    
 
The 2003 Government Reform 
 
The focus of the 2003 reform, which was the second batch of the 1998 reform, is to 




interests,”70 whereas the 1998 reform has put a great emphasis on streamlining the 
bureaucracy by cutting the number of ministries and personnel. The most prominent 
part of the 2003 reform was the creation of SASAC and functional division of SETC 
into SASAC and SDPC.71 In doing so, the Central Enterprise Work Committee that 
had supervised the central large state firms was reorganized into the SASAC in 
2003.72 While SASAC is neither a ministry nor a commission “whose ministers must 
receive NPC approval,”73 under the direct leadership of the State Council 
(guowuyuan zhishu jigou) SASAC exercises the powerful control over the most 
profitable central state firms. In effect, separating the regulatory control of SETC in
2003 contributed to consolidating the functions of the SASAC and the SDPC by 
transferring its bureau on state firms to the SASAC and on industrial policy and 
macroeconomic planning to the SDPC, which was renamed as the NDRC in 2004.
 
croeconomic 
omprehensive state institutions.   
74 
As a result, the previously fragmented authority over state firms and ma
control came to be integrated into c
 
 
The Changing Nature of Economic Governance 
 
China’s regulatory state is growing in the field of both economic and social 
regulation, but there is no consensus as to the changing nature of Chinese state 
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emanating from the governance reform.75 At one end, giving much credit to the 
effects of administrative reforms since the late 1990s, some argue that the function 
and structure of Chinese government tend to be rationalized and have made a genuine 
progress toward the market-oriented economy.76 Others argue that that the Chinese 
state has degenerated from the East Asian developmental model into a decentralized 
predatory state.77 Situating this study between them, those sharply contrasting 
perspectives help me better understand and identify the nature of Chinese state, 
particularly the patterns of economic governance, and why and how complex forms of 
state regulation emerge in the Chinese industrial economy.  
 
The View from Mainland China  
 
The subject of “regulation” (jianguan) is also central among influential scholars 
working on China’s regulatory reform in mainland China. Zhang Xinzhu, director of 
the Research Center for Regulation and Competition in CASS, comments that reform 
of the regulatory system is very difficult, because it demands the redistribution of 
public authority and social resources.78 While scholars in universities and government 
think-tanks agree with the newly emerging regulatory governance in China’s 
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industrial economy, their assessments of de facto regulation tend to be largely divided 
into two groups. One is those who put a great emphasis on the effect of “institutional” 
reforms in the regulatory system that have created a specialized public agency for 
regulation.79 Scholars in this strand argue that the functions of regulator and operator 
are clearly separated according to the principles of “zhengqi fenkai.”80 In the case of 
the telecom service business, for instance, Zhang Xinzhu firmly argues that the 
official regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), is entirely separated 
from the management of telecom firms, while it is not independent from government 
because the MII is part of government.81 In addition, Gao Shiji, another scholar 
specializing in regulation of infrastructure industries, argues that even though 
regulatory reforms in China have contributed to accelerating the transition of the 
socialist market economy, institutional environments for the market mechanism still 
remain insufficient.82 Gao Shiji particularly highlights the need for improvement of 
the legal system and administrative efficiency in order to meet the demands from the 
development of a market economy.83 Moreover, as China is rapidly transformed into 
a modern industrial society, Gao Shiji argues that state regulation is indispensable 
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because market failure is more likely to occur. Establishing a specialized regulatory 
institution is strongly required to help build up the market-oriented economy system. 
This creation of a modern regulatory system is more desirable when it is legally-
based, which would be the starting point toward the establishment of a constitutional 
government. 
 On the other hand, scholars in the other group, although they commonly 
acknowledge the rise of the regulatory state as a new mode of economic governance 
in China, pay more attention to the “obstacles” to the practice of regulation, such as 
the powerful influence of the party and a continuing sticky government-enterprise 
nexus, which lead to constrain the independence of the regulator.84 Zhou Qiren, 
specializing in infrastructure regulation at Beijing University, argues that regulatory 
agencies in China have never been independent from the party-state.85 For instance, 
since both senior officials in the telecom regulator MII and top executives of the 
service carriers are appointed by the party, they cannot be free from the party given 
their tenure. As such, despite the efforts of the government to build up the regulatory 
system, such as abolishing numerous administrative approval procedures and 
establishing regulatory agencies, Yu Hui in CASS addresses that the Chinese 
government does not have the capacity to conduct de facto regulatory reform, due to 
few experts and specialized regulatory agencies, the lack of public law, and weak 
transparency and accountability in public policy.86 Furthermore, in contrast with 
Zhang Xinzhu’s argument, the government is not separated from enterprises, which 
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seriously affects the independence of the regulator.87 In order to enhance the 
independent function of a regulator, Yu Hui puts emphasis on the need for substantial 
separation of government and enterprises and establishes a public hearing for public 
policy decisions (i.e., price).88 For effective state regulation, improvement in the 
legislative system and in administrative lawsuits is particularly underscored. 89 
 
.     
The Recentralized Regulatory State 
 
The model of regulatory state tends to emerge as a brand-new benchmark in 
explaining China’s changing nature of governance since the 1998 state reform. The 
regulatory state model argues that China’s rationalized government structure and 
changed function of state agencies contribute to enhancing the efficiency and 
transparency of the government. It also divests the sticky bonds between state and 
enterprises. At the head of the regulatory state model, Dali Yang states that the central 
leadership’s firm efforts to reform the government by streamlining and downsizing 
bureaucracy would lead to a reshaping of the state-business nexus. This, in turn, will 
level the economic playing field.90 Yang claims that “China has made real progress 
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toward making the Chinese state into a regulatory state suited to a functioning market 
economy.”91  
He views that the central government, by virtue of recentralized power, closed a 
number of industrial ministries and economic bureau through the reforms of 1998 and 
2003. Regulatory bodies, responsible for encouraging and monitoring fair 
competition in the market, were established. Yang believes that the creation of 
regulatory agencies indicates an important step towards strengthening the regulatory 
state. He predicts that China finally leads to “a modern limited government.”92 In 
particular, public hearings over utility prices, competitive bidding for public projects, 
and the auction of land or mineral resources gives rise to a buyer’s market as a new 
mechanism for market governance in China. According to Yang, these changes have 
made a great contribution toward transforming the relations between government and 
business as well as making the business environment transparent.93 As such, the 
growing market competition has weakened existing sticky bonds between state 
institutions and firms, and will eventually separate state institutions from business.94 
For effective market regulation, the capacity of central government has been 
enhanced by making strong vertical bureaucratic hierarchies.95  
Although his arguments rightly point out considerable effects of institutional 
reform on the changing nature of Chinese state, Yang oddly remains silent about the 
pivotal political body, the Party. How does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
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harmonize or conflict with a newly rising regulatory mechanism that may potentially 
challenge its vested prerogatives? While some argue that the party’s mobilizing 
capability is declining resulting from the ideological downfall and rampant cadre 
corruption,96 the top position of both government and enterprises are still dominated 
by the party. Given the continued power of the party organs in China’s political and 
economic life, its functioning is a key variable in explaining the changing relations 
between government and business. The party factor also demonstrates how the 
practices of Chinese regulatory mechanism are different from the conventional type 
of regulatory state. 
Moreover, Yang argues that “the ties between state institutions and enterprises 
began to weaken, which eventually divests state institutions of their business 
operation.” Yet how could we have substantial changes in the relations between state 
and business under the continued state ownership? According to my observations in 
the field, key strategic industries are neither privatized nor decentralized due to the 
party-state’s vested interests. The central government tightly regulates their assets and 
the personnel. In addition, Yang contends that Chinese producers in “most” industrial 
sectors do business in buyer’s markets, but the most profitable commanding heights 
(i.e. oil or telecom service) are under the central control. Central state institutions, not 
the market, decide the price and the market entry.  
The party-state still deeply remains involved in the appointment of senior 
officials in regulatory bodies and executives of SOEs.97 To be sure, the wholesale 
administrative redesigns provide institutional foundations for regulatory governance, 
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and show the Chinese leadership’s strong will for the reform. But the unsolved puzzle 
remains: how do two major institutional legacies of the Communist regime, the party-
state and dominant public ownership, harmonize with the regulatory structure in 
China? In sum, the recentralized regulatory state is emerging as a new mode of 
economic governance in China. Yang overlooks the potential diversity in the 
implementation of regulation. By comparing two strategic industries, auto and 
telecom, I suggest the contours of China’s regulatory state are varied. Ownership 
forms, state-enterprise relations and links between state institutions vary according to 
the specific case. Given the complex nature of Chinese political economy, the 
regulatory state in China is highly multifaceted.   
 
 
The Decentralized Predatory State 
 
While there have been academic debates on the causal relations between 
decentralization and corruption,98 scholars who study transitional regimes in former 
socialist state agree that decentralized political and economic authority are likely to 
produce increasing rent-seeking and predation.99 Minxin Pei argues that, as a 
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consequence of decentralized political-economic institutions resulting from the 
gradual reform strategies, the party-state’s capacity to mobilize and monitor agents 
has declined considerably. The rampant corruption of local cadres shows the problem 
of governance deficit. Pei concludes that the Chinese state has become a 
“decentralized predatory state.”100 Focusing on the cadre responsibility system at the 
local level (township), however, Maria Edin finds that the Party is not declining, but 
remaking its organization (governing institutions) and “reinventing itself.”101 
Furthermore, Edin points out that while decentralization and fiscal reform have 
allowed local agents to enjoy more autonomy than before, the party selectively 
exercises its political control over cadres; “decentralizing control of the ordinary 
cadres but recentralizing control over the leading cadres.”102 
Pei’s decentralized predatory state model contrasts sharply with the 
regulatory state model, which gives much credit to the effects of state reforms and the 
growing market forces. Pei argues that China’s gradual reform strategies, which aim 
to secure the party-state’s political control confronting institutional and legal reforms, 
have provided the ruling elites with the leeway to co-opt emerging business elites. 
This enables party officials to  protect their political prerogatives. Commenting that 
the East Asian development model is exceptional in that  the “helping hand” does not 
turn into the predatory practices, Pei holds that the Chinese state always had much 
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possibility of becoming a “grabbing hand” for rent-seeking because of decentralized 
political authority and  property rights.103  
Four institutional factors, according to Pei, are indicated as critical variables 
to bring about the decentralized predatory state in China. They include the 
decentralization of property rights, the declining monitoring capability, the 
availability of new exist options, and the erosion of ideological norms. During the 
past two decades, economic reforms have delegated much managerial authority to 
local governments such as the property rights, fiscal resources, and administration.104 
Such decentralization has considerably influenced the nature of Chinese state. In 
principle, the decentralization of property rights was introduced in post-socialist 
states in order to grant local state agents incentives, which was ultimately expected to 
increase state assets. Yet Pei claims that in China’s case, “the combination of lack of 
clarity of property rights and decentralization of such rights” provided local officials 
and managers of local SOEs with many chances to appropriate the rents.105 
Furthermore, administrative decentralization undermined the effective supervision of 
local cadres as well as daily decision-making power over local business. Pei’s model 
suggests that with the decentralization of property rights, fiscal, and administration 
functions have formulated “powerful incentives for local authorities to adopt 
predatory policies and practice.”106 
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In my view, however, the model of decentralized predatory state is apt to 
overstate the effects of the policy of decentralization. First, in theory, even though 
there is a high correlation between decentralized property rights and rampant 
predation, local agents do not always have incentives to strip assets. This is because 
the loss of state assets will critically affect the future tenure of local officials. Top 
executives of major large local state firms are directly appointed by the central state 
agency coordinated with the central party. Hence the decentralization of property 
rights in China does not necessarily result in decentralized predation. Second, 
administrative decentralization is certainly inclined to weaken the central party-state 
capacity to monitor local cadres and increase transaction costs. Instead, the centre 
strengthens the macro-level regulatory control of “strategically important issues.”107 
As Christopher Hood et al. have commented, “[t]he lessening of regulation at one 
level may be accompanied by re-regulation at another.”108 Given that most important 
business projects still require the central approval, decisive authority continues to be 
in the hand of the center although much decision-making authority has been delegated 
to local officials. Lastly, Pei gives the example of the telecom service sector to show 
how the ruling elite’s rent-seeking to protect vested interests gave rise to inefficiency 
and waste of national resources during the reforms.109 In contrast with Pei’s 
argument, China’s telecom service sector is one of the most profitable industries110 
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The Regulatory State, Chinese Style 
 
Located at the intersection of these two opposite views, some models bring the Party 
back in as a key variable to shape the patterns of economic regulation.111 The Party is 
a pivotal political institution in underlining China’s regulatory state. Continued public 
ownership of strategic firms and growing power of comprehensive government 
commission (i.e., SASAC) are closely related to vested interests of the Party. Given 
that the role of the Party has been rarely investigated in conventional models of 
regulation, the variable would be useful in illuminating how China’s practice of 
regulation is distinctive from existing frameworks.      
Taking a more cautious position in identifying the nature of China’s 
regulatory system, Margaret Pearson focuses on the function of independent 
regulatory agencies in governing strategic industries.112 Unlike Dali Yang’s 
estimation, Pearson finds that although China’s central leadership has rationalized 
administrative structure, established regulatory bodies, and separated government 
from business, these institutional reforms have not yet led to a remake of the Chinese 
party-state into a globally-advised regulatory state. Drawing on six case studies of 
infrastructure and financial service industries, Pearson contends that the independent 
functions of regulatory institutions are constrained by the continued state ownership, 
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the power of comprehensive state commissions and the party organs. Moreover, the 
regulator’s bureaucratic origins and authority are ambiguous. Unlike the conventional 
regulatory reforms that focus on privatization,  Pearson points out that the Chinese 
government maintains state ownership. In fact, the Party has been attempting to 
promote corporate governance of state firms in order to augment the value of crucial 
state assets.  
Moreover, not only have government restructuring programs created 
regulatory agencies; they have also strengthened the regulatory oversight of 
comprehensive state commissions at the center, the NDRC and SASAC, “which are 
in charge of planning and state asset supervision.”113 The independent functions of 
regulators in China are considerably constrained by superior state commissions. 
Normatively, China’s regulatory regime encourages competition in the market. But 
Pearson argues that orderly competition structured by the state, favoring “small 
number of dominant, state-chosen and state-owned players to protect the party-state’s 
considerable financial and social interests in these key assets.”114   
Most importantly, while Yang’s model of regulatory state is overall “muted” 
on the role of the Party in remaking the Chinese economic regulation, Pearson 
pinpoints the Party as one of key institutional factors. She finds that the Communist 
Party keeps exerting the political control through the right of personnel in both state 
institutions, including regulators, and state firms. As Sebastian Heilmann has 
commented, “The practice of Communist Party control and the role of secretive Party 
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organs in economic regulation belong to the least understood key elements of China’s 
political economy.”115  
Given the importance of the Party in making policy and supervision, 
Heilmann, focusing on the financial industry, accounts for how the Party organs 
actually have an effect on economic regulation in China. Heilmann argues that the 
centralization of financial market regulation and supervision in the late 1990s could 
have been achieved through the Party’s personnel authority and political 
supervision.116 By the creation of the Central Financial Work Commission, the 
Chinese party-state could effectively centralize financial regulation and control the 
performance of senior executives in financial firms and state financial regulatory 
bodies. Rather than passively accepting its declining monitoring and mobilizing 
capacity, the Party has actively confronted the changing environment in order to 
maintain its authority of personnel and supervision, which has been the most 
powerful means of political control. However, studies confined to highly centralized 
infrastructure or financial service industries show some limitations in accounting for 
China’s industrial regulation in general, because the Chinese leadership has employed 
different strategies and regulatory systems across the sectors.117 Hence varied forms 
of state regulation are likely to set in China’s industrial economy.  
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A Soft/Hard Regulation Model 
 
Drawing on Pearson’s centralized but limited regulatory state model,118 I propose a 
model of soft and hard regulation to better capture and understand complex patterns 
of central oversight in China’s strategic industries. By expanding the sector into 
strategic but decentralized industries, the forms of state regulation are systematically 
compared with highly centralized strategic sectors. This soft/hard regulation model 
above all sheds light on the various forms of regulatory governance within one 
country. Simply put, central oversight from the center is commonly identified across 
strategic industries regardless of strong local components. Yet the patterns of 
regulation are varied because of not only inherent sectoral differences, but also the 
governing structure, level of ownership and the role of foreign investors marked by 
issue areas.  
To some extent, the concept of soft versus hard regulation is relative when 
more than two industries are compared. Soft regulation is a type of central regulatory 
mechanism employed in the “decentralized strategic” industry. In a soft regulation 
model, first, the manner of oversight from the center is often “invisible” through 
floating supervising groups. There is no formally designated regulator, but the central 
party-state directly monitors the business of major local state firms. 
Second, when the sector has a strong decentralized governing structure in 
terms of administration and ownership, regulatory control from the center is much 
looser than in centrally-owned state industries. In other words, even though the 
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policies of decentralization tends to weaken central oversight due to the powerful 
authority of local governments, the centre still exercises soft/invisible control over the 
major local state firms. It demonstrates that decentralization does not necessarily lead 
to “the lack of central regulatory oversight,” and offers us a new way to look at the 
varied types of state regulation in China’s state industries. Lastly, a soft regulation 
model exhibits more or less relaxed control over market entry, which allows private 
firms to gradually spring up. Thereby, although state firms are given a more favorable 
business environment (i.e., land, information, or human resources) than private ones, 
competition comes to be more market-driven with less government control.        
 
Table 2-1: Comparing Soft versus Hard Regulation 
 Soft Regulation Hard Regulation 
Central regulatory oversight Invisible Formal  
Main state ownership forms Local SOE Central SOE 
Market entry  Relaxed control  Private 
and foreign-invested firms 
Strict control  No private, 
foreign-invested firms 
 
Compared with soft and invisible regulation, a model of hard regulation emphasizes 
central control by formal regulator based on various types of legal regulation such as 
guiding, yijian, and jueding.119 Here “hard” means that regulatory supervision from 
the center in state industries is tight, in that not only the market structure but also the 
personnel and budget management of enterprise are determined and monitored by 
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central regulatory institutions. Hard regulation can be employed because the most 
strategic and profitable firms in China are under the central state ownership, which is 
related to the second feature of hard regulation. In fact, the SASAC as a stake 
shareholder directly supervises and controls the assets, budget, and personnel 
management of central state firms. The increasing role of comprehensive state 
commissions is one of the most important and distinctive features of China’s 
regulatory mechanism compared with conventional approach that has focused on the 
independence of formal regulator.120  
In this model, local firms simply remain subordinated to the central firms, and 
their major business decisions (i.e., the price) should be first approved by the central 
office of the firms. Asset management is supervised not by local authorities but by 
staffs from the central regulator. This hierarchically centralized structure governing 
central state firms weakens the regulatory power of local governments. Third, market 
entry is strictly controlled by the central regulatory institution in order to structure the 
market with a small number of state firms. The norm of competition is encouraged 
and emphasized, but it is not driven by the market. Instead, it is planned and designed 
by  central regulatory institutions.    
The forms of regulation in China’s state sectors become more complicated 
when the sector has both central and local state firms. Even in the same industry, the 
Chinese government employs different regulatory mechanisms: while the central 
control over local state firms is invisible and looser than in central state firms, central 
firms are tightly supervised by central regulatory institutions. It shows that although 
strategic state industries converge on “centralized oversight” as other scholars of 
                                                 




China find,121 I argue that specific manners of state control are varied between and 
within industries. A soft and hard regulation model, which I propose in this 
dissertation, helps understand complex regulatory governance inside Chinese 
industrial economy.  
  
 
V. Chapter Conclusion 
 
In recent years, the body of literature on China’s regulatory state has grown. 
However, the existing literature reveals some limitations in explaining the complex 
systems of regulation inside the Chinese industrial economy. The state-business 
nexus in China is very dynamic, not only across industries, but also within specific 
sectors. Therefore, it would be less relevant to conclude that the changing nature of 
Chinese state is a single-type of “regulatory” or “predatory” state. In this chapter, by 
introducing a soft/hard regulation model I have attempted to challenge the existing 
analytic frame and assumptions of the regulatory state in China and to help better 
understand the varied types of state regulation in China’s strategic state sectors.  
In doing so, first, I have introduced two contrasting macro-level approaches: 
Yang’s minimalist regulatory state and Pei’s decentralized predatory state. Taking a 
macro-level approach, Yang overemphasizes the effects of government reforms and 
concomitant separation of state and enterprise on remaking China modern state. Pei 
highlights the “dark” side of reforms, such as rampant corruption and rent-seeking. 
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He claims that the capacity of the central party-state is declining and that it has 
become a decentralized predatory state. However, I suggest that they are less useful in 
accounting for the complex mechanism of China’s economic regulation in state 
industries, for they fail to recognize how the party has been continuously revamping 
its function and organs in order to maintain the political control in both government 
and business.  
Secondly, I have presented Pearson’s analysis of China’s regulatory state, 
situating in between the above opposite models. Focusing on the most strategically 
significant infrastructure and financial service industries, Pearson evidences that how 
China’s key political-economic institutions (i.e., state ownership or the party) and 
strategic policies have contributed to create different practices of regulatory state 
from the conventional independent regulatory model. Parallel to this approach, 
Sebastian Heilmann also demonstrates how the Party organs have played a pivotal 
role in recentralizing regulatory control in the financial industry. Both Pearson and 
Heilmann agree to the fact that the regulatory state is emerging as a new mode of 
economic governance, but, in contrast with Yang or Pei, they neither overlook nor 
treat the Party as a passive actor. Instead Pearson and Heilmann persuasively point 
out how the political control of the Party associated with the continued state 
ownership has an effect on shaping the centralized regulatory governance in China.  
However, these central state sector-focused studies offer, limited explanations 
for the overall regulatory mechanism in China’s industrial economy. I have proposed 
a soft/hard regulation model in the context of central state control. The model aims to 






                                                
into strategic but decentralized industries. I have argued that the pattern of soft 
regulation occurs when the sector has strong local components but is under the central 
oversight. Yet the manner of central party-state regulation is often invisible and loose 
due to the powerful local authority through administration and ownership. On the 
other hand, central state firms in key industries are tightly and directly supervised by 
the central regulation institutions. I conceptualize this pattern as hard regulation. 
Furthermore, when the sector has mixed forms of ownership such as central, local, 
and private firms, both soft and hard regulation are identified together.  
Lastly, while the Chinese government has been making great efforts to 
institutionalize market governance, the strong invisible hand of the party is playing a 
critical role in formulating new mechanism of market governance. The legacies of 
Communist institutional structure have been giving rise to variation in systems of 
regulation in China. This path dependent institutional evolution has a significant 
effect on making the regulatory state, the Chinese style. Rather than “one-size-fits-
all” mentality,”122 I suggest that China’s regulatory structure has much more 
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CENTRALIZED MIXED REGULATION: 
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
 
 
“Local actors were of course important in the story of Chinese reforms.  
But they were important as actors in a game directed from Beijing.”   




One of the most rapidly growing sectors, China’s auto industry holds a remarkable 
record. In 2005, its domestic sales totaled 5.92 million vehicles, and by taking up 
10% of the market share, China achieved the second largest auto market in the 
world.2 Compared with the global market share in 2001, which remained only 4%, it 
seems to signal that China, after the U.S. and tied with Japan, could become the next 
global auto power. Since the reform and open policy in 1978, the Chinese leadership 
targeted the automotive industry as a key sector that would contribute to modernizing 
and invigorating the retarded planned economy. Moreover, its multiplier effect over 
other industries, such as the chemical, machinery, electronic, and steel sectors, has 
made the Chinese leadership set a high priority on the development of the auto 
industry. 
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 In this chapter, I argue that the regulatory mechanism in China’s automotive 
industry exhibits four main characteristics. First, and most importantly, even though 
automobile manufacturing in China is dominated by decentralized administration and 
public ownership, there is centralized regulatory power in governing local auto 
businesses. Yet the manner of central oversight over local state firms is invisible and 
loose compared with central SOEs, due to strong local public ownership. Second, the 
forms of central oversight in the sector are also varied among local state-owned auto 
producers as well as between central and local state firms. While the central state-
owned enterprise First Automotive Works (FAW), similar to telecom service carriers, 
is tightly controlled by central regulatory power, central oversight over local auto 
manufactures is relatively soft through indirect and informal channels. Hence mixed 
forms of regulation are likely to be set in governing the automobile business in China. 
Across localities, furthermore, state auto firms in Shanghai are monitored by an 
invisible floating regulatory body from the central party-state, whereas Beijing’s 
state-run auto producers are implicitly and indirectly checked by the central top 
leadership who nominates the mayor and the party secretary of Beijing.  
 Third, noting that the role of the party in China’s industrial regulation has 
been either less discussed or devaluated, I discover that the party continues to 
maintain significant levers of control through the party committee (dangwei) in both 
government and state enterprises. In both central and local automotive businesses, the 
party committee dominates the boards of directors, thereby exercising a critical 
political control over major business decisions as well as over personnel. In 




formal public agencies and procedures in regulation, preferring to interact directly 
with top executives in the State Council. Finally, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) plays the role of regulatory “watchdog” in the 
automotive sector by holding the authority to approve market entry, foreign 
investment partners, and large-scale business projects. Since most major auto 
manufacturers are local state-owned, local level Development and Reform 
Commissions (DRC) under the leadership of local governments exert direct influence 
on local automotive businesses by providing industrial support for land or 
infrastructure building. Yet regardless of the level of ownership, auto industrial 
policies, various regulations, and the final stamp of approval from the NDRC for 
major projects are of high importance to automotive entrepreneurs in China.            
 In a theoretical context, mixed forms of central regulation in China’s auto 
industry show that, unlike Minxin Pei’s decentralized predatory state model, the 
central party-state does not lose its regulatory capacity in the sector. Rather, the party 
deeply penetrates into both government and automotive enterprises through formal or 
informal channels, and oversees personnel and asset management in order to secure 
their vested interests. This also means that China’s recent streamlining and 
rationalized bureaucratic structure, whose effects on the nature of the state often tend 
to be over-evaluated, does not necessarily lead to transforming the state-business 
nexus into modernized economic governance, as Dali Yang anticipates. Instead, the 
growing regulatory power of comprehensive state commissions over automotive 
enterprises never conforms to the idea of either minimalist or decentralized state 




creating centralized but varied patterns of regulatory oversight in China’s auto 
industry. A model of soft/hard regulation that I propose in this study attempts to 
explain these complexities in regulating China’s auto business. 
 In this chapter, after introducing the historical evolution of auto industrial 
development policies in China, I explain the structure of governmental authority at 
both the central and local levels, focusing on the major state institutions involved in 
the automotive sector. The chapter then proceeds to present three cases of auto SOEs 
and map out each pattern of regulatory oversight from the center. Aiming to capture 
and explain the regulatory architecture of the sector, I propose a soft and hard mixed 
form of regulation in China’s automobile industry.  
 
II. The Nature of China’s Auto Market 
 
Beijing’s emphasis on automotive sector development is not a new issue, but has 
accounted for much work over the last two decades. The development of the auto 
industry in China is important because it closely relates to the growth of other 
industries, including the chemical, steel, machinery, and service industries, making it 
a so called “comprehensive industry” (“zhonghe hangye”). According to one research 
study that examines the correlation between industry and macro economic growth, the 
major contribution of four sectors, machinery, auto, steel, and electronics, to China’s 
industrial growth recorded 33 percent in 2000. This proportion increased to 48 
percent in 2003.3  While the contribution of the automotive sector to the national 
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economy was estimated at around 0.8 percent in 2006, the central government is 
attempting to increase it to 2.5 percent during the eleventh five year plan.4 In this 
section, I introduce how the sector has been developed and the role of industrial 
policy in China’s automobile manufacturing development. 
 
Historical Evolution  
After Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1949, China’s first auto firm, the First 
Automotive Works (FAW), was built in 1953 in Changchun in northeast China. Its 
auto production was launched with the memorable ‘Liberation (jiefang)’ truck in 
1956.5 Due to a lack of capital and technology, however, the Chinese auto industry 
heavily relied on the Soviet Union’s technical assistance. Following FAW, the 
Shanghai Automobile Assembly Plant was set up in 1958, and the Second 
Automotive Works (now Dongfeng) in 1969.6 During the early stages of 
development, China’s auto manufacturing was limited to heavy and light trucks, 
buses, and jeeps, mainly for transportation or military use. There was passenger car 
production, but only for government affairs or officials, not for private purchase. As 
late as the mid 1980s, the private purchase of automobiles was not allowed. This was 
the major obstacle to the development of the auto industry in China over the pre-
reform era.   
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 Since 1978, the development of China’s auto industry has been accelerated 
with economic reforms.7 The auto industry, particularly passenger car production, 
was newly emphasized because of its “multiplier effects” on related manufacturing 
industries, such as steel, electronics, and glass.8 It was also perceived as a key 
foundation for building up a modern economic system. However, the moderated 
governmental policy for market entry in the early 1980s led most provinces to 
establish their own automobile manufacturing plants. As a result, the number of auto 
vehicle firms increased from 53 in 1976, before the reform, to 114 in 1985, to 122 in 
1995, settling at 117 in 2004.9 This fragmented industrial structure caused the central 
government to recognize the need for a consolidation policy to improve productivity 
and economy of scale. The auto industry was targeted by top leaders, such as Jiang 
Zemin and Zhu Rongji, as the priority sector for restructuring in 1992.10 In 1987, the 
central government designated three large-scale auto firms and three small ones 
(“sanda sanxiao”) as major passenger car assemblers for the key production base, 
and market entry was again restricted by the central government in 1989. They 
included FAW, SAW, and SAIC as the three large firms and Beijing Jeep, 
Guangzhou Peugeot, and Tianjin Auto as the three small ones. These consolidation 
efforts were reaffirmed in China’s first auto industrial policy in 1994, and were again 
stressed by the central government in the new auto industrial policy in 2004. 
                                                 
7 While there was the auto industry in China, its overall development began after the open and reform 
policy since the 1980s. Institute of Industry Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Science 
(CASS), 2004 China’s Industrial Development Report (Zhongguo Gongye Fazhan Baogao), p. 220 
8 Eric Harwit, China’s Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995), p. 36 
9 China Automotive Technology Center, 2005 China Automotive Industry Yearbook (Zhongguo Qiche 
Chanye Nianjian) (Tianjin: Zhongguo Qiche Jishu Yanjiu Zhongxin, 2005) 
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 Another important feature during the 1980s was to encourage foreign 
investment in the form of the Joint Venture (JV). To develop the auto industry, which 
required intensive capital and highly advanced technology, the Chinese top leadership 
adopted the policy of “exchange technology with market” (“huan jishu he 
shichang”). Through the JV production system, the Chinese government expected 
that there would be a great learning effect for local auto firms in terms of technology 
development and managerial skills, although it has now been evaluated as a failure.11 
The first JV auto firm, the Beijing-Jeep Corporation, was created by the Beijing 
Automobile Corporation and the American Motors Corporation (AMC) in 1983. 
After Beijing-Jeep, SAIC and FAW each set up JV firms with Volkswagen in 1985 
and 1991, respectively. In 2005, the number of foreign auto firms having a JV with 
Chinese OEMs had increased to nine.12 Although JV foreign investment was highly 
encouraged as a development strategy, the Chinese government clearly stated strict 
regulations for technology transfer, products lines, and the stock share rate of the 
enterprises.   
 Given the globalizing production and supply networks in the auto industry, in 
fact, China’s JV development strategy is seen to be inevitably necessary.13  To cope 
with the rising development cost resulting from rapid technological change, major 
auto assemblers have adopted global production networks where multiple suppliers 
                                                 
11 This was early acknowledged by the government and auto firms, and it is why new auto industrial 
policy in 2004 emphasizes the need for “independent innovation” (zhizhu chuangxin) to produce 
Chinese own auto brand. 
12 Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation. 2005. China Auto Industry Development Research (Zhongguo 
Qiche Gongye Fazhan Yanjiu), pp. 31- 53.   




meet and work together on a single product. 14 The rising demands for extensive 
resources and advanced technology have led small automotive firms, both assemblers 
and suppliers, to be integrated into the global manufacturing system in the auto 
industry.15 In 2001, 13 auto assemblers produced more than 1 million cars and they 
accounted for 87% of the world auto production.16 
 Since the late 1990s, moreover, China has experienced two internal and 
external transformations that have affected the industrial management of the auto 
industry. Internally, there was extensive administration reform in 1998, and 
externally, China joined the WTO in 2001. As a consequence of the state reforms, 
governance structure has become more integrated into a comprehensive state agency, 
the NDRC, which contributes to consistent policy-making and implementation.17 
Externally, WTO membership has led the Chinese government to release its former 
protection measures in stages, such as high tariffs or quotas, to meet negotiated 
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Sources: Interview at Beijing-Hyundai JV, Beijing (February 2006). 
 
Automotive Industrial Policy in China 
Industrial policy is often perceived as an indicator showing direct state intervention in 
the market, because it has been used as a key instrument to allocate resources to 
specific target sectors. In implementing industrial policies, fiscal subsidies (i.e. bank 
loans or tax exemptions), export credits, and import restrictions have been widely 
granted to favored sectors and firms by the government. For this reason, industrial 
policy has been treated as a “window” to reveal the role of the government in 
economic management, regulation, and control of markets. Throughout the reforms 
since the 1980s, Chinese government and researchers have paid attention to the role 




Korea.18 Learning from its neighbors, the SPC in the early 1990s promulgated a 
series of industrial policies for selected pillar industries.19  Even today, traditional 
East Asian style industrial policy is favored by China in some respects. China’s rec
effort is its emphasis on creating large business groups by merging inefficient small 
enterprises (“Zhuada Fangxiao”) in order to build up “vertically integrated and 
globally competitive national champions.”
ent 
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 With institutional reforms and integration into the global economy during the 
1990s, the Chinese state highlights the notion of a “socialist market economy” and the 
changing function of industrial policy from direct control and allocation of resources 
to macro control and regulation. Hence, industrial policy in China could be defined as 
a guideline for long and mid term development direction and strategies to achieve 
substantial goals in a specific sector, as in the automotive industry. China’s auto 
industrial policy presents a general development plan and policy goals, in order not to 
provide specific auto manufacturers with preferential benefits in business. While 
some argue that the automotive industrial policy at the national level has little 
meaning due to difficulties in effective enforcement at the local level, it still has 
significant implications for both local and foreign entrepreneurs in designing their 
own business plans. In other words, although policy implementation across regions 
has been fragmented, the national automotive industrial policy from the center is the 
most important guideline for both local governments and auto firms. For instance, the 
 
18 Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy, and the Big 
Business Revolution (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Ling Liu, China’s Industrial Policies and the Global 
Business Revolution: The Case of the Domestic Appliance Industry (London: Routledge, 2005); 
Interview with Zhao Ying in Institute of Industry and Economics, CASS, Beijing (October, 2005) 
19 Industries include electronics, chemicals, machinery, telecommunications, construction, transport, 
and petroleum. Liu (2005: 25) 
20 Edward S. Steinfled, “Market Vision: The Interplay of Ideas and Institutions in Chinese Financial 




SAIC-VW, the second largest auto SOE based in Shanghai, has established the 
Department of Auto Industrial Policy Analysis within the group to study the national 
auto industrial policy.21 
 In the policy-making process, China’s automotive industry tends to show a 
pluralized mechanism by opening up policy drafts to enterprises before final 
documentation. Although the ultimate decision is made by the NDRC, it is an 
important route to exchanging opinions concerning new policies between government 
and business. This coordination between the central government and auto 
entrepreneurs has contributed to the policy-makers having a better understanding of 
the concrete conditions and demands from business. It is also beneficial for auto 
manufacturers to obtain an opportunity to keep track of what the center wants as well 
as to reflect their opinions to the government. In this manner, although policy-making 
in the auto industry tends to be top-down, Chinese automotive enterprises are asked to 
come and reflect their opinions about the draft for better policy decisions. In general, 
the center, particularly the NDRC, reviews three or four rounds before the final draft, 
and these open hearings are arranged by the NDRC.22 Both state-owned and private 
automotive enterprises are invited to join the discussion, but ideas and opinions from 
private firms are taken into less consideration than those from SOEs.23 Foreign auto 
firms are rarely allowed to participate in these meetings; they usually reflect their 
opinions through their Chinese JV partners.  
                                                 
21 Interview with SAIC-VW senior manager in Shanghai, (March 9, 2006) The difference is found 
between Chinese scholars and entrepreneurs: while scholars in general devaluate the role of auto 
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its necessities and roles. 
22 Interview with Tang Yiyi in SAIC-GM, Shanghai (Feb 2006) 




III. The Structure of Governmental Authority for Regulation 
 
At the Central Level 
Before the 1998 Reform: The auto sector had been regulated by four central 
governmental agencies: the State Council, the State Planning Commission (SPC), 24 
the Ministry of Machinery Industry (MMI), and the China National Automotive 
Industry Corporation (CNAIC). 25 Under the leadership of the State Council, the SPC 
as the macroeconomic “planner” formulated and issued long-term economic plans 
and policies, including automotive industry policy. By clearly specifying policy 
objectives and regulations for technology, investment, and finance in the automotive 
industry, the SPC could exert substantial control over foreign JV partners. While the 
SPC was not involved in the daily business of the auto industry, it retained the 
authority to finally approve two key issues: Sino-foreign joint ventures and 
investment projects valued at over 1.5 billion yuan.26  However, despite a super-
ministerial agency rank, the authority of the SPC was constrained by the fragmented 
overall state authority overseeing the auto industry. In effect, the SPC was “not 
independent from other ministries and enterprises and simply brings together requests 
from other ministries.”27 There was also a change in the SPC’s directorship during 
the 1980s. The SPC had been administered by the vice-minister but came to 
transferred to a lower level cabinet rank.
be 
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National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
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26 Harwit (1995: 46) 
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government reform was not a regulator, but rather a coordinating body in governing 
the auto sector. 29 
 At the ministerial level, the MMI reserved the specific authority for 
automotive enterprises. By holding the ownership of central automotive firms, the 
MMI appointed the senior managers of large centrally-owned auto firms (i.e., FAW 
and Dongfeng). It also had the right to set technical standards, issue production 
licenses, and restrict market entry.30  Subordinate to the central MMI, the CNAIC 
was mainly responsible for supervising the auto industry as a central governm
agency.
ent 
                                                
31 As two central state auto producers obtained separate lines in the state plan, 
central auto firms became free from CNAIC in 1984, instead of “directly 
subordinated to the SPC.”32 As a result of the policy of decentralization during the 
1980s, in 1987 the CNAIC was degraded to a federation that basically provided auto 
firms with business consultation, but lacked enforcement power.33 Thereby, the 
authority of CNAIC was not strong enough to exercise effective regulatory control.  
 In sum, before the 1998 administration reform, the structure of government 
authority was fragmented. The SPC, as a comprehensive state body, lacked binding 
force over other central commissions, ministries and enterprises. Furthermore, the 
equal bureaucratic ranking of the central MMI with provincial governments was an 
 
29 Yeo and Pearson (2007: 10) 
30 Huang (2002: 554-555) 
31 Thun (2006: 108) 
32 Yeo and Pearson (2007: 10) 
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by the State Council ratification in May 1987. Its former authority over planning or personnel in 
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obstacle to effective policy implementation in China’s auto industry. 34 Therefore, 
there was no effective institutional environment to prevent “rent-seeking and over-
investment by local governments, which were strongly motivated to capture 
economic interests.”35  Hence, Beijing’s consolidation policy before state reform was 
seen to be ineffective. 
 
After the 1998 Reform: Aiming to streamline the bureaucracy, China’s 1998 
administrative reform abolished a number of ministries that directly managed 
industries. The former key state planning body, the SPC, was transformed into the 
State Planning and Development Commission (SPDC) as a more comprehensive 
agency. As of 2003, the SDPC was again renamed as the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) to highlight the changing function of the government 
from “planner” to “regulator” of a market-oriented economy. As a core watchdog in 
the automotive industry, the NDRC is responsible for making long-term planning and 
industrial policy, technology innovation, and final investment approval.36 The former 
MMI was first integrated into the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in 
1998. With the dismemberment of SETC in 2003, its authority over industrial policy, 
market entry, and regulation of investment and technological innovation was 
transferred to the NDRC.37 As another function of the MMI, the right to appoint 
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35 Yeo and Pearson (2007: 11) 
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managers of the central auto firms was first housed in the SETC, and then transferred 
to the central SASAC. 
 The post-1998 regulatory system has affected the auto industry in two 
respects. First is the re-engineered NDRC, not as a planner but as an integrated 
regulatory body. Its authority is more comprehensive than the SPC by integrating the 
work of the former MMI and other defunct industrial ministries. In addition, the 
bureaucratic rank of the NDRC is higher than other ministries or provincial 
governments, which contributes to maintaining independence in the course of policy 
decision and implementation. As did its predecessor, the NDRC formulates and 
implements national auto industrial policy, and has the final authority to approve new 
JV investment projects or market entry of local OEMs. Specifically, the Department 
of Industry Policy (DIP) within the NDRC is in charge of drafting policies for the 
auto sector. DIP studies and analyzes the condition of industrial development, and 
makes policy recommendations for future direction based on national long-term 
developmental strategies and goals. In policy enforcement, DIP substantially 
supervises the enforcement of industrial policies.38 
 The other important change resulting from the state reform is the creation of 
the SASAC, which is mainly responsible for the management of crucial state assets 
and the personnel of state firms. State asset management comprises the raising of 
equity capital and competitiveness, and risk management to prevent loss. Since most 
auto manufacturers in China are either central or locally state-owned, SASAC is 
capable of maintaining effective regulatory control over automotive industrial 
                                                 




management.39 In supervising the automobile market, the central SASAC has the 
formal authority only for two central state firms (the FAW and Dongfeng Group); 
other auto SOEs are supervised by the local SASAC. The central SASAC in principle 
has no formal rights to supervise and monitor the business of local state firms.  
 
At the Local Level 
Although policy decision-making is ultimately made by the central authorities, 
China’s decentralized political and economic structure in the automobile industry is 
most remarkable. In particular, local government’s substantial autonomy in managing 
the business of the automotive industry is closely related to its property rights over 
local auto firms. By the mid 1990s, before the administration reform, local 
governments had a distinctive internal structure for the automotive sector. It was 
common for the city mayor to exert critical influence on the planning, finance, and 
personnel of local auto enterprises, and at least one vice mayor was in charge of 
developing the auto industry as an official task.40   
 The power of municipal commissions, such as the Planning or the Economic 
Commission, varied in each city. While the Auto Industry Leading Small Group in 
Shanghai, under the direct reins of the mayor, played a predominant role in both 
coordinating government bodies and guiding local automotive firms (both assembly 
and supply firms), in Beijing and Guangzhou the Economic Commission was the 
                                                 
39 While there are private firms in supply and component parts, only two private enterprises in the 
passenger car OEMs of the Chinese auto industry. They are the Geely Holding Group Corporation and 
the Lifan Group.  
40 It appears now that their special efforts have greatly contributed to the development of the auto 
industry in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou, and it was particularly prevalent during the 1980s. For 
example, in the late 1980s, Beijing vice mayors, Zhang Zemin and Wu Yi; Shanghai vice mayors in 




main institutional body to regulate the performance of automotive firms.41 Due to a 
fragmented institutional structure, the Auto Offices in both Beijing and Guangzhou 
could not have separate status as a governmental organization. The auto office in 
Guangzhou belonged to the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics of Guangzhou 
municipal government, and the auto office in Beijing was affiliated with the Beijing 
Automotive Industry Corporations (BAIC) as the head office.42 That is, before the 
1998 government reform, institutional structure for the auto industry was not unified 
and varied across regions, which reflected fragmented regulatory control over 
automotive firms.  
 The 1998 government reform contributed to integrating the formerly 
fragmented and overlapped administrative functions into two comprehensive 
commissions at the local level: the local DRC and SASAC. In principle, the local 
DRC and SASAC have no direct relationship with the central NDRC and SASAC; 
they are organized and directed by provincial and municipal mayors.43 As such, local 
DRC and SASAC report directly to the provincial or municipal mayor, not to the 
central NDRC or SASAC in Beijing. In personnel matters, for example, the directors 
of the Shanghai municipal Development and Reform Commission and the Shanghai 
municipal SASAC are appointed by the Shanghai city mayor, neither the central 
NDRC nor the central SASAC. Although major projects still require approval from 
the central government, the business of local auto firms is supported and supervised 
by local governmental agencies.  
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 China’s auto industry policy-making is centralized, but local governments 
may not necessarily strictly implement the policies.44 In other words, local 
governments may make decisions for their own benefit rather than following the 
national auto industrial policy, although some items are classified as “central 
government approval is required,” such as new market entry or a new JV project. 
Moreover, since policies, regulations, and financing for local auto firms are decided 
by the local DRC, local auto firms including JVs are directly supported and 
supervised by the local DRC, not the central NDRC.  
 Another state commission emerged in 2003..45 As the central SASAC does, 
the local SASAC is mainly responsible for the management of crucial state assets and 
personnel for the local auto firms. Top executives and senior managers of SAIC and 
BAIC are appointed by the Shanghai or Beijing SASAC. In governing the local auto 
industry, the authority of local governments comes from the property rights over the 
local auto firms, which allows the local SASAC to have the right of personnel 
management. It is a significant source of political control over the auto business.46 
 
IV. The Patterns of Regulation: Three Cases 
 
The institutional context governing China’s auto industry is dynamic across localities 
and enterprises. While most automobile manufacturers, except recently established 
                                                 
44 Interview with Jian Sun by email (June 2006). He is vice President of A.T. Kearney Greater China, 
Shanghai Office; the auto industry specialist. 
45 See, Shanghai and Beijing official government website. 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node8059/CityAgencies/userobject22ai20.html (Access: Dec. 
2006) 




private auto producer Geely in Zhejiang province, are state-owned, they exhibit 
diverse forms of ownership and governing structures in terms of central and local 
government relations, or inter-governmental relations. In the forms of ownership, 
there are central state-owned, local state-owned, foreign-invested, and private 
producers. In order to explore the mechanism of regulation and its patterns, I explore 
auto firms that are located in different political and economic institutional contexts. 
For this purpose, three major auto SOEs are examined here: one is centrally-owned 
(FAW) and the others are owned by local governments (SAIC and BAIC). But 
because the two local state firms are also divergent in the manner of central oversight, 
this presents another dynamic in the auto industry in China. 
 
 
CASE ONE: FAW Group 
 
An Example of Hard Regulation in the Auto Business 
 
First Automotive Works (FAW) Group Corporation,47 located in Changchun, in 
northeast China’s Jilin Province, is a historic symbol for the Chinese auto industry. In 
1953, it was constructed in Changchun, a strong industrial base since the Japanese 
occupation of 1931 to 1945, with a focus on machinery industries. Changchun also 
serves as a transportation hub linking the Chinese inland and offering favorable 
business opportunities.48 At the early developmental stage, FAW only produced 
trucks and then slowly expanded its business into light trucks and passenger cars. The 
                                                 
47 Unless otherwise specified, FAW here means FAW Group Corporations, and not individual firms 
within the Group, such as the JV FAW-VW 
48 Thun (2006: 172); Tomo Marukawa, “The Contradictions of Industrial Groups: A Case Study of the 




production of passenger vehicles was accelerated by signing the establishment of a 
large scale JV passenger car manufacturing with German Volkswagen Automobile 
Company in 1991.49 Putting a great emphasis on the production of passenger cars, 
FAW merged with Tianjin Xiali Auto firm in 2002 by acquiring a 50.98 per cent 
stake, and signed a historic JV agreement with Japan’s Toyota for a strategic and 
cooperative relationship.50 As a third JV partner, another Japanese auto firm, Mazda, 
signed a JV company with FAW Group Corporation in 2005. The FAW-Mazda JV 
firm cooperates with a focus on sales of the Mazda brand in China, and its equity is 
composed of 25 per cent from Mazda, 5 per cent FAW Group, and 70 percent from 
FAW Car (yiqi jiaoche).51 
 As of 2006, FAW Group consists of thirty wholly-owned subsidiaries (quanzi 
gongsi) and eighteen share-holding companies (konggu gongsi), which include 
foreign-invested JV firms.52 Likewise, while FAW is a central-government firm 
(zhongyang qiye) meaning that the central government retains the property rights as 
an owner, FAW consists of two different types of state ownership: wholly state-
owned and share-holding enterprise. According to the 1994 Company Law, wholly 
state-owned means that there is only one state-owned investment entity. Therefore, 
the state is the sole owner of the enterprise. A share-holding company is defined by 
the proportion of shares each shareholder holds; the state need not be the majority 
(over 51%) owner though it can still be the largest share holder.”53 Hence FAW 
                                                 
49 2004 FAW Group Corporation Annual Report  
50 FAW official website, see http://www.faw.com/international/toyota_history.jsp (Last access, Nov. 
2006) 
51 See, http://www.faw.com/international/Mazda.jsp (Last access, Nov. 2006) 
52 FAW 2006 Annual Report 
53 Shu Y. Ma, “The Chinese Route to Privatization: The Evolution of the Shareholding System 




retains the assets of 30 wholly-owned subsidiaries as a single investment entity, while 
share-holding companies in the FAW Group (i.e., FAW-VW) may have multiple and 
dispersed shareholders. Despite this dispersion of ownership within the FAW Group, 
the management of assets is supervised by the central SASAC as the owner of FAW. 
The Group’s annual production capacity recorded over one million units in 2005.54 
The auto industry has contributed to 52 per cent of the industrial output in Changchun 
city, and FAW is not only the main system (zhuti), but also a driving force (longtou) 
in developing the automotive industry in Changchun.55   
 
Figure 3-1: FAW Structure 
     First Automotive Works Group 
 
 Administration Dept.   Party and Mass Dept.  Branch 
 
 
    
 FAW Jiefang Auto Corp. FAW-VW 
  FAW Export/Import Company Tianjin FAW-Toyota 
Wholly-owned Corporations: 30 Share Holding Corporations: 18
 
Sources: FAW 2006 Annual Report; China Auto Industry Statistics (2005: 353) 
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WTO dui Changchun Qiche Gongye de Yingxiang), Social Science Strategy Line (Shehui Kexue 




For people living in Changchun, FAW appears to be more than a workplace. It is not 
simply a company to go to for work, but rather a “backbone” of their lives because it 
provides employees and their family members with housing, school, and medical 
facilities. In fact, the first impression when traveling in Changchun is “the automobile 
city.” On my way to the FAW-VW firm by taxi, ten minutes from the Changchun 
train station, I could see a town of the FAW Group Corporation. Most buildings or 
shops relate to FAW: FAW elementary and middle schools, FAW apartment 
residence, and FAW hotels. FAW Group Corporation is indeed a crucial economic 
and social ground for Changchun residents. One female working in the Journal of 
China Auto Industry affiliated with FAW says, “My parents and I are all working in 
FAW subsidiary companies, and we are very proud of FAW and cannot imagine 
Changchun without FAW.”56 It seems that FAW, not the Changchun municipal 
government, is deeply enmeshed in residential life.  
 
Table 3-2: Main Economic Data of FAW 
 2002 2003 2004 
Sales of Vehicle 
(unit) 
580,356 902,329 1007,471 
Sales of Income  
(100 million yuan) 
845.10 1,076 1,175 
Profits  
(100 million yuan) 
43.03 65.8 45.8 
Long-term 
Investment  
(10 thousand RMB) 
n.a 1,264,374 392,294 
Total Assets  
(10 thousand RMB) 
n.a 10,619,287 10,236,249 
Sources: 2003, 2004 FAW Annual Report 
                                                 




Centralized Regulatory Power 
 
In this section, I discuss the mechanism of the state regulation of FAW and identify 
tightly centralized oversight. Central state ownership, the significance of political 
rank in the party, and the party committee in both government and state firms have all 
contributed to create centralized regulatory power in FAW. 
 
Central Ownership, Incompetent Local Government 
In governing business in China, central ownership makes a difference in the 
following four aspects: funds, tax, assets, and personnel management. Since FAW 
belongs to the central government (specifically SASAC plays the role of owner in 
practice), the tax from FAW is the state tax (guoshui) for the central government’s tax 
revenue. When FAW needs additional funds, it is able to take a loan from the State 
Bank, usually with a lower interest rate.57 Due to the special position of FAW in 
China’s auto industry, one Chinese scholar working in a government research 
institution refers to FAW as “the First Son (zhangzi)” of the Chinese auto industry.58 
This means that regardless of the financial situation of the firm, FAW receives special 
attention and support from the Changchun municipal government, central state 
agencies such as NDRC and SASAC, and top leaders of the CCP; loans from the 
State Bank are guaranteed by FAW’s special position in the sector.59 While FAW 
remittance goes straight to the central revenue, the Changchun municipal government 
                                                 
57 Email interview with Sun Jian who is the vice President of A.T. Kearney, Shanghai Office and 
mainly charge of offering business consulting to major local OEMs. (December 28, 2006) 





supports the development of the auto industry, for automobile manufacturing is the 
major source of local revenue and employment. Before the 1998 administrative 
reform, senior managers of FAW were appointed by the Ministry of Machinery 
Industry, now downgraded to the State Bureau of Machinery Industry under the 
NDRC.60 
 
Figure 3-2: The Personnel Process in FAW 
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Sources: Interview in Shanghai (March 2006) and Beijing (December 2005); Christopher 
McNally (2002), “Strange Bedfellows: Communist Party Institutions and New Governance 
Mechanism in Chinese State Holding Corporations,” Business and Politics, 4 (1), p. 100 
 
                                                 




The central SASAC has the final and formal stamp of approval for the appointment of 
senior managers and supervises the business management of FAW.61 But the internal 
process of personnel is much more complicated. A nomination is first made by the 
Party Committee of FAW Group, and then the central party department of 
organization (DO, zhongzubu) carefully screens the career background to see whether 
there are any problematic issues for the appointment. This cadre evaluation process 
by the DO has been conducted in appointing not only Party and governmental 
officials, but also senior managers of SOEs.62 After that, the DO officially 
recommends to the CCP Central Committee and the central government (Ministry of 
Personnel). After going through these evaluation procedures, the SASAC may have a 
final candidate to appoint. While the central SASAC has formal authority to appoint 
top executives, as well as board members of management in central state firms, its 
decision only remains a “rubber stamp because the top leaders have already discussed 
it through informal meetings.”63 Therefore, the central leadership can choose the right 
people who have great loyalty to the Party and the capacity to achieve whatever the 
center has as a priority. Thereby, SOE executives and senior managers selected by the 
central party-state pay closer attention to the national guidelines than to the 
enterprise’s incentives and productivity. The Changchun municipal government’s 
lack of ownership for FAW has extensively constrained the opportunities to appoint 
firm managers who would be concerned with how FAW may contribute to local 
                                                 
61 Interview with DRC scholars in Beijing (Nov. 2005) 
62 The cadre evaluation by the department of organization focusing on the administrative monitoring is 
studied well by Yasheng Huang, “Administrative Monitoring in China: Institutions and Processes,” 
China Quarterly, no. 143 (September 1995); Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political 
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economic and social development. In addition, as Thun (2006) points out, the lack of 
ownership and capital has made the Changchun government incapable of making 
long-term business plans and securing local supply firms. Thus the role of the 
Changchun government has been entirely confined to making a “favorable business 
environment” for FAW.  
 
Significance of Political Rank 
Much literature argues that China’s 1998 administrative reform and emerging 
regulatory state agencies demonstrate the Chinese leadership’s strong will to 
rationalize policy-making and implementation by legalizing formal state agencies and 
procedures.64  However, FAW shows that informal politics and political rank rather 
than institutionalized formal procedures are still influential. As a central state firm, 
the organizing structure of FAW is distinctive from other large auto SOEs. While the 
president of SAIC or BAIC is basically under the reins of the mayor of Shanghai or 
the Beijing municipal government, the president of FAW is wholly free from the 
Changchun municipal government and its party committee, and can directly 
communicate with the State Council. It is not because of the central ownership of 
FAW, but because of the political rank of FAW president, Zhu Yanfeng, in the 
Communist Party.65   
 After serving as the president of First Automotive Passenger Car Holding 
Corporation Ltd. and vice president of the FAW Group in 1997, Zhu Yanfeng took 
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office as the president of both the FAW Group and FAW-VW in 1999.66  As a 
member of the Communist Party, Zhu is deputy secretary of the party committee in 
FAW and serves as an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party, elected at the 16th NPC in 2002. It is a very powerful position in that there is a 
high probability of becoming the ranking member of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC). One Chinese scholar working in the DRC 
comments that Zhu is remarkably high among state sector enterprise presidents, and it 
is a very rare case.”67 Due to his high political rank in the CPC, although central 
SASAC is officially supposed to supervise the business management and 
performance of central state firm FAW, its monitoring function in practice remains 
perfunctory. President Zhu may go directly to the State Council to consult on a 
variety of issues. One large auto SOE manager even argues that “no matter what 
happens to FAW, they will be fine because Zhu is too high for governmental agency 
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Figure 3-3:  The Centralized Regulatory Structure for FAW 
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Sources: Based on interviews in FAW Headquarter and FAW-VW in Changchun (October 
2005; March 2006) and the DRC in Beijing (December 2005) 
   
The figure above illustrates the internal dynamics between central state agencies and 
FAW, and how the management system actually works. FAW is under the 
directorship of two major central bodies: NDRC and SASAC. In theory, there is no 
direct channel for central state firms to reach the State Council; however, the special 
position in China’s auto industry of both FAW and president Zhu has lead to creating 
this distinctive governing mechanism. Furthermore, since both the mayor and the 
party secretary of the Changchun municipal government are lower than the president 
of FAW in the Communist Party rank, they are actually incapable of asking the 
president of FAW to report on business projects or financial circumstances. It would 
be questionable to expect that the central SASAC is capable of effectively monitoring 




and local governmental officials are not powerful enough to challenge the authority of 
FAW’s president.                  
                     
Dominant Role of the Party Committee 
 
As the 1994 Company Law endorsed the shareholding system (gufenzhi) as “the 
mainstream reform program for state-owned enterprises,” the Chinese party-state 
establishes the board of directors and issues shares to diverse entities as well as the 
state, attempting to enhance the separation of government and enterprise (“zhengqi 
fenkai”). Even though FAW-VW is a central state firm with a foreign investor, most 
key business decisions are discussed and made by the board of directors. Yet this 
board of directors is dominated by members of the party committee. This shows that 
although the Chinese leadership has been trying to modernize the enterprise system, 
converting completely state-owned enterprises into shareholding enterprises, the party 
deeply embedded in the corporate mechanism is the main obstacle.      
 While FAW has organized a modernized system of board members and 
directors, its top positions are occupied by members of the party committee. The 
leading members of FAW consist of nine executives; one president and eight vice 
presidents. The president, Zhu Yanfeng, is deputy secretary of the Communist Party 
Committee and also an alternate member of the CCP (zhonggong zhongyang houbu 
weiyuan). Among the eight vice presidents, there is a hierarchy. Number two, Zhao 
FangKuan, is secretary of the Communist Party Committee serving as senior 




Party Committee, secretary of the Discipline Committee, and the chairman of the 
labor union, playing the role of senior political and ideological engineer.69 Even 
though the board members have regular meetings to discuss a variety of business 
plans, the final decision is significantly influenced by the preferences and ideas of the 
top executives. As Dickson notes (2003: 43), “to make sure that the party continued 
to play an active and influential role in SOEs, most SOEs in Shanghai adopted 
‘internal regulations’ that half of the members of the party committee must also be 
members of the board of directors and that at least one-third of the members of the 
party committee be managers with the enterprise.”70 This also occurs in the case of 
FAW-VW in Changchun. The board of directors (dongshihui) in FAW-VW consists 
of 16 members, comprising seven German and nine Chinese senior managers. Its 
chairman (dongshizhang) is Zhu Yanfeng, who serves as the president of FAW Group 
Corporation, and the vice chairman is German professor Folker Weissgerber, as of 
2003. Among the nine Chinese board members, four are members of the party 
committee in either Changchun city or Jinlin province, where Changchun city is 
located.71 As long as the majority of Chinese board members consists of members of 
the party committee, the modernized management system of enterprise remains 
perfunctory, and its substantial operation hinges upon the party committee.      
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71 They are Xu Jianyi, Qin Huanming, Zhang Pijie, and An Tie cheng. See FAW – VW 2004 Annual 
Report, p.3. Individual career profiles as the member of the party committee are also found the 






CASE TWO: SAIC Group 
 
An Example of Soft Central Regulation in the Auto Industry 
 
The advanced machinery industry, production technology, and auto-parts production 
experience have given Shanghai a favorable environment and a competitive edge for 
the auto industry.72 Shanghai has comparatively better infrastructure and investment 
conditions than other automotive manufacturing regions, and its coastal location has 
made the city a hub for investment and export. Therefore, regardless of the 
geographic location of their headquarters, most auto firms in China have installed at 
least one office in Shanghai. 
 In terms of sales and profits, SAIC73 is the second largest auto manufacturer 
after FAW, recording sales of 843,000 units, 10 billion yuan revenue, and 107 billion 
yuan total assets in 2004.74  By establishing joint ventures with Volkswagen (SAIC-
VW) in 1985 and General Motors (SAIC-GM) in 2002, the SAIC Group has 
organized “a comparatively complete production system for passenger cars.”75 In 
order to enhance modernized corporate governance and be listed on the stock market 
in Hong Kong, the SAIC Group restructured itself and established SAIC Motor 
Corporations Ltd. in December 2004.76 Thereby, important financial management 
                                                 
72 Victor F. S. Sit and Weidong Liu, “Restructuring and Spatial Change of China’s Auto Industry under 
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73 Unless otherwise specified, SAIC after 2004 means SAIC Motor Corporations Ltd.,, not individual 
firms within the Group, such as SAIC-VW or SAIC-GM.  
74 SAIC 2004 Annual Report 
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was transferred to SAIC Motor Corporations, and the former SAIC Group was now 
simply engaged in advanced manufacturing and modern service issues.77 
 
Figure 3-4: The Structure of SAIC Group 
  Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation (上海汽车工业集团总公司) 
 Wholly-owned (100% asset share)  
  Shanghai Motor Corporations Ltd. (上海集团股份) 
 
 
  SAIC-VW     SAIC-GM 
Sources: Interview in SAIC, Shanghai (March 2006) 
 
In the late 1990s, 75 percent of the SAIC Group was owned by the Shanghai 
government,78 but now it is wholly-owned by the Shanghai municipal government. 
The authority to supervise asset management of the SAIC Group was retained by the 
Shanghai Economic Commission, and was then moved to the Shanghai SASAC in 
2003.79 As in other regions, SAIC for the Shanghai government has served as not 
only a major resource for employment and revenue, but also an industrial base for the 
development of related industries, such as the steel, iron, and chemical sectors.  
In sum, compared with the central state-owned FAW, SAIC shows a different pattern 
of regulation due to strong local components. Despite the decentralized government 
authority and the property rights, there is invisible but significant regulation from the 
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center. In the following section, I explain each central and local regulatory 
mechanism for the major local auto producer SAIC.  
 
Table 3-3: Main Economic Data of SAIC 
 
 2002 2003 2004 
Sales of Vehicle 
(unit) 
390,508 612,216 610,641 
Sales of Income  
(10 thousand 
yuan) 
7,119,620 9,729,364 10,006,301 
Net Profits  
(million yuan) 





1,439,479 1,316,503 1,069,609 
Total Assets  
(10 thousand 
yuan) 
5,965,192 7,544,732 10,687,234 
 




Invisible Central Oversight 
 
SAIC is formally owned and regulated by the Shanghai municipal government, but its 
personnel and business management is under substantial control from the central 
party-state at the same time. In other words, while SAIC is a local-government firm, 
the central party-state exerts invisible but considerable regulatory control. In 
governing the business of SAIC, it appears that the central and Shanghai governments 




and enhance the value of crucial state assets, whereas the Shanghai government 
directly supports SAIC with various preferential policies for steering the local 
economy.  
 
Regulatory Control from Local Government 
 
The Shanghai government, like other local governments, considers the auto industry 
to be a strategic sector and an important source of revenue and employment in the 
local economy, and therefore provides a variety of benefits, such as land, tax, or 
supply fees.80 In addition, compared to the Changchun municipal government’s role 
in FAW, the Shanghai municipal government has effective levers of control over both 
SAIC and foreign investors by holding the property rights for SAIC. This implies that 
the authority to allocate financial resources, assets, and personnel management lies in 
the Shanghai government. Through these controls over finance and personnel, the 
Shanghai municipal government is able to keep powerful instruments to govern the 
business of SAIC. Although new JV projects or market entry still require approval 
from the NDRC, the central state institutions do not have the authority to supervise 
and intervene in the business of SAIC, because its ownership belongs to the Shanghai 
government. 
 Under the reins of the Shanghai city mayor, the Shanghai Development 
Reform Commission (DRC) provides SAIC with a macro direction for industrial 
development plans and regulations in line with national industrial policies. Although 
                                                 




new JV partners or large scale business projects require central approval,81  the 
Shanghai DRC has more direct influence on the business of SAIC than the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),82 for the Shanghai DRC retains the 
power to allocate financial and material resources in the Shanghai auto industry. For 
SAIC, the necessary funds for building infrastructure, factories, and R&D facilities 
for the development of technology come from the Shanghai DRC, not the central 
NDRC. One of the sources for these funds is taxes from local auto firms, and this is 
why local governments endeavor to develop the auto industry. In principle, all 
automotive enterprises in China should pay 33% of their total profits as tax. Within 
this amount of money, 60% was formerly remitted to the central NDRC and 40% to 
the local-level DRC,83  but now both the central and the local DRC each receive 50% 
of the tax.84 In addition, the Shanghai DRC is in charge of the review and approval of  
significant auto investment projects, except for new foreign JVs and projects costing 
over 10 billion. Likewise, the business of SAIC, such as issues of finance, investment, 
and technology, is basically coordinated with the Shanghai DRC, not the central 
NDRC.  
 As another governmental arm of regulation at the local level, the Shanghai 
SASAC is mainly responsible for supervising the SAIC Group’s asset and personnel 
management. As indicated earlier, personnel management is often considered to be a 
powerful means of political control.85 As to finance, SAIC Motor Corporation, 
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restructured by SAIC in 2004, is mainly responsible for the asset management of the 
whole group of SAIC. This means that auto firms subordinate to SAIC, such as 
SAIC-VW or SAIC-GM, have to report their balance sheet including fixed, tangible, 
and total assets to SAIC Motor Corp. After collecting general information on SAIC, 
SAIC Motor Corp directly informs the Shanghai SASAC; Shanghai SASAC then 
communicates with the central SASAC. There is no formal route for SAIC Motor 
Corp to directly interact with the central SASAC; it must be through the Shanghai 
SASAC, because SAIC is a locally-owned auto firm, not central government-owned. 
In addition, top executives and senior managers of SAIC are appointed by the 
Shanghai SASAC. Indeed, because SAIC is wholly-owned by the Shanghai municipal 
government, the central government has no formal right for personnel appointment.  
The final nomination is made by the Shanghai SASAC, though nominees are first 
recommended by the SAIC party committee (dangwei), and then closely inspected by 
the Shanghai Organization Department of the CCP. Successful candidates are 
reviewed at the second-round by the Shanghai party committee and then referred to 
the Shanghai SASAC through the Shanghai DRC.  
 
From the Central Government: “Invisible/Soft Regulation” 
Although it is mainly the Shanghai government exercising regulatory control over the 
business management of SAIC, it does not mean that SAIC is completely free from  
central regulation. The central leadership has allowed local governments to enjoy 




while it always keeps an indirect but powerful mechanism for regulation.86 The 
central government’s regulatory control over SAIC is mainly through three channels: 
personnel, the approval of business projects, and supervision. 
 
Personnel Management:  In SAIC, top executives and senior managers are appointed 
by the Shanghai SASAC. Just as in FAW, although the final nomination is made by 
the Shanghai SASAC, nominees are first recommended by the SAIC party committee 
(dangwei), and then closely screened by the Shanghai Organization Department of the 
CCP.  
 Some contend that when local interests conflict with national interests, local 
government and enterprises would ignore the central demands if the situation relates 
to the issue of local economic development.87 Yet this can be easily back tracked 
given that “the central government still appoints mayors who, in turn, appoint the top 
management of SOEs.”88 Moreover, both local officials and senior executives of local 
SOEs try to follow what the central government plans to achieve, because their future 
promotion is evaluated around that measure. According to one senior SAIC engineer, 
“the main concern of the president of SAIC is not substantial growth of the firm 
through developing its own technology and brand, but future tenure. In order to 
impress the central high leadership, which will affect a better position after the SAIC 
presidency, the SAIC president wants to achieve a great outcome during the tenure. 
However, while developing its own technology/brand requires eight years at least to 
develop and commercialize in the market, the SAIC president usually works 
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approximately five years. Eight years is very long for state firm presidents to 
demonstrate their capacities to the central leadership. Hence, SAIC top executives 
strongly prefer making JVs with foreign auto manufacturers that can provide SAIC 
with advanced technology and necessary capital investments within a short time.”89 
This illustrates that although the central government does not retain formal authority 
in the personnel of the local auto state firms (SAIC), “the central control over 
promotion of top management of local SOEs remains influential.”90 
 
Business Management;  Even though the Shanghai DRC and the Shanghai SASAC 
are the main state agencies in making final decisions, their industrial policies and 
management of local state firms should be based on national directives of industrial, 
enterprise, and regulatory policies. Since the 1980s, decentralized administrative 
institutions and ownership have indeed granted substantial autonomy to local 
governments, particularly at the provincial and municipal levels. But the power of 
local government has been inevitably constrained by the institutional structure 
designed by the central party-state. No matter how much local governments increase 
discretion in their fiscal and corporate governance, they are basically local “agents” 
appointed by the center in order to implement effectively what the central government 
attempts to do.91 One senior manager working in SAIC-VW comments that “although 
we are a local JV-SOE owned by the Shanghai government, the central NDRC rather 
than the Shanghai DRC exerts critical influence over our long- and mid-term business 
plans and management. To be a winner in both domestic and international markets, 
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studying central policies and regulations is very important for auto firms in China 
even though implementation is fragmented. Interestingly, while officials and scholars 
in Beijing argue that the central government has no authority to intervene and 
influence local auto businesses, in practice most local entrepreneurs strongly 
emphasize the power of the central government, even though indirect and loose, 
rather than local authorities.92 
 
Supervision:  In practice, there is “the least known but perhaps most significant 
informal channel for central regulation of SAIC.” 93 Not by formally organized public 
agencies and procedures, SAIC is closely monitored by the central supervising group, 
which is called “xunshizu (巡视组).”94 The idea was first initiated by the CCP 
Central Committee in 2001 to combat the growing corruption from high level local
cadres and was approved by the State Council in 2003. Its official role is to 
“supervise the selection of provincial or lower levels of local leaders” by an 







                                                
95 Yet they actually have been supervising not only local cadres (elites
but also the performance of local auto SOEs. In other words, it is a formal ins
for monitoring high level cadres (lingdao ganbu), but its supervision over SAIC
 
92 Interview in Beijing-Hyundai, Beijing (November 2005); Guangzhou-Honda, Guangzhou (March 
2006); Shanghai-GM (March 2006); Shanghai-VW (March 2006) 
93 Yeo and Pearson (2007: 24) 
94 Cheng Li name xunshizu inspection team to review nominated candidates for the provincial cadres, 
but I will term this as “floating supervising body” focusing on its regulatory control over major SOEs 
in China. With respect to the “official” function of xunshizu, see Cheng Li, “Reshuffling Four Tiers of 
Local Leaders: Goals and Implications,” China Leadership Monitoring: Goals and Implications No. 18 
(2006) p. 3. 
95 Cheng Li (2006: 3); see, 
http://www7.chinesenewsnet.com/gb/MainNews/SinoNews/Mainland/xhw_2004_03_11_19_55_14_1




invisible.96 As to organizing members, there is a difference between official 
documents and information from interviews. While “xunshizu” is in theory organized 
by the current CCP Central Committee and the party committee from each of the 31 
provinces, this floating body, according to my interviews, consists of 6 ~12 retired 
CCP cadres. They visit major auto state firms directly and supervise both central and 
local auto firms. Their major task is to oversee business plans, balance sheets, and 
board meetings of the auto SOEs. Although it is not a formal regulatory institution, 
this group has the right to monitor whether automotive SOEs conceal some profits 
and remind them of what the center wants. Likewise, xunshizu in the auto industry 
“functions as a non-authorized use of authority used for regulatory power.”97 It is a 

















                                                 
96 Xunshizu’s supervision has been extended from cadre elites at the provincial level to the business 
management of key SOEs, and its monitoring of the business management has come to be more 
formalized based on the Party’s guidelines.  In 2004, the Central Committee of the CCP and the 
Department of Organization established xunshizu for the financial industry in order to strengthen the 
regulation of the financial structure.  See, “The Central Committee and the Department of Organization 
Establish Xunshizu for State-owned Firms,” (“Zhongjiwei yu zhongzubu zujian guoqi xunshizu”), 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2006-04-13/8/716449.shtml (Last Access: March 8, 2007). 




Figure 3-4: The Regulatory Structure of SAIC 
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98 This was created by SAIC Group in December 2004, holding all the assets and business of SAIC 
Group. SAIC Motor Corporations Ltd. is expected to “play a strategic role in helping SAIC achieve its 




CASE THREE: BAIC Group 
An Example of Soft Central Regulation in the Auto Industry 
 
In spite of China’s first foreign JV auto firm, the Beijing-Jeep established in 1984, 
Beijing’s automotive industry has not been very successful. A number of issues have 
been pointed out as causes of the failure. They include: 1) the fragmented 
organizational structure inside BAIC, 2) the lack of strong will and leadership in the 
Beijing municipal government, 3) Beijing city’s inconsistent industrial policies, 4) a 
weak industrial base for the manufacturing industry, and 5) the lack of trust in foreign 
partners resulting from inexperience with foreign firms.99 Until the early 1990s, 
BAIC had taken the lead in the Chinese auto industry, but its dominant position was 
eclipsed and is still maintained by SAIC and FAW. 100 
 Compared with Changchun or Shanghai, Beijing has never been a great 
location for the auto industry, not only because the land on which to build the 
assembly factories and related industries is extremely expensive, but also because 
Beijing city is a center of culture and history, not a heavy manufacturing industrial 
base. Yet despite the early failure and the unfavorable environment for auto 
manufacturing, the growth of BAIC has been remarkable of late. From BAIC’s case, 
it can be seen that the Beijing municipal government’s function has been critical in 
revamping automobile manufacturing in the city. As in SAIC, the Beijing DRC 
provides the firms with benefits for land and funding if needed, and Beijing SASAC 
                                                 
99 More discussion, see Jim Mann, Beijing Jeep: How Western Business Stalled in China (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1989); Harwit (1995) 
100 In 1990, sales revenue of BAIC was RMB 4.12 billion and SAIC’s was RMB 3.61 billion. The 
situation is completely changed according to the 1997 sales revenue record. While BAIC recorded 




supervises the asset management of the Group. From the center, while SAIC is 
monitored by invisible party-state xunshizu, BAIC is indirectly checked by Beijing 
city officials who are concurrently working for the central party-state. 
 
Figure 3-5: The Structure of BAIC 
   Beijing Automotive Industry Corporations (BAIC) 
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Sources: Interview in Beijing-Hyundai Corporation, Beijing (November 18, 2005); China 
Automotive News [Zhongguo Qiche Bao] (February 20, 2006), p. C 6. 
 
 
Central Oversight through Overlapped Authority 
 
New Attempt 
Since the late 1990s, the Beijing municipal government has come to seriously 
consider developing the auto industry due to its potential economic effects on 
modernizing other manufacturing sectors and industrial growth in Beijing. Indeed, 
after the establishment of the Beijing-Hyundai JV, 37.3 percent of the industrial 




Corporations (BAIHC, a new name for the former BAIC).101 Regarding economic 
performance in 2004, BAIHC achieved 36.5 billion yuan in total assets, 530 thousand 
units in sales, and its sales revenues attained 48 billion yuan.102 Among Chinese auto 
enterprises, BAIHC gained 10.47% of market share and came to be the number four 
player. Particularly, Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company (BHMC) ranked number five 
in the passenger car market in China. 
 The auto industry was not the “core” concern for Beijing leadership. As Thun 
and Segal (2001) point out, Beijing’s bureaucratic and economic structure are more 
favorable to the IT industry,103 and the Information Technology industry has been 
targeted as the most strategic field in Beijing. However, as the bubble in China’s IT 
industry began to decline from its peak in the early 2000s, the Beijing municipal 
government set out modifying its industrial development plan, moving the emphasis 
from the IT industry to the manufacturing industry, particularly the automobile.104 
Despite the previously noted “unfavorable” environment, the auto industry again 
attracted close attention not only from local government but also from the central 
leadership.  
 In the course of development, Beijing was looking for a new foreign auto 
manufacturing partner to create a JV firm with BAIHC. This conveniently coincided 
with Hyundai Motor Company’s business scheme in the Chinese market. In fact, 
Hyundai had tried to form a JV with a Chinese auto producer in 1997, but it did not 
                                                 
101 “Three Carmakers Prop up Beijing’s Auto Expansion in 2003,” Xinhua News Agency (Feb 6, 2004) 
102 China Auto Industry Yearbook 2004. p. 77 
103 Segal and Thun (2001) 
104 Interview with director of Beijing Auto Investment Corporation, Mao Hai in Beijing (November 10, 
2005); interview with Korean senior managers in Hyundai Auto Investment Holding Corporation, 




materialize because other foreign manufacturers were evaluated as more competitive 
by the Chinese government and the auto firms.105 In 2001, Wu Bangguo, a vice 
premier of the State Council, conceived the necessity for the development of the auto 
industry in Beijing. Wu Bangguo arranged a meeting with Jung Mong-Gu, the 
president of Hyundai Motor Corporations (HMC), and Jia Qinglin106 in Beijing.107  
At the meeting, they immediately agreed to establish a JV between BAIHC and 
HMC. In April 2002, they signed a contract which would be effective for thirty ye
and outlined specific principles, goals, and scope for the partnership.
ars, 
 of 
                                                
108 The idea
making the Beijing-Hyundai JV firm was mainly initiated and supported by the 
central leadership in coordination with the Beijing municipal government.  
 
Structure of BAIHC 
Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Corporation is a state-owned large scale 
automotive enterprise, serving as the center of the Beijing auto industry development 
and of human resources. As of 2006, thirty two auto producers are affiliated with 
BAIHC, including supply manufacturing, auto related service and trade, and 
investment firms.109 The Beijing municipal government is attempting to make 
automobile manufacturing a pillar industry of Beijing’s economy. Cheng Lianyuan, 
 
105 Interview with Mao Hai in Beijing (November 10, 2005). Mao mentioned that in the late 1990s 
FAW, Dongfeng, and Guangzhou Auto Industry Corporations were considering JV with Hyundai but 
they thought that Hyundai was not bad but would be not the best choice for them. In the end, FAW 
decided Toyota as a new JV partner; Dongfeng 
106 As of 2001, Jia Qinglin served as the secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee and the 
member of the political bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Now he is member of the Standing 
Committee of the political bureau of the 16th CPC Central Committee and the chairman of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee. See, 
http://english.people.com.cn/data/people/jiaqinglin.shtml (Access: Nov. 1, 2006) 
107 Interview with Mao Hai, Beijing Automotive Investment Corporation Ltd (November 10, 2005) 
108 “Beijing Motor Corporations Cooperates with ROK’s Hyundai,” People’s Daily (April 30, 2002) 
109 Ibid.; “Beijing Auto Industry Holding Corporations (Beijing Qiche Gongye Konggu Youxian Zeren 




director of the Bureau of Industry Promotion in Beijing, attributes Beijing’s recent 
auto sector growth to Beijing-Hyundai Motor Corporation (BHMC), Beijing-Jeep, 
and Beijing Foton.110 They are key players in BAIHC, but my discussion will be 
focused on BHMC whose annual production capacity reached approximately 300,000 
vehicles; total sales were 233,668 vehicles in 2005.111 
 Although there are variations in the rate of investment assets among Sino-
Foreign JV auto firms, most JV passenger car producers have been set up in similar 
ways: 50 percent of assets from the Chinese mother enterprise, and the other 50 
percent from the foreign JV auto partner. As we examined earlier, FAW-VW is 
organized by FAW Group (50%) and Germany’s VW (50%), and SAIC-GM is 
constructed by SAIC Group (50%) and the U.S. auto firm, GM (50%). However, the 
ownership structure of BHMC, which has been the engine of the increasing 



















                                                 
110 “Three Carmakers Prop up Beijing’s Auto Expansion in 2003,” Xinhua News Agency (Feb. 6, 2004) 
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Sources: Qian Pingfan, DRC of the State Council, Beijing (March, 2006) 
 
 
BHMC is a JV firm between Korea’s Hyundai Motor firm and a newly established 
Beijing Auto Investment Enterprise (BAIE), not BAIHC. BAIE consists of various 
shareholders: the mother corporation, BAIHC (23%), and other stockholders 
including private ones (77%). In other words, although BAIE is a state-owned auto 
firm because its largest shareholder is BAIHC, which is wholly-owned by the Beijing 
government, the non-state investors are also extensively involved in investment 
resources. These non-state investors can participate in the business management and 
operation of BAIC.  
 One official in the Development of Research Council of the State Council 
highlights two potential benefits of this new form of ownership structure.112 One is 
that this new system may contribute to reducing state intervention in business 
                                                 




management. The power of the government in business as a chief stockholder will 
decrease gradually, for the government is not the single owner, and there are other 
voices. These incremental changes may result in substantial SOE reform in the near 
future. The other potential benefit is that the increase of non-state investment capital 
may lead to the diversification of capital in the Chinese passenger car industry not 
wholly-owned by the state. If so, why was this type of investment corporations in the 
auto industry attempted in Beijing, not Shanghai? According to one official in 
Beijing, the central government has less expectation from Beijing’s tax revenue than 
from other industry-centered cities such as Shanghai.113 Free from these pressures, 
the Beijing municipal government could experiment with ownership structure an
therefore, allowed BAIHC with other non-state investors to create a new type of state-
owned investment enterprise.  
d, 
                                                
 
Regulatory Mechanisms from Local Government 
Beijing Auto Industry Holding Corporations (BAIHC) is a local state firm formally 
owned by the Beijing municipal government. This means that Beijing city retains the 
whole asset share of BAIHC. By integrating the previously fragmented regulatory 
authority, the Beijing municipal government has two comprehensive commissions: 
Beijing Development and Reform Commission (BJ-DRC) and Beijing Municipal 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (BJ-SASAC). 
Beijing SASAC plays the role of owner on behalf of Beijing city, and is responsible 
for supervising the management of assets and business operations in BAIHC and its 
 




affiliate Beijing-Hyundai.114 While BJ-DRC/SASAC have more direct and powerful 
influence on BAIHC than the central SASAC, if business projects are expected to 
have an enormous effect on the overall society, Beijing-Hyundai reports to both 
central NDRC/SASAC and BJ-DRC/SASAC.115 In addition, top executives of 
BAIHC are appointed, evaluated, and removed by BJ-SASAC through legal 
procedures.116  
 Under the leadership of the Beijing city mayor, Beijing-DRC provides 
BAIHC with a variety of preferential policies in order to make BAIHC competitive 
with both domestic and international enterprises in China. Some argue that 
“interventionist instruments of industrial policy were either unavailable or 
unattractive to officials in Beijing,”117 but Beijing Municipal Bureau of Industrial 
Development (Beijing shi gongye cuzin ju) officially introduces the details of 
preferential policies and their potential benefits in attracting more foreign investment 
and enterprises.118 In theory, while BJ-DRC is in charge of enhancing comprehensive 
coordination, and reducing routine microscopic administration,119 BJ-DRC maintains 
                                                 
114 China Auto Industry Yearbook (Zhongguo Qich Gongye Nianjian) 2005. p. 76; Also refer to the 
official website of Beijing Municipal Government, 
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Organizations/t1570.htm 
115 Interview with Fan Bi who is senior manager of Beijing Auto Investment Corp., Ltd. (February 17, 
2006) 
116 Interview with Mao Hai in Beijing Automobile Investment Corp. Ltd., (November 2005). Also see, 
“Beijing Municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission,” 
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Organizations/t1570.htm 
117 Segal and Thun (2001: 578) 
118 Bureau of Industry Development in Beijing Municipal Government presents the full accounts of the 
auto industry structure, development advantages and resources as well as preferential policies. See, 
http://www.bjid.gov.cn/ywwz/auto/autoAdv2.asp (Access: Oct. 31, 2006) 
119 Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (Beijing Shi Fazhan he Gaige 
Weiyuanhui), “Introduction to the Functions of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development 




influential levers of control over local auto manufacturers by regulating sources of 
funding for land and infrastructure building, taxes, and human resources.120  
 For example, the Beijing-Hyundai JV auto firm has been taking great 
advantage of three kinds of preferential policies from BJ-DRC.121 First is the 
financial support to purchase land and to build infrastructure for auto production in 
the city. In order to help construct auto factories in Beijing, where the land is highly 
expensive compared to other regions, the Beijing municipal government assiste
Beijing-Hyundai’s purchase of the land. Beijing-Hyundai’s manufacturing factory in 
Shiyan was originally “Beijing Qingsing Qiche Gongsi,” which was built in 1998 on
1,600 thousand acres of land, and cost 160 billion yuan for building infrastructure. In 
2001, this factory was taken over by Beijing-Hyundai at a price of 45 billion yuan 
through BJ-DRC’s financial support.  Another preferential policy is the “two 
year exemption, three year reduction” tax policy (“liangnian mian, sannian jian”). 
This was designed to encourage the inflow of foreign direct investment and capital
into China’s auto industry by providing JV auto firms with advantages in the tax 
structure. In China, all automotive manufacturing enterprises are responsible for 
paying 33 percent tax from their annual profit revenue: 30 percent is remitted to t
central and 3 percent is remitted to local governments. JV auto firms do not need to 
pay any tax for the first two years, which makes a big difference between JV aut






turers in the end.122  
                                                 
120 Interview with Mao Hai, Beijing Automobile Investment Co., Ltd., Beijing (November 10, 2005) 
121 Interviews from Mao Hai, Fan Bi, and Ko Jaejung in Beijing  
122 Including private auto firm, they argue that since the market structure itself in China is not fair, we 




 The final source of regulation is human resources. To recruit highly qualified 
engineers and technicians in BAIE, the Beijing city government provided BAIE some 
assistance in employing advanced engineers and technicians from other auto firms. 
Thereby, BAIHC or Beijing-Hyundai, under the support of BJ-DRC, could attract 
excellent human resources from other auto firm such as FAW or Dongfeng.123          
   
Regulation from the Central Government 
While Beijing Auto Industry Holding Corporations (BAIHC) is a local state firm 
owned by the Beijing municipal government, there is central oversight that exercises 
indirect control over the business of Beijing auto enterprises. First, the center may 
oversee and exert indirect control over the appointment of top executives and senior 
managers in BAIHC. Although BJ-SASAC retains the right to appoint the president 
of BAIHC, given that BJ-SASAC is organized by the mayor, who is nominated by the 
central party, there is influential central oversight over personnel in Beijing’s auto 
state firms.   
 Second, it must be noted that “the central and Beijing governments are 
sometimes hard to distinguish and appear to act together.”124 The line between the 
central government and the Beijing government is often ambiguous, and key posts 
such as the mayor or the party secretary of the municipal party committee are directly 
nominated by the central party.125 In doing so, the central party-state keeps its eye on 
Beijing city’s automotive business without an invisible central supervising agency as 
                                                 
123 Interview with Mao Hai in Beijing Automobile Investment Corp Ltd., Beijing (Nov. 2005) 
124 Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 35. 
125 Brian Hook eds., Beijing and Tianjin: Towards a Millennial Megalopolis (Hong Kong:; Oxford: 




seen in Shanghai’s auto enterprises. To be sure, governors, mayors, and party 
secretaries in other provinces or cities are also appointed by the central party-state. 
Yet the difference is that the Beijing municipal government is more particularly tied 
with the central party-state than are other provinces and cities.126 In many cases, 
Beijing’s government and party leaders concurrently serve as members of the Central 
Committee of the CCP and Politburo.127 Most of them have tended to be promoted 
straight to the center, unless their performance in Beijing is not satisfactory. This has 
implicitly encouraged local leadership to be more responsive to central policies in 
order to give a good impression to the central leaders for future career promotion.   
 Furthermore, as addressed in the 2004 auto industrial development policy, the 
central government may regulate the sector through the right of approval for new JVs, 
business projects costing over 10 million USD, and new market entry. In effect, 
central leadership is deeply involved in invigorating Beijing’s auto industry. Beijing 
set about accelerating the development of automobile manufacturing as a key 
strategic sector not by Beijing municipal government’s initiative, but rather by the top 
leadership at the center. When BAIHC searched for a new foreign JV partner, the 
central government was involved from the very beginning of negotiations, not just at 
the final approval stage. For example, in comparison with French auto maker 
Renault’s 6 years of negotiations with BAIHC, Korea’s Hyundai signed a contract 
soon after the meeting between the vice premier of the State Council, Wu Bangguo, 
and the president of Hyundai Group, Jung Mong-Gu. As such, the decision of a 
                                                 
126 Ibid 






foreign partner for Beijing Automobile Investment Corp. was not determined by 
Beijing city, but the central top leaders.  
 
V. Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explained the pattern of regulatory control identified in China’s 
auto industry by examining three major auto SOEs. It has been well acknowledged 
that domestic political and economic institutions generate various forms of regulatory 
mechanisms in a global economy, but even within China’s auto industry the forms of 
regulation are varied, not only between central and local state firms, but also even 
between local producers. In explaining centralized regulatory power in the Chinese 
auto industry, I have introduced the concept of “mixed regulation.” In the context of 
central oversight, asset and personnel management in local state firms SAIC and 
BAIC are monitored by invisible central regulatory power, whereas central state firm 
FAW is tightly supervised by formal public agencies. In this study, I distinguish these 
varied patterns of central control: the former is “soft” regulation, while the latter is 
“hard” regulation. Hence, soft and hard mixed forms of regulation are identified in 






CENTRALIZED HARD REGULATION: 








Like the automobile industry, China’s telecom service is certainly a key strategic 
sector that has been rapidly achieving both development and reform over the past two 
decades.1 Since 1998, the growth rate of the telecom industry has been maintaining 
more than 20%; the sales value has increased from 156.2 in 1998 to 111,576 billion 
yuan as of 2005.2 This rapid development of the telecom industry is directly 
correlated to a series of regulatory reforms which were launched in 1994 by 
establishing China Unicom, and accelerated by the creation of the regulatory Ministry 
of Information Industry (MII) and the WTO entry in 2001. The telecom service 
industry provides us an excellent comparison with the auto manufacturing sector, in 
that it shows how the Chinese state governs these two strategically important but very 
different industries. The automobile and telecom service sectors have differences in 
historical pathways, forms of ownership and governing structure, as well as sectoral 
characteristics. 
                                                 
1 “Guoziwei Mingque Dianxin Hangye Wei Guoyou Jingji Yankong Yangye,” Beijing Yuele Xinbao 
(December 12, 2006) 
2 Cheng Li, 2006, “China’s Telecom Industry on the Move: Domestic Competition, Global Ambition, 




In this chapter, I argue that the new regulatory mechanism in China’s telecom 
industry has four main features. First, despite regulatory reform and growing market 
forces, central state control still continues. But, both the actor and the manner of 
control are remarkably changed through regulatory reform. While the old regime was 
a state-run monopoly system where the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
(MPT) was the main actor in controlling the telecom business as operator, the new 
mechanism is a state-overseeing oligarchy structure in which the number of operators 
has increased but is confined to six firms. In addition, it is tightly supervised by 
SASAC as the new actor for continued state control. By enacting various legal 
regulations and rules, SASAC has been expanding its intervention in the telecom 
market, from asset management and personnel to budget and investments. Compared 
with the softly central oversight in the auto industry, I conceptualize the pattern of 
regulation in the telecom sector as “centralized hard regulation.” The authority of 
oversight is centralized, in that local governments have no substantial right to make 
policy decisions, for all leading telecom firms are owned by the central government; 
local telecom firms are simply local units of central firms. Hard regulation here refers 
to tight state control over the business of industry through formal state institutions by 
rules. As I have pointed out earlier, therefore, the focus on how SASAC, not the MII, 
regulates the telecom operators more clearly shows the nature of the regulatory state 
in China’s telecom industry.  
Previous studies that investigate a changing mode of economic governance in 




or its relationship with telecom enterprises.3 To appreciate how the Chinese state 
governs the telecom industry, however, we need to pay close attention to the SASAC, 
which is playing actual “boss (laoban)” of telecom operators, and its growing power 
of managing the business of telecom firms. On the surface, the MII as a regulatory 
institution (jianguan jiegou) exists to encourage and oversee fair competition, but, 
above that, substantial control over the telecom business comes from the powerful 
comprehensive state agency, SASAC. Its empowerment is also interrelated with tight 
central state ownership of telecom firms and continued strong control of the party 
organs.   
Second, while it is often not explicitly visible, the party organ is deeply 
enmeshed in both enterprises and government, and exercises considerable influence 
on the operation of the firms. Through the right of personnel selection, the party may 
control the high-level officials of the MII and the senior executives of telecom firms. 
Although there are many efforts toward corporate reform in China’s telecom sector, 
the party committee in telecom corporations still dominates the board of directors; the 
party secretary of the head of the party committee holds the chairmanship of the 
board concurrently with the president of the firm. Moreover, in 2003, SASAC 
evolved from the Central Enterprise Work Commission (zhongyang qiye gongzuo 
weiyuanhui), which was under the direct leadership of the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP. Given this bureaucratic origin, the empowerment of SASAC in 
managing the telecom sector is also associated with the continued hand of the party in 
business.  
                                                 




Third, the function of the MII to oversee the sector is constrained not only by 
the powerful influence of SASAC and the party organs, but also by the NDRC and 
the State Council. The MII is mainly responsible for facilitating and supervising fair 
competition in favor of consumer interests in the telecom market, but the playing field 
and rules of the game are formulated by the top central state institutions. The telecom 
service fee, market entry, telecom industrial policies, and the structure of the market 
are ultimately finalized by the top governmental bodies.  
Finally, above the comprehensive commissions and ministries, the Leading 
Small Group on Informatization (xinxihua lingdao xiaozu), directly underneath the 
State Council, make the authoritative policy decision for the reform and development 
of the information industry, including the telecom sector. It is the least known 
governing state body, but shows the strategic significance of the sector placed upon it 
by top Chinese leadership. 
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Therefore, the story of China’s telecom service regulation shows that strategic 
industries, similar to the auto sector, are governed by centralized oversight, even 
though the industries have significant differences in both their governing structures 
and their forms of ownership. Compared with centralized soft/invisible regulation in 
the auto industry, the pattern of hard regulation in the telecom industry demonstrates 
the complexities of China’s regulatory mechanism within the centralized economic 
governance. Theoretically, the model of a regulatory state governing the telecom 
industry in China is likely to conform to neither Dali Yang’s centralized but 
minimalist state favoring the buyer’s market, nor Minxin Pei’s decentralized 
predatory state. Rather, the form of centralized hard regulation falls somewhere in 
between these two extremes. On the one hand, the empowerment of SASAC over the 
MII manifests tight central state control over the telecom business to secure crucial 
state assets, which would never lead to minimal party-state intervention, as Yang 
proposes. On the other hand, the centralized political authority and property rights in 
the telecom industry could greatly reduce the possibility for rent-seeking. By holding 
the right of personnel selection in both central state institutions and telecom firms, the 
party maintains the levers of control in managing the sector. 
 The telecommunications industry consists of service and equipment parts, and 
the services are divided into basic and value-added services.4 In this study, my 
                                                 
4 Telecommunications service is divided into two categories: basic telecommunication and value-added 
services. Basic telecom service include “all telecommunication services, both public and private that 
involve end-to-end transmission of customer supplier information” Examples are: 1) voice telephone; 
2) packet-switched data transmission; 3) circuit-switched data transmission; 4) telegraph; 5) facsimile; 
6) private leased circuit services; 7) analog/digital cellular/mobile telephone; 8) mobile date; 9) paging; 
10) satellite-based mobile; 11) fixed satellite services. See, “WTO: Telecommunications Services 
Coverage,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_coverage_e.htm (Access: 
July 18, 2007). Value-added telecom services are for which “suppliers add value to the customer’s 




research focus is on basic telecom services, particularly voice telephone services 
including cellular/mobile telephone service. These cover local, long distance, 
international, and wire-based services. I do not look at paging or telegraph services in 
the basic services. 
In this chapter, after introducing the old regime governing China’s telecom 
industry before the reform, I explain internal and external challenges that led the 
Chinese government to conduct a comprehensive restructuring program and its 
successive procedures in China’s telecom markets. The chapter proceeds to discuss 
the new regulatory architecture of the sector and proposes centralized hard regulation 
as the specific form of the regulatory state in China’s telecom service industry. It then 
details two policies:  price and market entry.     
 
 
II. State-run Monopoly: the Old Regime 
 
Until the 1970s, the telecommunications system had been mainly used for semi-
military and administrative needs.5 As a consequence, China’s telecom industry was 
fairly backward, resulting from a lack of technology and investment capital, and 
inefficient management. Since the 1980s, the Chinese top leadership has perceived its 
critical importance as an infrastructure industry in order to boost future economic 
development and to enhance the standard of living. Through various preferential 
policies, such as tax reduction, back loans, or high installation fees, the Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                           
include: on-line data processing, on-line data base storage and retrieval, electronic data interchange, 
email, and voice mail.  
5 Yan Wan, 2001, “Sector Reform,” In edited by Jintong Lin et al., Telecommunications in China: 




Post and Telecommunications (MPT), the former regulator and operator before the 
reform, began to take advantage of financial resources in developing the sector.6 
Accelerated by  government policies, China’s telecom industry has developed rapidly. 
The revenue from the industry was 2 billion yuan in 1985, increasing to 11 billion 
yuan in 1990, 120.9 billion yuan in 1996, and 210.36 billion yuan (USD 25.3 billion) 
in the first five months of 2004.7 Apart from telecom development policies from the 
government, fast growth was attained by the sustained stable development of the 
national economy and the rise of the national income since the early 1990s.   
Prior to the 1998 regulatory reform, the major feature of China’s 
telecommunications regime was the state-run monopoly system. By integrating China 
Telecom into a commercial arm, the MPT had regulated the overall telecom market 
and at the same time operated the business of the telecom industry. While the SPC 
was the highest level economic planning commission in China, it had little influence 
on managing the telecom industry. Not only because the SPC was not independent 
from other ministries, but also because the MPT held the control of the national 
communications infrastructure, the development of the telecom industry was basically 
planned, regulated and operated by the MPT.8 
                                                 
6 Since China was seriously deficient in investment capitals for telecom industry in the early stage of 
development, the Chinese government made up a deficit by charging high rate installation fees for 
telephone lines. During the 7th Five year plan (1986-1990), the installation fees and sub-charge took up 
30% of the total investment capitals in the telecom industry; over the 8th Five year plan (1991-1995), it 
grew up to 50%. Wan (2001: 163) 
7 Chen Xiaohong, 1999, “Zhongguo Dianxinye: Zhengce, Chanye Zuzhi de Bianhua ji Kugan Jianyi,” 
Guanli Shiji (Management World), No. 1, p. 131; “Ministry to Enhance Supervision on Telecom,” 
China Business Weekly (July 12, 2004) 
8 Lynn Crisanti, “Untangling China’s Datacom Networks,” The China Business Review Vol. 24, Issue 




The MPT was also in charge of finance and strategic development planning 
for the industry. To encourage the rapid growth of the “crown jewel”9 of the telecom 
industry, the Chinese government provided the MPT with jurisdiction over 
installation fee decisions and various preferential policies, such as tax reduction or 
exemption and  privileges in bank loans.10 This monopolized provider, the MPT, had 
made basic telecom service, including the fixed-line, mobile service, and data 
transmission, very expansive but low-quality. It is said that, by the late 1990s, the 
installation cost for a fixed-line for urban Chinese people was nearly the same as one 
month’s pay. As an effort to improve the situation, in 1988 other related ministries 
such as the Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI), the Ministry of Electronic Power 
(MEP), and the Ministry of Railways (MR) asked the State Council to organize a 
rival service provider, China Unicom.11Yet due to the strong resistance of the MPT, it 
was not until Deng’s southern tour in 1992 that they realized the importance of some 
domestic competition. Thus, in 1993, China Unicom’s development was finally 
approved by the State Council. Following this, Jitong Communication Corporation 
was established in 1994 as another player in order to provide Internet services. Due to 
the MPT’s resistance and unfair policies to keep up its vested interests, the market 
was still nearly monopolized by China Telecom. But the establishment of China 
Unicom and Jitong demonstrates that the top Chinese leadership was conscious of the 
need and importance of introducing competition in the telecom market. Since then, 
the Chinese government has undertaken successive structural reforms to create 
market competition. 
                                                 
9 “Into the Crucible,” The Economist, (November 3, 2001) 
10 Wan (2001: 162-163; 167) 




On the other hand, in 1994, the MPT’s operation arm, the Directorate General 
of Telecommunications, came to be legally registered in the State Administration of 
Industry and Commence as a separate system operator named China Telecom. But the 
substantial separation of government from the telecom business did not appear yet; 
China Telecom worked closely with the MPT (regulator) until the MPT was merged 
into the MII in 1998. It was generally perceived that “MPT has not yet been separated 
into regulatory and commercial branches, and still regulates and operates within 
traditional broadcasting, electronics, and telecoms boundaries.”12 
In regulating local telecom business, the geographical and administrative 
structure of governmental authority was organized in three levels. At the central level, 
the MPT guided and supervised the overall industry.  Local units of the MPT, known 
as Post and Telecommunications Administrations (PTAs) were established at the 
provincial and municipal levels. Under the leadership of provincial/municipal PTAs, 
post and telecom bureaus (PTBs) were set up at prefectural levels.  
Under the system of dual leadership (shuangzhong lingdao), 
provincial/municipal PTAs were administered by both the central MPT and local 
governments simultaneously. By decentralizing decision-making authority and 
financial responsibility to the local levels, the MPT allowed local governments to 
make local telecom development plans and direct investment. Yet it was schemed not 
to transform but to maintain the pre-existing hierarchical structure. All revenues from 
telecom services were first collected by the MPT, and then redistributed to each PTA, 
                                                 




while the MPT kept hold of much of this revenue.13 Monopolized authority for the 
distribution of revenue between the MPT and the PTAs demonstrated a hierarchically 
centralized management of the telecom industry. It demonstrates that “the PTAs were 
essentially provincial-level MPT with parallel bureaucratic and economic interests,”14 
even though there were bureaucratic tensions between the MPT and the PTAs. 
 
 
III. Reform and New Challenges 
 
The creation of a regulatory agency, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) in 
1998, and the following market restructuring clearly signal the launch of substantial 
reforms in China’s telecom industry. The reforms were driven not only by internal 
demands and changes, but also by external forces, such as the requirements of WTO 
accession and a global wave of regulatory reforms. Internally, the 1998 administrative 
restructuring program, which abolished or integrated a number of industrial ministries 
to streamline the former inefficient bureaucratic structure, facilitated the 
establishment of the new regulatory body, the MII. There were demands to institute a 
regulatory agency responsible for overseeing the growing competition in the telecom 
market. Externally, the most significant impetus to push the reform was the WTO 
accession.  
The telecom service industry in China had been exclusively closed to foreign 
investments. However, the Chinese government could not delay opening its telecom 
service market, because one of the entry requirements for WTO membership is the 
                                                 
13 Milton Mueller and Zixiang Tan, China in the Information Age: Telecommunications and the 





Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA).15 The BTA stipulates the immediate 
opening of the telecom service market to foreign investments, and specifies the 
maximum ratio of the ownership of foreign firms within six years. Upon entry, 
foreign firms may take up 50% ownership of the value-added service firms in 2 years, 
and 49% ownership in the mobile and fixed-line service in 5-6 years.16 BTA 
regulatory reforms also require the implementation of transparent and fair criteria for 
service licensing and the building-up of an independent regulatory body. This would 
be the most challenging issue for the Chinese government: meeting a global standard. 
In addition, incoming foreign telecom giants after WTO entry provided the Chinese 
government with a strong stimulus to create large-scale telecom firms that would be 
capable of competition with foreign giants.17    
Internally, the rise of the MII, replacing the MPT and assuming both the 
former regulatory agency and monopoly operator, is notable. This also contributed to 
reducing the bureaucratic tensions between the MPT and other ministries (i.e. MEI or 
MR) regarding the MPT’s monopoly. Given that China Unicom had been always in 
unfavorable competition with China Telecom backed up by the MPT, integrating two 
competitive ministers, the MPT and the MEI, into the MII ultimately promotes fair 
competition in the telecom market. A second feature of the reform is the attainment of 
the separation of government and business (zhengqi fenkai). By completing the 
separation of China Telecom, which had been already under way in the period of the 
                                                 
15 See, the WTO official website on the telecommunications sector, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.htm (Access: April 17, 2007) 
16 Bing Zhang and Mike W. Peng, 2000, “Telecom Competition, Post-WTO Style,” The China 
Business Review (May-June), p. 14 
17 This comment is from Zhang Xinzhu who closely works as the telecom policy-maker, and is director 
of Research Center for Regulation and Competition, the Chinese Academy of Social Science, “Netcom 




MPT, the MII no longer operates the daily business of telecom companies. Instead, 
the MII intensifies the regulatory authority to encourage and oversee fair competition 
and takes charge of drafting most policies and rules (i.e. service fees or market 
competition).18 Finally, China’s emphasis on competition in the telecom market was 
implemented by the continuous restructuring of the sector, including the successive 
break-up of China Telecom and the entry of new players. Despite the creation of 
China Unicom and China Jitong, the market was predominated by China Telecom. In 
1998, in the mobile services, the market share of China Unicom only remained 6% 
while China Telecom accounted for 94%.19 Concerned about this limited competition 
and unbroken monopolized structure, the Leading Small Group on Informatization 
(xinxihua gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) under the Zhu Rongji’s leadership pushed forward 
carrying out further restructuring reform. Its major goal is to break up China 
Telecom’s monopoly and bring about more effective competition.    
The first round of restructuring was finalized by the State Council in 1999 
after the MII proposed four different drafts.20 The major issue for the government 
was not to introduce new players, but to break up China Telecom, because the 
creation of new operators, China Unicom and China Jitong, was assessed as not very 
successful in changing the market structure. In breaking up the monopoly of China 
Telecom, there were various suggestions and debates from government-funded 
institutions, universities, and consulting companies. The focus of these debates was 
“how” to split it up, horizontally or vertically. A horizontal break-up suggests the 
                                                 
18 Interview, in BUPT, Beijing (December 2005) 
19 Zhang and Peng (2000: 12) 
20 Scott Yunxiang Guan, China’s Telecommunications Reforms: From Monopoly Towards Competition 




split of the elephant-like China Telecom into small local-unit telecom firms by 
region, allowing China Telecom to maintain its former comprehensive services. On 
the other hand, a vertical split highlights the functional divisions of China Telecom
that dominated fixed-line, mobile, satellite, and paging services. By adopting a 
vertical break-up, China Telecom was divided into three companies, each with a 
different service area: China Mobile in the wireless services; China Satellite for the 





ng distance fixed line 
rvices.22  
                                                
21 State efforts to break up China Telecom’s long history of monopoly gave
business licenses to new players. Two new basic service providers launched basic
service in 2000: China Netcom and China Railcom. Both aimed to compete with 
China Telecom, but their target services were different. China Netcom operated 
internet service and provided IP telephony and other value-added services. In the 
















21 Qingjiang Kong, 2001, “China’s Telecom Regulatory Regime on the Eve of WTO Accession,” 
Issues & Studies (July/August), 37 (4), pp. 165-166  
22 China Netcom has distinctive internal enterprise structure from other telecom service SOEs. It 
consists of “four state-owned share holders that managed to receive $325 million in equity investment 










                         China Paging        
                                          (1999)                                          China Telecom (2002) 
C l           China Telehina Te ecom                            com  
      (1993)              China Telecom            (2000)                 China Netcom (20
                             (1999)                 
02) 
China Mobile  
           
itong (1994)                                           
   (2000) 
                                          Merged    J
 
hina UnicomC  (1994)             Merged 
 
                            China Satellite (1999)    
 
                                                                China Railcom (2000) 
ources: Wang Xudong, “Some Issues on Informatization in China and Research in CIS,” Center for 




Networks Communications Group (China Netcom), created by the union of the 
                                                
 





Despite the break-up of China Telecom and the creation of new service provide
China Telecom still accounted for more than 90% of the market share in local 
network service; two competitors, China Netcom and China Railcom, called for an 
additional break-up of China Telecom to create more effective competition. These 
two companies lobbied for a second break-up of China Telecom,23 but a number of 
telecom analysts and experts suggested the creation of new service providers or the 
improvement of a regulatory mechanism for effective oversight rather than anoth
break-up of China Telecom. In December 2001, the State Council decided on a 
second-round split of China Telecom into two firms: China Telecom and China 
 




former China Netcom and Jitong Communications.24 Both provide fixed-line service, 
but while China Telecom is in charge of services for 10 provinces, including the north 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Hebie, and Shanxi) and northeast areas (Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Helongjiang), and Henan and Shandong, China Netcom provides services in less 
developed northern provincial regions.25 Kan Kaili,  telecom expert at Beijing 
University of Post and Telecommunications, did not agree with the idea of a second 
break-up of China Telecom, and warns of the potential possibility of the rise of 
“regional monopoly” rather than increasing competition.  
In effect, before the State Council made the final decision to divide China 
Telecom into North and South, the SDPC in May 2001 notified several telecom 
experts to attend an open discussion regarding the China Telecom break-up. At the 
meeting they recognized that the main issue was not whether the second-round break-
up of China Telecom was profitable, but how to break up China Telecom. 
Specifically, the Leading Small Group (lingdao xiaozu), directly under the State 
Council, played a key role in the planning and enforcement of splitting China 
Telecom into North and South.26 The Leading Group was directed by the prime 
minister and consisted of six party-state officials. Led by the MII, the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), the Organization Department (DO) of the CCP, the SDPC, and the 
SETC organized the Leading Group, and each member of the Leading Group 
assumed a specific responsibility:  the MoF was responsible for managing the state 
assets; the DO appointed the top executives of South-Telecom and of North-Netcom; 
                                                 
24 “Fangan huo Guowuyuan Pizhun Zhongguo Dianxin Zhengshi Huafenwei Nanbei Liangbufen,” 
http://it.sohu.com/97/03/it_article5710397.shtml (Access: April 16, 2007) 
25 Ibid 
26 The origins, constitution, and functions of the Leading Small Group of Informatization are discussed 




the MII took on drafting policies.27 Yet the most important part is the decision of the 
top executives of the firms, for one MII official said that the successful development 
of companies ultimately rests on who the president of the firm is.28 One telecom 
expert/economist at Beijing University asserts that continuous break-up schemes 
cannot introduce substantial competition in China’s telecom market unless the price is 
set in open-market competition, and private enterprise and capital are allowed to 
enter.            
 
Table 4-1: Comparison of the Telecom Regime 
 Before reform After reform 
Operator MPT SASAC (boss) / Six Firms 
Regulator MPT MII 
Owner Government Government / 
Shareholders 
 
Sources: Interviews in BUPT, DRC, CASS (Institute of Industry Economy, Institute of Law), 





IV. New Regulatory Mechanism 
 
The new regulatory architecture consists of four leading state institutions: the State 
Council, the MII, the NDRC, and SASAC. Compared with the old regime dominated 
by the MPT, there are more state actors; their division of labor is transparent, 
                                                 
27 Wan Lijian, 2001, “Gepa Liyi Longzheng Hudou Zhongguo Dianxin Fenzhe Niandi Quzhong 





although it is often overlapped. In this section, I first introduce the overall structure of 
central oversight and their major functions, and then discuss the primary 
characteristics of the new regime, which will give insight into the form of the 
regulatory state in the telecom industry. Unlike Dali Yang’s model, which 
hypothesizes the appearance of the modernized minimalist government in China’s 
market economy, the new regulatory mechanism illustrates how the party-state 
maintains its levers of control over telecom firms, despite government and corporate 
reforms since the late 1990s.  
 
 
The Structure of Central Authority  
 
 
The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) 
 
While the 1998 state restructuring program abolished or downgraded most industrial 
ministries from ministry (bu) to bureau (ju) under the supervision of the 
comprehensive state institution (i.e. SETC), the creation of the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) by merging the MPT and the MEI is an exceptional 
case.29 The MII is established to be mainly responsible for supervising (jianguan) the 
overall telecom market as the regulator.30 The MII concurrently takes on certain 
government functions for the development of the information industry. The MII drafts 
industrial policies and various rules for regulatory control, and exercises control 
                                                 
29 Yang (2004: 37) 
30 “Research on the Government Management Problem in the Natural Monopoly Industry: Study of the 
Government Management System in the Telecommunications Industry,” (“Longduanxing hangye de 
zhengfu guanzhi wenti yanjiu”). 2003. Economic Research Reference (Jingji Yanjiu Cankao), 25. p. 
5;Liu Shijin and Feng Fei. 2006. Monopoly Industry: A Stronghold Drive for Reform (Longduan 




(guanzhi) over price, cooperating with the NDRC.31 Although the MII is the key 
regulator in the telecom service sector, the functions of oversight are shared with 
other state agencies, such as the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance, and the Industrial 
and Commercial Bureau. (gongshang guanliju). Therefore, the independent functions 
of the MII are structurally constrained.    
 
 
Table 4-2: Telecom Regulation 
 
Content of regulation  Regulator 
Market entry MII, Industrial and Commercial Bureau, NDRC 
Price  MII, Ministry of Finance, NDRC, wujiaju 
Services quality MII, Bureau of Technology Regulation 
 
Sources: Liu Shijin and Fei Feng. 2006. Longduan Hangye Gaige Gongjian [The Reform in the 
Monopoly Industry]. Beijing: Zhongguo Shuili Shuidian Chubanshe, p. 229. 
 
 
The governing structure of telecom regulation is a hierarchically organized, central-
provincial dual system. At the local level, the former Post and Telecommunication 
Administrations (PTAs) at the provincial/municipal levels were dismissed.32 Based 
on “Notice Regarding Building Local Telecom Management Structure Scheme” 
issued by the State Council in 2000, provincial- and municipal-level Communica
Administrations (shengji dianxin guanli ju) were newly established, mainly to 
leverage regulatory oversight over the business of local telecom firms and to “set up a 
nationwide supervision system for its profitable telecom sector.”
tions 
                                                
33 They are also in 
 
31 Interview with Wu Hong, the faculty of Beijing University of the Post and Telecommunications 
(BUPT), Beijing (December 2005) 
32 Su Jinsheng, “China Telecom Industry: Reform, Development and Regulation,” 
Telecommunications Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Information Industry, unpublished 
(Access: July 20, 2007) 




charge of securing fair access to public telecom utilities and coordinating economic 
and service relations among telecom firms across localities.34 While the new system 
puts more emphasis on the regulatory task of protecting fair market competition, local 
communications administrations exhibit similar structural and functional relationships 
with the MII and local governments. Similar to the former PTA regime, 
communications administrations at the provincial/municipal levels are under dual 
leadership (shuangzhong lingdao), but it is clearly addressed that the primary 
leadership is held by the MII in regulating the local telecom industry.35 
Provincial/municipal communications administrations on behalf of the MII supervise, 
as long as local telecom firms follow the various policies and rules set by the head 
offices. They are organized by officials directly dispatched by the MII, and 
implement central policies and rules at the local level. Telecom markets at the county 
and township levels are supervised by the provincial/municipal communications 
administration.36 Local governments have only advising authority (“professional 
relationship,” yewu guanxi) over local telecom administrations, which are as good as 
local agents of the MII.37     
 
 
                                                 
34 Shanghai Communications Administration (Shanghai Tongxin Guanliju) website (Access: July 20, 
2007) 
35 See, Shanghai City/Beijing City/Guangdong Province Communications Administration’s official 
websites as the examples of major telecom localities.  
http://www.bca.gov.cn/filelist.jsp?officeid=gjjj&catalogid=aboutus ; 
http://www.gdca.gov.cn/about/index.asp (access: 07/20/2007) 
36 Liu and Fei (2006: 228) 
37 Subject Division Group for the Research of the Governmental Control over the Natural Monopoly 
Industry. 2003. “Dianxinye de Zhengfu Guanzhi Wenti Yanjiu” [Studying the Problem of the 
Government Control over the Telecommunications Industry]. Jingji Yanjiu Cankao [Economic 




The NDRC in the Telecom Industry 
 
Compared with the automobile industry, the NDRC plays a lesser role in the telecom 
sector because more state institutions are involved in governing the sector. However, 
the NDRC still remains important as a supra-ministerial commission with respect to 
two issues. First, the NDRC is responsible for making telecom industrial policy, and 
has the right to review various policies and rules drafted by the MII and to suggest its 
own policy recommendations to the State Council, which retains the final authority to 
approve.38 Since the NDRC does not specialize in the telecom industry, policies are 
drafted by the MII. As a macro economy coordinator, the NDRC harmonizes telecom 
industrial policies with the overall development of other industries.  
The other function is to set telecom service prices. Because the service fee in 
the basic infrastructure (i.e. telecom) exerts a great influence on the social stability 
and the national economy, the NDRC is actively involved in the policymaking 
process of the service fee, coordinating with the MII.39 At the national level, the 
NDRC and the MII discuss and make decisions about telecom prices on the condition 
that the State Council approves. At the provincial level, the telecom service fee is set 
by a provincial price bureau (wujia ju), which is under dual-subordination from both 
the NDRC and provincial governments. The local price bureau cooperates with local 
governments, but they are under the direct leadership of the NDRC. While local 
governments and the local price bureau take into account the developmental condition 
of the local economy when they set telecom prices, their final decisions are basically 
grounded on the national policies.   
                                                 
38 Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council, Internal Report (2005); Interview with 
Wu Hong in BUPT, Beijing (December 2005) 








The SASAC is a state institution that supervises the management of state assets in 
state enterprises. It was established in 2003 under the State Council, and its primary 
job is to secure and increase the value of crucial state assets by monitoring and 
restructuring the 159 centrally-owned SOEs (zhongyang qiye).40 In the telecom 
sector, SASAC supervises the assets management of the six centrally-owned telecom 
service firms: China Telecom, China Netcom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China 
Railcom, and China Satellite. Given that taxes from the telecom service firms account 
for 42% of the national economy, SASAC’s supervision of the telecom service firms’ 
assets and profits is strongly required as the practice of shareholder. By directly 
dispatching asset management teams, SASAC regularly monitors either the loss or the 
increase of state assets.41 Also, six telecom service firms annually report their 
financial status, such as revenue, profit, tax, assets to SASAC. SASAC takes charge 
of “managing” state assets to increase their value. In doing so, SASAC is allowed to 
design the restructuring plan, and the reshuffling of the telecom firms is mainly 
undertaken through merger. The director of SASAC, Li Rongrong, has continued to 
state that the domestic telecom sector will "definitely" be restructured.42  Since all six 
telecom service firms are central SOEs, local level SASAC has no formal authority to 
supervise the business of central telecom firms at the local level.  
                                                 
40 The number of the central SOE was 196 in 2003, but it decreases by 159 in 2007. See, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/zyqy/qyml/default.htm (Access: March 14, 2007) 
41 Interview in BUPT (Dec. 2005) 




Another role of the central SASAC is to appoint the top executives and senior 
managers of the telecom firms. Although the appointment is first recommended by 
the Party Committee of each firm and the Department of Organization of the CCP, 
the formal right of personnel management in telecom firms is in the hands of the 
central SASAC.43 In addition, SASAC retains the authority to ask government 
officials or the top and senior executives of the six leading telecom firms to move 
their positions, and this actually occurred to in 2004. The case is not confined to the 
major telecom service firms. In effect, one senior manager in Putian Telecom, one of 
the major telecom equipment firms in China, was working in China Telecom, but he 












                                                 
43 Interview in CASS, Beijing (Feb. 2006); Also see, John Ure. 2006. “Study on the Future 
Opportunities and Challenges of EU-China Trade and Investment Relations: Study 10 
Telecommunications Service” p. 29. 
























                                        
 
* “------” indicating personnel decision 
 
Sources: Based on the author’s interviews in Beijing, China (December 2005; January – 
February 2006)   
 
Likewise, each function of SASAC and the NDRC shows that SASAC holds more 
concentrated powerful regulatory control than the NDRC in the telecom service 
sector. In order to supervise the management of crucial state assets from the profitable 
telecom sector more effectively, SASAC is given a more extended scope of 
regulation in governing the business of telecom firms. While I will extensively 
discuss the growing power of SASAC later, in the telecom sector, SASAC has charge 
of not only asset and personnel management, as in other central SOEs, but also 
market restructuring and budget control. In addition, the central SOE-dominated 
structure of the sector contributes to empowering the function of SASAC. On the 




overlapped authority in regulation. In contrast to the auto industry, where the NDRC 
may make the final decisions on market entry or major investment projects, the 
NDRC in the telecom service sector shares the regulatory control with the MII 
concerning setting service fees and making industrial policies.    
 
The State Council 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the State Council holds the most powerful authority in 
governing state industries in China, because most significant policies are required to 
receive final approval from the State Council. Even though the MII is the official 
state agency responsible for the regulatory control of the telecom industry, the State 
Council is a much more powerful government body than the MII.45 The role of the 
State Council in the telecom industry is particularly notable in that market entry, 
service fees, and the restructuring of the market are controlled and finally determined 
by the State Council. Especially, new market entry is wholly decided by the State 
Council based on Regulation on Telecom Management (dianxin guanli tiaoli) and 
Government Statue of the State Council (guowuyuan zhengling). As to the service 
fee, both the MII and the NDRC are allowed to design and suggest their own policies 
to be considered, but the final decision-making authority is the State Council. While 
the MII attempts to set service fee policies considering overall market competition 
and consumer demands, the NDRC suggests the level of service fee that is compatible 
with maintaining macroeconomic development and stability. However, the final 
decision on the service fee is made by the State Council, neither the MII nor the 
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NDRC.46 Excepting the protection of consumer interests, the State Council and the 
Central Enterprise Work Group (zhongyang qiye gongwei), restructured into the 
SASAC in 2003, affect a relatively larger influence on regulatory policies and control 
than the MII.47      
 
Centralized Hard Regulation in China’s Telecom Industry 
 
 
The MII and its separation of China Telecom has been regarded as a benchmark to 
show changing government-business relations in the telecom industry. The MII as a 
regulator encourages fair competition and oversees the business of telecom firms by 
various rules. Yet the newly established SASAC serves as an overseer of telecom 
firms and is becoming the dominant actor in telecom regulation. Originated from the 
Central Enterprise Work Group (zhongyang qiye gongwei), which was under the 
direct leadership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP,48 SASAC 
controls personnel as well as supervises the state assets of large telecom operators. 
SASAC is exerting more substantial influence on the operation of telecom firms than 
the MII.49 In identifying how the Chinese state governs the telecom service industry, 
that is, the government-business relations in the sector, therefore, we need to pay 
more attention to the rapidly growing power of SASAC in managing the telecom 
industry. As the primary characteristic of the new regulatory mechanism, this section 
discusses the empowerment of SASAC and its means of control, the continued strong 
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Industry (2003: 14) 
48 Naughton (2003: 8) 




voices of the party organs, the roles of the Leading Small Group of Informatization, 
and thereby the limited power of the MII. Then, two policies, price and market entry, 
are examined to exhibit how the central party-state employs strict control over the 
telecom industry in China. 
 
 
Empowering the SASAC 
 
 
In the case of China’s telecom regulation, the empowerment of SASAC is particularly 
remarkable as a new powerful state institution. As the new overseer of telecom 
service firms, understanding the roles and influence of SASAC on the telecom firms 
is critical in accounting for how the telecom industry is governed in China. This also 
illuminates the larger relationship between government and strategic state industries 
in the Chinese political economy.    
Since the regulatory reforms, the dismantling and restructuring of the MPT 
into the MII and the separation of China Telecom from the MII in 1999 are seen as 
efforts by the Chinese government toward regulatory governance in the telecom 
service industry. Yet, the persistent public ownership in the sector invites another 
form of state control, and particularly its centralized state ownership has been 
empowering SASAC in governing the business of telecom firms. While the Chinese 
leadership contends that the division of China Telecom from the MII presents the 
successful implementation of the “separation government from business” (zhengqi 
fenkai), SASAC as the new overseer of the firms is deeply engaged in the overall 




power of SASAC in the telecom service sector comes from exclusively centralized 
state ownership, which makes it possible for SASAC to create a mechanism for 
coherent central control over the telecom firms. While foreign investors are steadily 
open to China’s basic telecom service, still rare, privately-owned firms are not 
allowed to be service carriers. As Lance Gore early argues, “the significance of 
continued public ownership is that it ties enterprises vertically to the state’s command 
structure through state agencies to whom property rights are delegated. This vertical 
tie allows the organizational structure of the party-state to continue to structure the 
otherwise market economy.”50 
In principle, SASAC is designed to be responsible mainly for supervising the 
management of crucial state assets of central SOEs, but its functions come to be more 
and more comprehensive in the telecom market. One Chinese telecom scholar even 
warns against overwhelming intervention of SASAC in the telecom industry and 
holds that many problems in the industry result from SASAC’s overstepping in the 
management of the telecom industry.51 He argues that the growing role of SASAC in 
the telecom sector is problematic, for SASAC basically does not comprehend the 
operation of the telecom business area.52 The major means of control that SASAC 
employs are: 1) restructuring (zhongzu), 2) control over budget management, and 3) 
personnel.   
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SASAC’s TOOLS OF CONTROL 
 
 
Restructuring (chongzu 重组): Through a series of regulatory reforms in China’s 
industrial economy, one of the crucial indications of movement toward a market-
oriented economy is a transformation of the mode of economic governance from 
direct governmental control to a rule-based regulatory mechanism. Rather than 
relying on state planning or price controls, state institutions make an aggregate effort 
to reform and steer the economy through “market forces.” As the new supervisor of 
telecom firms, SASAC has already started to address the importance and need for the 
structural adjustment of the telecom market. In April 2005, the head of SASAC, Li 
Rongrong, pointed out the problem of duplicated investment among the six telecom 
firms, which, he perceived, becomes unfavorable for the overall development of the 
telecom industry, as well as for preparing incoming 3G (third generation) mobile 
communications services.53 With the creation of an official ordinance in December 
2006, SASAC ensures the importance of enhancing the structural adjustment of large 
state-owned enterprises in order to facilitate an effective resource distribution of 
enterprises. In particular, this document emphasizes that SASAC will continue to 
push forward and complete the reform and restructuring of the telecom, electricity, 
and civil aviation industries.54 SASAC reaffirms in “The Review of 2006 Work of 
Planning and Development and the Thought on 2007 Major Task”  its vigorous 
                                                 
53 “The SASAC’s Head Li Rongrong: China’s Telecom Industry Should be Restructured,” (Guoziwei 
Zhuren Li Rongrong: Zhongguo Dianxinye Kending Yao Zhongzu) Beijing Evening News (Beijing Wan 
Bao), April 18, 2005.  
54  “Guanyu Tuijin Guoyou Ziben Tiaozheng he Guoyou Qiye Zhongzu de Zhidao Yijian,” December 




efforts to enhance the strategic adjustment of telecom enterprises and to encourage 
market competition.55       
Rumors of splits and mergers of the telecom service carriers have been 
growing since 2005. There was a proposal to merge the leading four firms into two 
carriers. According to this plan, China Mobile and China Netcom would be merged 
into one company; China Unicom and China Telecom would be integrated into 
another firm.56 On the other hand, the NDRC suggests the split of China Unicom’s 
GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) and CDMA (Code Division 
Multiple Access) networks and merging with China Telecom and China Netcom, 
which provide fixed-line services but are eager to start mobile service business. This 
proposal was not adopted. 
The supervisory SASAC often emphasizes the need and importance of 
structural adjustment in the telecom market to formulate effective competition and 
enhance the value of crucial state assets. Based on a recently released regulation, 
SASAC will continue to push forward the completion of reform and restructuring in 
the telecom industry.57 Although one high official of the MII states that “China 
Unicom will not be split and merged into other companies, and we have no specific 
plan to restructure,”58 the formal authority to control the operation of telecom firms is 
in the hands of the SASAC. As clearly specified in Li Rongrong’s official statement, 
the aim of SASAC is to make the central state-owned enterprises large-scale national 
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champions. Specifically, SASAC has a plan to organize 80~100 of the large central 
SOEs, including making 30~50 competitive central SOEs in the international market 
by 2010.59 For this purpose, SASAC reduced the number of central SOEs from 196 in 
2003 to 169 in 2006; it has been further reduced to 159 as of 2007.60 Four large 
central telecom carriers, China Telecom, China Netcom, China Mobile, and China 
Unicom, are inevitably restructured by SASAC. One Chinese scholar in the BUPT 
asserts that “the market restructuring not by the market forces but by state institution 
policy cannot be as much effective as planned. These administrative instruments by 
the SASAC should be abolished; we have to let the market play a role in facilitating 
the restructuring telecom market.”61 
 
Control over Budget Management: As the special state institution under the direct 
leadership of the State Council, the main responsibility of SASAC is to supervise and 
administer the security and the increase of value of crucial state assets. While the 
supervision of asset management exerts indirect influence on the actual business 
operation, the newly established “state capital budget system” (guoyou zichan yusuan 
zhi) gives SASAC considerable authority to control the financial management of 
central state firms. Under the authority of SASAC, the state capital budget system 
requires central state firms to remit some portions of after-tax profits and revenues 
from investment or restructuring to SASAC. And, expenditures for investment in new 
business projects or the planning of central state firms require approval from SASAC.  
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The idea of the state capital budget was initiated by some Chinese scholars 
when SASAC was set up in 2003.62 Moreover, Article 13 of the Interim Regulations 
on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises refers to 
“SASAC may formulate rules and systems on state-owned assets supervision and 
administration of enterprises,”63 and leaves room for making supplemental rules and 
regulations. According to this, the new regulations on the budget and investments 
management of state firms are framed by SASAC. After numerous discussions and 
negotiations among principal state agencies, a new budget system under the authority 
of SASAC officially got the office through the approval of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) in 2004, for it is part of the government budget administered by the MOF.64 
One the one hand, the revenue of a state capital budget includes revenue from state 
capital management, transferred state capital property rights, and disposed state 
capital. On the other hand, expenditures of a state capital management budget include 
expenditures from investment, business management, and loans.65 This state capital 
budget management system allows SASAC to approve the enforcement of budgets 
and settlements of accounts for central state enterprises, to monitor the procedures of 
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budget enforcement, and to determine whether the content accords with the 
development and planning of business management.66  
The ultimate aim of the state capital budget system is to improve efficiency in 
managing state capital. By doing so, it not only facilitates the effective distribution of 
budget and supervisory functions, but also tightens control over state capital. It may 
eventually lead to accelerating the best allocation of state assets and reform of the 
state asset management system.67 One scholar at the Research Institute of the MOF 
holds that the state capital budget system also contributes profits from state assets to 
complement the deficiency of social security funds in China.68 However, regardless 
of these numerous potential benefits, the state capital budget system is clearly a 
powerful instrument of control over “the largest and most profitable centrally-run 
corporations.”69 This also means that the largest state firms in China’s strategic 
industries become more susceptible to the voices of SASAC. In effect, SASAC starts 
to implement the state capital budget system in telecom enterprises, and its 
intervention steadily penetrates the business operation of telecom enterprises.70    
As of 2006, SASAC has reconfirmed its absolute control (juedui kongzhili) 
over the telecom industry, including six other key sectors, for they closely relate to 
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the national economy and security.71 Before the state capital budget system appeared, 
as an investor (chuziren) and the biggest shareholder, SASAC had been exerting great 
influence on the business of telecom enterprises, particularly when four major 
telecom carriers attained listings in foreign stock markets.72 The new system of a 
state capital budget allows SASAC to control more details of financial management 
in telecom corporations. One deputy director of the Research Institute of SASAC 
argues that the state capital budget system is designed to prevent excessive 
investment in 3G businesses as well as to encourage the building-up of long-term 
development and planning in telecom corporations.73 Furthermore, after-tax profits 
remitted to SASAC can be used for the future development of 3G firms and
a useful comprehensive financial power. In effect, it indicates the growing power of 
SASAC over central state firms. Some contend that “this new system gives SASA
new resources and various options for carrying out continuous restructuring of the 




ation.”74   
                                                
Through a state capital management budget system, SASAC comes to have 
substantial power to control expenditures and monitor the flows of revenue of state 
firms. The supervision of enterprises’ budget management is indirect interference in 
business, for SASAC is not involved in daily business management, such as specific 
production volume or the development strategy of corporations. 
 
71 Other six industries include military, electricity, oil and chemistry, coal, civil aviation, shipping. The 
SASAC “Guanyu Tuijin Guoyou Ziben Tiaozheng he Guoyou Qiye Zhongzu de Zhidao Yijian” 
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Personnel (renmian 任免): The control of personnel has been used as a key 
instrument for political control in China.75 SASAC maintains formal authority to 
appoint and remove top executives of central state-owned enterprises, including the 
six leading telecom service firms, under coordination with the Department of 
Organization (zhongzubu) of the CCP. In that most top executives of telecom firms 
are party members, the Party organization Zhongzubu takes charge of evaluating and 
appointing cadres. The Department of Organization delegates the right of personnel 
selection to SASAC, much of the actual work of managing top leaders of central 
state-owned telecom enterprises, even though SASAC’s administration remains a 
“rubber stamp” that formally approves the decisions made by the party.  
As the de facto supervisor of telecom operators, SASAC not only appoints, 
but also continues to rotate top leaders and senior managers of telecom carriers 
without pre-consultation or notice.  The first extensive rotation occurred in 2004, 
indicating arbitrary government interference and an ambiguous decision-making 
process in the management of the telecom business. Starting with the move of Zhang 
Chunjiang, the former vice-minister of the MII, to the CEO of China Netcom in 2003, 
SASAC carried out major reappointments in 2004: China Mobile’s vice-president, 
Wang Xiaochu, changed his position to board chair and CEO of China Telecom; the 
former China Unicom’s board chair and president, Wang Jianzhou, was asked to 
move to the competitor China Mobile; Chang Xiaobing, the vice-president of China 
Telecom, was appointed as the new board chair of China Unicom.76 One general 
manager working in Putian Telecom, which is not a telecom service carrier but an 
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equipment firm, says that “I was enjoying working in China Telecom, but one day I 
was reassigned to be senior manager of Putian by the government. Where I work is 
not my choice, even though I do not want to change the job, because we are working 
in state-owned enterprises. Our actual boss is the government, not the board of 
director or the president of enterprises.”77 As such, SASAC may control these 
business elites of the telecom industry through tenure appointments. One faculty 
member at Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications points out that “the 
SASAC rotates the top executives of leading telecom firms in order to prevent them 
from the rent-seeking and growing corruption problems in high level cadres.78 In 
effect, Minxin Pei holds that China’s telecom industry is “a huge source of rent 
generation because it employs a large number of employees, invests massive capitals, 
and collects monopoly rents.”79               
 
 
Continued Strong Hand of the Party 
 
Although the function and influence of the Chinese Communist Party on the business 
management of telecom enterprises is not clearly specified in public, particularly in 
foreign stock markets, the Party is still continuing to play a pivotal role in business. 
Since large central state-owned enterprises have been fully managed by the CCP,80 
the legacy of party control remains strong. The major channels of control are the 
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Department of Organization (zhongzubu) of the CCP and the Party Committee 
(dangwei) within the firms.  
In fact, the importance of the Department of Organization of the CCP 
(hereafter the DO) did not arise in interviews in the field with Chinese telecom 
experts, including government officials, policy-makers, entrepreneur, scholars, and 
journalists. In the early stage of interviews, without my question, one interviewee 
voluntarily explained the significant influence of the DO, because the tenure of high 
level officials of the government (i.e. MII) and senior managers of telecom SOEs are 
evaluated and nominated by the DO.81 While SASAC also has the right to appoint top 
executives and senior managers of state-owned telecom enterprises, substantial 
evaluations and decisions on either appointment or removal are carried out by the 
DO, whose main job is to nominate leading cadre (ganbu renmian). By creating 
political incentives, this authority of personnel by the DO constrains the independent 
function of the MII and keeps maintaining invisible sticky ties between the Party and 
telecom enterprises.82 Moreover, the appointment and removal by the DO is often 
based not on expertise but on personal relations (guanxi) or loyalties to the Party, a 
practice which is becoming a serious obstacle to future development and reform in 
the telecom industry.83 
While the DO operates as the external mechanism to exert political control 
(i.e. personnel) over the management of telecom corporations, the party committee 
(dangwei) is placed inside the firms and constitutes the central organization with the 
board of directors. The party committee in telecom corporations is not the 
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administrative or economic organization (zuzhi) but the “political” organization.84 Its 
core task is to ensure that the policies and guidelines of the communist party are well 
reflected and implemented in business. Its political functions are demonstrated 
through participation in three ways: 1) all major corporate decisions, 2) management 
of personnel resources including the control of cadres, and 3) enforcement of 
supervision.85 
First, by taking up principal positions in enterprises, the party committee 
exercises influential power on important corporate decisions. This is significant 
because most big decisions in enterprises often directly relate to the party’s guidance, 
directions, and policies. It is believed that the party committee’s central position in 
state-owned enterprises helps ensure that the business planning and policies of 
enterprises concord with the directed lines of the party and state. For China’s top 
leadership, production management and development of telecom corporations 
particularly count, due to its enormous effect on employment and revenue of the 
national economy. Second, by holding most of the principal positions in the firms, the 
party committee can be certain of the actual enforcement of the party’s principles and 
rules in the firms’ operations. Finally, the party committee is responsible for securing 
the supervision of the business performance of telecom enterprises and the leading 
cadres. It mainly monitors whether there are mistakes in the management and reform 
of large-scale production, and if corruption occurs when the leading cadres of the 
firms exercise their authority. 
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Second, with listing major telecom corporations in the Hong Kong and New 
York stock markets, China’s telecom enterprises established boards of directors and 
actively introduced the Western concept of corporate governance. Yet, the chairmen 
of the boards of directors in all four major telecom corporations are concurrently 
serving as the party secretary, which is the head of the party committee; members of 
the board belong to the party committee at the same time. The party’s dominant 
occupation of key leadership positions is remarkable, and the top executives of 
telecom firms wear multiple hats at the same time. For example, China’s Telecom’s 
CEO (zongzai), Wang Xiaochu, serves as the chairperson (dongshizhang) of the 
board of directors and the party secretary (dangzu shuji) simultaneously. Likewise, 
China Mobile’s CEO, Wang Jianzhou, is the party secretary and the chair of the 
board, and China Netcom’s CEO, Zhang Chunjiang, is also the party secretary and 
the chair of the board.  
 
Table 4-3: Three Hats of Telecom Firm Leaders 
 China Telecom China Mobile China Netcom 
CEO (zongzai) Wang Xiaochu Wang Jianzhu Zhang Chunjian 
Chairman of the 
Board of Directors 
(dongshizhang) 
Wang Xiaochu Wang Jianzhu Zhang Chunjian 
Party Secretary 
(dang shuji) 






Moreover, senior executives and members of the party committee in China’s large 
state-owned enterprises substantially overlap; “all senior executives serve on the party 
committee except those recruited from abroad and from multinationals operating in 
China.”86 Four major telecom corporations exhibit this case exactly; the board of 
directors is dominated by members of the party committee. The board of directors in 
China Telecom consists of 14 members; the chairman and 7 executive directors are 
occupied by members of the party committee.87 China Unicom’s board of directors is 
organized with 13 members; 8 executive directors of the board are members of the 
party committee.88 China Mobile’s senior management consists of 7 top executives: 
one president, five vice-presidents, and one chief technology officer. All of them 
simultaneously serve as members of the party committee.89 While China Netcom has 
a more diverse composition of its board of directors than the other telecom firms, 5 
key positions out of 14, the chairman and four executive directors, are still dominated 
by party members.90   
This clearly demonstrates how regulatory and corporate reforms in Chinese 
enterprises actually have been constrained by the party’s leadership as long as they 
remain state-owned. In other words, even though the Chinese government has been 
actively transforming wholly state-owned enterprises into the form of share-holding 
corporations with the constitution of a board of directors, these efforts to modernize 
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the enterprise system are in practice bounded by the party. As indicated earlier, it is 
because the ultimate key corporate decisions are made by the party secretary, who is 
both the chairman of the board and the CEO. Zhang Chunjiang certifies the role of the 
party secretary in state-owned enterprise in one interview, saying that “I am Netcom’s 
Party Secretary. My responsibility is to ensure that the direction of our Communist 
Party is upheld within China Netcom.”91 
Paradoxically, China Netcom, under the strong leadership of Zhang 
Chunjiang, spearheads reforming corporate governance, aiming to be a model for 
other large state-owned enterprises in China. Zhang emphasizes the importance of 
introducing a global standard of corporate governance to China Netcom, and the firm 
launches the management consulting with McKinsey and invites independent 
directors to the board, such as the former chairman of Goldman Sachs, John 
Thornton, and the Chinese corporate governance economist, Qian Yingyi.92 China 
Netcom is in effect evaluated as the most energetic in terms of corporate reform by 
strengthening its board of directors and clarifying the roles of the party committee in 
business management. However, as China Netcom shows, the reforms in the telecom 
industry are not necessarily designed to dilute the political power of the party in the 
business management of telecom corporations in China. Rather the hand of the party 




                                                 






Leading Small Group on Informatization 
  
 
The establishment of the Leading Small Group on Informatization (xinxihua gongzuo 
lingdao xiaozu), directly under the State Council, shows the strategic importance of 
the telecom industry in China. Its members are made up of “representatives from 
nearly 20 ministerial and state-level organizations, including Ministry of Electronic 
Industry (MEI), Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), and Ministry of 
Radio, Film and Television (MRFT).”93 It was first organized as a supra-ministerial 
body in 1996, mainly playing the role of “watchdog” for the effective implementation 
of government regulations and policies in the telecom market.94 Its task also included 
the drafting of telecom industrial policy, aiming to attenuate the monopolized power 
of the MPT, but it was not effective. The MPT could continue to make and submit 
drafts of telecom policies and regulations to the State Council despite the internal 
check system by the Leading Small Group.      
While the Leading Group was temporarily dismantled in 1999, the State 
Council and the CCP continuously emphasized the importance of state 
informatization development. In 2001, the National Leading Small Group on 
Informatization (guojia xinxihua lingdao xiaozu) was reconstructed, highlighting the 
promotion of building up the Information Society in China.95 The prime minister 
serves as the director of the Group, and there are 4 vice-directors: 2 vice-prime 
ministers, one member of the standing committee of the political bureau, and one 
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member of the political bureau.96 Just like the makeup of SASAC, the Group is “a 
joint venture of the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party,”97 with each 
having 50 % of the seats. Led by this leadership, the Group consists of 25 members 
who are all minister-level leaders.98 This reveals how strongly China’s top leadership 
has put an emphasis on the strategic development of the telecom industry with other 
parts of the information industry. The Leading Group takes responsibility for 
deliberating on a number of issues, such as development strategies of the information 
industry (i.e. telecom or electronic), macro planning, related rules, the drafting and 
decision-making of important policies, and the overall coordination of development 
strategies and industrial policies for state informatization and security.99   
Most importantly, policies and regulations in Chinese industrial economies 
require final approval from the State Council. In the telecom service sector, the 
Leading Small Group directly underneath the State Council plays the key role of top 
policy decision-maker. China’s influential business magazine, Caijing, argues that the 
State Council’s Leading Small Group can be seen as the “architect” (shejishi) 
designing a new system of regulation to govern the telecom industry.100  While it was 
first established to monitor and restrain the power of the monopolized MPT, its 
supervisory function was shifted to the MII. Greater emphasis on promoting industrial 
development, rather than enforcing fair rules of competition in the telecom market, 
shows the pattern of regulation over the telecom industry. It also demonstrates that 
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China’s telecom industry is actually regulated by “political authority” rather than by 
market forces.   
 
Constrained Regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry 
 
The creation of a regulatory institution is one formal benchmark in demonstrating 
state efforts toward regulatory reform. Throughout the administrative restructuring 
programs, the Chinese state abolished the bulk of industrial ministries, but the notable 
exception to this movement is the creation of the telecommunications regulator, the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII). As discussed earlier, the main responsibility 
of the MII is to facilitate and monitor fair competition among telecom service 
carriers. However, the regulatory oversight of the MII in the telecom market has been 
considerably constrained, due to the internal governing structure and poor 
coordination among state institutions resulting from institutional deficiency in 
balancing and constraining mutual interests.  
As for the internal governing structures of China’s telecom industry, even 
though the MII is the formal regulator, above the MII there are the party and two 
powerful comprehensive state institutions: the NDRC and the SASAC. The MII in 
China’s telecom industry is known as “the regulator (jianguan jiegou),” but it is a 
state-designated administrative agency in order to meet WTO agreements.101 
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Therefore, although the MII is mainly responsible for promoting and supervising fair 
competition in the telecom market, it is not free from government. Unlike the Anglo-
American independent regulator model, the regulation of the MII is constrained by 
these top party-state institutions as long as it remains a “government agency.” Since 
the MII is institutionally subordinated to the NDRC, most industrial policies and 
regulations drafted by the MII are reviewed by the NDRC. In particular, the MII has 
the right to participate in the policy decision-making process of setting telecom 
service fees, but it should consult with the Price Bureau (wujia ju, 物价局) under the 
NDRC and local governments, because telecom service fees significantly affect the 
overall local economy. As such, although the MII encourages market competition, 
service fees are determined not by market competition among firms, but by state 
institutions in the name of the security of the national economy. However, one 
Chinese scholar holds that even though the MII does not have the final say on service 
fees, what counts is that the MII is allowed to participate in the price policy-making 
process. He said this is why regulatory reform in the telecom industry is evaluated as 
more successful than other network industries.102 
The oversight of the MII is also restrained by the rising power of SASAC, 
which asserts a great influence on the business management of telecom corporations 
in China. While the MII is mainly in charge of breaking up the monopolized market 
structure and enhancing fair competition in the telecom market, it does not retain 
substantial authority to direct the market players, telecom operators. The competition 
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in the telecom market is heavily structured and controlled by SASAC, the overseer of 
telecom firms in China.103 In other words, the norm of competition is encouraged and 
enforced by the MII, but the actual competition among telecom service carriers is 
managed by SASAC. Contrary to the MII’s emphasis on competition, SASAC, in 
effect, ensures its plan to create national champions by merger or acquisition aiming 
to create 80 ~ 100 globally competitive corporations by 2010.  
Thus, SASAC is less interested in breaking up the monopoly in the telecom 
market. While there are four major companies in China’s telecom service sector, only 
two players, China Telecom and China Mobile, dominate the fixed-line and mobile 
service. How to structure competition is in the hands of SASAC, not the MII. 
Moreover, the MII is fettered not only by state institutions but also the party, for 
senior officials of the MII are nominated by the Department of Organization of the 
CCP. If regulatory oversight is “structurally” constrained by two top comprehensive 
state institutions, the party exerts political control over the MII through the powerful 
means of personnel. A number of interviewees confirm that even though the MII was 
established to assume independent regulation, there are pressures behind the playing 
field, and they relate to the political interests of the CCP cadres who occupy the top 
positions of the MII.104 
A more problematic issue is that personnel decisions are often carried out 
based not on the expertise of candidates but the personal relations (guanxi) and 
interests of the CCP. One interviewee, who is the Chinese expert in regulatory reform 
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of infrastructure industries, clearly indicates that this could be an obstacle to the 
effective reform and future development of the telecom industry.105 Also, the 
continued sticky relations between the MII and the telecom enterprises are identified 
by the origins of the personnel. Top executives of telecom firms and high level MII 
officials are often exchanged by order of SASAC. A representative example is the 
exchange of position between Zhang Chunjiang, who was the vice minister of the MII 
and now serves on the CEO of China Netcom, and Xi Guohua who was the president 
of China Netcom but currently holds Zhang’s former position at the MII.106 In many 
cases, senior officials of the central or local bureau of the MII move to telecom 
enterprises, and vice versa. For example, Zhao Jibin, who assumed the head of the 
Zhengzhou Railway Bureau, is currently serving as the chairman of the board of 
directors in China Railcom. 
Effective oversight of the MII is also limited by poor coordination (xietiao) 
with other state institutions involved in policymaking and implementation. Compared 
with the auto industry, the division of labor is transparent among the top state 
institutions, but often overlapped responsibilities produce different voices and make 
regulation of the MII less productive. Although the recent remarkable regulatory 
reforms in the telecom industry (i.e. the establishment of the MII, the separation 
China Telecom from the MII, and the entry of new players) have brought about much 
progress in corporate governance, the lack of an internal system to adjust mutual 
interests appears to be an obstacle to the effective regulatory function of the MII.  
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Bounded Competition: Policies of Price and Market Entry 
   
 
The Telecom Price (zifei) Policy 
 
In China’s telecom industry regulation, oversight over the service fee serves to 
represent the mechanism of state control as well as government – business relations. 
The supervision of telecom pricing is perceived as critical to the top leadership, 
because the service fee considerably affects the overall development of the telecom 
industry, including distribution of resources, consumers, managers, and market 
competition, as well as trading costs and efficiency in other industries.107 In 
examining the telecom price policy, I will first account for the policy-making 
structure of the telecom service fee in China, and discuss who sets the rules of the 
game and who is in charge of supervising market competition. Then, the story of the 
telecom price wars, which reached a peak in 2004, and the government’s immediate 
battle against it present insight into the central state’s continued control over telecom 
service fees, despite growing market-oriented competition among companies. It also 
paradoxically demonstrates that even though market competition is encouraged, state 
institutions, including the MII, not only supervise but also control competition among 
administrative instruments. 
Before the 1998 reform, the telecom service fee was set and regulated by the 
former planning body, the SPC, and the MPT. Within the boundary of regulations 
from the SPC and the MPT, the provincial price bureau (wujia ju) and provincial post 
and telecommunications administrations managed and monitored the telecom price of 
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local telecom enterprises, which were basically subsidiaries of central telecom 
enterprises.108 The initial stage of competitive telecom pricing was introduced by 
placing the market a principal body. The 2000 Telecom Regulations (tiaoli), the 
comprehensive legal regulations governing the telecom industry, however, manifested 
the government-set and government-led prices as the standard for the telecom service 
fee in China.  
In formulating the level of telecom prices, Article 26 of Telecom Regulations 
said the government may consider diverse views from associated groups such as 
telecom service managers or subscribers through public hearings.109 Responding to 
increasing competition in the telecom market, Telecom Regulations was issued in 
2000 to provide both service providers and users with price setting rules. Its main 
principles are to facilitate competition and technology advancement.   
Confronting a number of changes in the internal market environment and the 
WTO entry, the MII and the NDRC successively issued a series of legally valid 
notices (tongzhi) on telecom service fees. While the MII has the main responsibility 
for supervising the price of telecom enterprises, the specific rules are drafted by 
coordinating with the NDRC. The Ministry of Finance is also involved in both rule-
making and overseeing of telecom service fees. 110 But enactment is carried out only 
after the approval of the State Council. In other words, while the MII takes charge of 
overseeing price setting by telecom companies according to the 2000 Telecom 
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Regulations, both the MII and the NDRC have no final substantial authority to make 
decisions about telecom pricing; it must be ratified by the State Council.111 This is 
also confirmed by a number of interviewees in Beijing.112 
The story of price wars in basic telecom services shows the Chinese top 
leadership’s strong will to put the telecom service sector under central regulation, 
even though the importance of competition has been continuously emphasized for 
better service and technology development. Besides cutting the price rate, companies 
have made use of a variety of promotional packages to attract consumers. In early 
2001, price competition started to emerge and reached a climax in June 2004, which 
in the end gave rise to immediate government action to control the telecom market. 
In fixed-line service, China Railcom kicked off the price competition with 
China Telecom by setting its service fee at half of the rate China Telecom charged. 
The most intensive competition occurred in the field of mobile service as the number 
of mobile service subscribers grew more quickly compared with the fixed-line users. 
The situation was escalated by the combative price cuts of China Mobile and China 
Unicom, two major mobile operators. In April 2003, Guangzhou Unicom (subsidiary 
of China Unicom) and Guangzhou Mobile (subsidiary of China Mobile) adopted a 
one-way tariff package in Guangzhou, which was contrary to the national two-way 
charge system.113 Consumers of Guangzhou Mobile, with a 20 yuan monthly fee, 
could enjoy free calls from the same network subscribers; Guangzhou Unicom’s 
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GSM users paid a 10 yuan monthly fee and received free calls from other Unicom 
subscribers.114 
In addition, the tools of competition were not confined to price cuts, but 
shifted to the “package promotion” (taochan). Telecom operators competitively 
provided potential consumers with enticing promotions, such as free wireless service, 
multi-media messaging, and online games and chatting.115 When the central SASAC 
dispatched a supervising panel to Guangzhou in order to investigate the state of the 
mobile service price wars in early 2004, Guangzhou Unicom’s profits as of January 
2004 had decreased 60 million yuan. The situation of Guangzhou Mobile was similar. 
One manager of Guangzhou Mobile admitted that profit loss from the price wars in 
2003 was 2.4 billion yuan.116 In the business of telecom operators, Guangdong 
province particularly takes an important position, for it makes up one sixth of the 
overall profits of telecom operators. As such, the price competition in Guangdong 
considerably affected the whole country’s telecom fees.117   
Another catalyst to the mobile service fee cuts was the emergence of “Little 
Smart” (Xiaolingtong) in 2001.118 It is operated by China Telecom and China 
Netcom, whose original license is the fixed-line. Founded on fixed-line local network 
services, Xiaolingtong satisfied the demands of consumers, through one-way service 
charges, cheap minute rates and monthly fees, better than the official mobile 
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operators, China Mobile and Unicom. Its subscribers rapidly increased: by 2003, 
China Telecom had more than 20 million users; China Netcom recorded 15 
million.119 Xiaolingtong users also occupied 36 % of China Mobile’s subscribers.120 
However, Xiaolingtong’s service was blocked in four major cities, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Guangzhou, in order to maintain the stock prices of China Mobile and 
China Unicom.121       
The 2004 telecom price wars immediately caused the MII and the NDRC to 
issue a new administrative circular (tongzhi), which aimed to implement more strict 
control over telecom service fees than before.122 In the enforcement, the circular asks 
the headquarters of telecom corporations to tighten supervision of the business 
management of local telecom firms. For price cuts, short-period promotions, and 
tariff packages, both fixed-line and mobile local subsidiaries, would have to get 
approval from each headquarters of telecom corporations. The governmental agencies 
asserted that price cuts from excessive competition in mobile service markets are 
“vicious competition” (exing jingzheng), because they may lead to the loss of crucial 
state assets. In effect, when the central SASAC dispatched a supervising panel to 
inspect the circumstances of the price wars between Guangzhou Mobile and 
Guangzhou Unicom in early 2004, their revenues for January 2004 were considerably 
decreased. The decline of revenue from mobile telecom service in Guangdong 
province was considered to be critical, for the profits from Guangdong province 
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occupy one sixth of the national telecom operation. However, the meaning of “vicious 
competition” is ambiguous. Chen Jinqiao, director of the Chinese Academy of 
Telecom Research under the MII, points out that “fair” and “vicious” competition is 
not clearly specified. Given that price is a key indicator to manifest the market-based 
economy, it is called for that the government needs to clarify when price competition 
is vicious, and how price competition relates to the loss of crucial state assets.  
Responding to the government’s claims on the problem of state asset loss, 
Zhou Qiren, economist of the China Centre for Economic Research at Beijing 
University, argues that “if something is overpriced, price cuts will not lead to losses 
of corporate assets. On the contrary, such cuts may increase corporate revenues as 
they will boost consumption of the service.”123 Furthermore, one official, who works 
in the research center for the macro economy in the NDRC, argues the need for more 
price competition, holding that today, telecom price competition in China’s mobile 
service is not enough to renovate the overall system of telecom fees; it simply 
remains the reconstructing of the system.124 Some even warn that state institutions’ 
unnecessary control over telecom pricing can turn into a new type of “administrative 
monopoly” (xingzheng longduan) in dealing with the natural monopoly industry. 
Administrative monopoly reinforces the absolute power and position of regulatory 
institutions while obstructing the interests of consumers.125 
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To some extent, even though the MII has been making related laws and 
regulations to build up a legislative means to control (supervise) price competition 
among telecom operators, they remain only temporary measures. Telecom service 
fees in China are not based on market demand, but are made by coordination among 
state institutions. One official of the MII, who does not want to be identified, 
acknowledges that the manner of regulatory control over telecom pricing is already 
unsuitable to the growing market. The minister of the MII, Wang Xudong, referred to 
market-driven telecom operation as the keynote of 2004 MII policies and said that 
“MII is working on related laws and regulations to build up legislative means to help 
cut down mobile telecommunications fees.”126 Moreover, local telecom operators 
cannot cut the prices or supply a variety of promotional packages to attract potential 
customers, because local telecom firms are annually assigned a target revenue and a 
number of subscribers to attain. Therefore, the underlying driving force of price 
competition is not to meet market demand, but to meet the central state firms’ 
planning. The “buyer’s market,” as Dali Yang anticipates, is unlikely to emerge in the 
telecom market soon. 
To summarize, first, the Chinese government encourages and emphasizes the 
importance of market competition in the basic telecom service sector. Yet, de facto 
competition is continuously controlled by the central authorities. Not the market but 
the MII and the NDRC set the prices and make the rules of the game for telecom 
services; the central SASAC sends off supervising panels to major local telecom 
firms (i.e. Guangzhou, Shanghai, Tianjin) in order to monitor whether a loss of state 
assets occurs when price competition is heated up.  





Second, telecom companies have had limited influence on the industry’s price 
and competition policies. As the mobile service price wars in June 2004 manifest, 
local telecom companies had more say in setting prices to reflect consumer demand. 
Rather than respond to growing market forces, however, the government has made 
strict restrictions on price competition in the name of securing crucial state assets, 
calling for strengthened supervision of telecom corporations’ head offices over local 
units.  
And, third, the governing mechanism of price policy is highly centralized. In 
the bureaucratic structure, local state institutions, such as the local level NDRC or 
SASAC, have no substantial right to interfere. Local Telecommunications 
Administrations oversee the price policies of local telecom companies, but they do 
not retain the right to make policy decisions, simply enacting the rules from the 
central government (MII, NDRC, SASAC, and Ministry of Finance). In business, 
local telecom firms are not allowed to decide their own prices, billing systems, or 
promotional events. The 2004 circular stipulates that local telecom companies should 
first submit a “written” document to their head offices of operators and need to 
receive permission from the head before making any changes in price-related 
business.  
 
Regulating Market Entry 
 
Market structure is in general organized out of competition, and at the same time 
competition is the major force in shaping market structure. Therefore, control over 




basic telecom service, the number of operators and forms of investment capital are 
strictly restrained by the state. Even though there is no official statute, only six 
companies are allowed to provide basic service.127 These are China Telecom, China 
Netcom, China Railcom, China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Satellite. The 
central part of control is the areas of service; for example, mobile or international 
telecom services are very stringently restrained.128 It is a path-dependent legacy of a 
state-run monopoly system that tightly restricted the entry of new telecom companies 
in order to maintain the monopoly system. Regulatory control over market entry is the 
exercise of administrative authority in establishing and preserving the relationship of 
enterprises. Since the 2000 Telecom Regulations Article 9 stipulates that the creation 
of new telecom enterprises should receive ratification from the State Council, in 
China’s basic telecom service, the State Council takes the main responsibility for 
deciding on the market entry of new companies into the basic and value-added 
services.129 The break-up and merger of telecom enterprises are also subject to the 
decision of the State Council. So far there have been two new telecom enterprises 
established by the ratification of the State Council, China Unicom and China Jitong, 
which was incorporated into China Netcom in 2001.  
Furthermore, the nature of capital entering the basic telecom services is also 
controlled by the State Council. On the one hand, the entry of domestic private capital 
to the basic telecom services is restricted, although no clear regulations exist.130 On 
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the other hand, the WTO accession no longer allows the Chinese government to delay 
the entry of foreign capital into its telecom industry. Responding to these demands, 
the government, the State Council, and the MII clearly formulated the rules, and the 
entry and operation of foreign capital is controlled by the government based on these 
regulations.131  The Regulation (guiding) of Foreign Business Investment in Telecom 
Enterprise, released in 2001, has three major parts in governing foreign capital.132 
First, regardless of basic or value-added telecom services, the Regulations Article 2 
prohibits the establishment of a foreign company that consists of only foreign capital. 
Second, according to Article 6, foreign capital that enters China’s telecom service 
areas must organize a joint venture with Chinese capital, and foreign investment in 
the joint venture cannot exceed 49 % in fixed-line, or 50% in wireless and value-
added telecom services. And third, foreign capital is allowed to invest within the 
confined areas of telecom service, but is not allowed to be an independent actor.      
With respect to state control over telecom market entry, we can see some 
transitions in arguments within China’s major government think-tank. As of May 
2004, one report from the Institute of Enterprise Research of the DRC under the State 
Council argues that a licensing system (xukezhi) for telecom market entry in China is 
necessary for a while, because it helps moderate any potential disorder and conflict 
resulting from the rush of large scale companies into the market.133 At the same time, 
the nullification of market entry licensing does not always accelerate market 
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competition. For the public interest, the control of market entry may contribute to 
gradually opening up and putting the market in order. The report also claimed that a 
controlled market entry would be beneficial to the supply of stable services as well as 
harmonious development of the industry. Through a licensing system, the 
governmental agencies can make plans and coordinate technology standards ahead of 
time, which is conducive to not only facilitating the creation of a unified network but 
also to promoting a domestic manufacturing industry.134  The same research institute 
presents somewhat contrasting arguments in the report of December 2005, holding 
that stringent controls over both market entry and types (nature) of capital are actually 
adverse to the development of the telecom industry and improvement of subscriber 
interests, by constraining effective market competition.135 
        
 
V. Chapter Conclusion 
 
Highly centralized state regulation for the telecom industry in China is hardly 
surprising, for its state assets and profits constitute huge resources of revenue in the 
Chinese economy. However, what is interesting and important is to identify the 
pivotal state institution for exercising substantial control over the business of telecom 
firms, and to single out the patterns of centralized regulation in the telecom industry. 
In this chapter, I have explained two major findings: the empowerment of the SASAC 
and the concept of “centralized hard regulation” for China’s telecom industry, and its 
                                                 
134 Ma (2004) 
135 Enterprise Research Institute, the DRC of the State Council, 2005, “Zhongguo Dianxinye Guizhi 
Zhengce Xianchuang ge Zhanwang,” Zhongguo Xinxi Chanye Zhengce Zichi Tizhi Yanjiu: Ti San 




components, such as central state ownership and continued command of the party in 
both government and enterprises. 
First, while the MII appears to be a key state agency in regulating the telecom 
market, its authority has been considerably constrained by comprehensive state 
institutions, such as the NDRC and SASAC. Telecom pricing policies  have to be 
coordinated with the NDRC; the structure of market competition is controlled by 
SASAC. Even though the MII does not agree with state-led market restructuring, 
rather than by market forces, it cannot avoid it because SASAC has the formal 
authority to restructure the telecom market by merging firms. Therefore, I propose 
that the focus should be on SASAC, not the MII.  Although both SASAC and the 
NDRC are comprehensive state institutions, SASAC is a more important key state 
body than the NDRC in exercising regulatory control over the business of telecom 
carriers. SASAC as a new operator is increasingly expanding its intervention in the 
business of telecom firms, from assets management and personnel to budget and 
investments management. The separation of China Telecom from the MII does not 
lead to de facto separation of government and business, because SASAC, a new 
comprehensive state institution, replaces the role of operator from the MII and 
maintains its lever of control over telecom firms. The empowerment of SASAC in the 
telecom industry is feasible because the six leading telecom service carriers are under 
central state ownership. 
Second, the pattern of regulation in the telecom industry is “centralized hard” 
regulation. It is centralized in that local governments have no binding authority to 




administrations (tongxin guanli ju) are the main state agencies to oversee local 
telecom firms, but they are under the direct leadership of the MII. The staff of 
provincial telecommunications administrations is recruited and accredited by the MII, 
and implements the policies and rules from the MII. Local governments may suggest 
some opinions (jianyi), but they do not retain the authoritative power to enforce them 
on local telecom administrations. In other words, provincial telecom administrations 
are under a dual-subordination to the MII and provincial governments, but they are 
the agents of the MII. Telecommunication administrations at county/township levels 
are administered by provincial telecommunications administrations, not by the MII; 
provincial telecom administrations direct lower level telecom administrations. As 
such, the structure of administration in regulating the sector is hierarchically 
centralized.  
In business, since local telecom firms remain the local unit of central firms, 
they have no right to make final decisions (i.e. price or investment), but simply 
implement policies and rules from the head office. Particularly, after the price war of 
2004, local telecom firms have to receive approval from the head office for any 
change of telecom service fees or billing systems. These strong central components 
sharply contrast with the auto industry, where local governments have ownership over 
local firms; local auto firms, even though most of them are state-owned, have a right 
to manage the business of their firms.  
Moreover, compared with softly centralized regulation in the auto industry, I 
refer to the patterns of central regulation for the telecom service sector as hard. Here I 






institutions based on rules. Hard regulation in the telecom industry is workable, due 
to central state ownership and deeply penetrated party organs in both government and 
enterprises. Since I conceptualize the forms of soft vs. hard regulatory control in 
terms of government and business relations, even though there are political tensions 
or struggles among state agencies, this does not necessarily mean that government is 
not capable of exerting tight control over the firms. For example, there are political 
tensions between SASAC and the MII, and between the MII and the NDRC in 
governing the telecom sector. But SASAC as the operator of telecom firms, the so 
called “laoban,” retains supreme power over the telecom firms and can tightly control 

















VARIED CENTRAL STATE REGULATION: 









In Chapters 3 and 4, I mapped out the overall features of regulatory mechanisms in 
the auto and telecom service industries, focusing on demonstrating how the patterns 
of regulatory governance can be divergent across and within a case in China’s 
industrial economy. This chapter compares regulatory patterns of the two sectors in 
the context of central oversight and seeks to answer the two-fold main puzzles of this 
dissertation. First, why, despite strong components of decentralization, centralized 
regulatory control sits firmly in automobile manufacturing, just as in the telecom 
service sector, which has a long history of central ownership and control. Second, 
under the centralized regulatory mechanism, various patterns of regulation still 
remain. What determines the rise of soft, hard, and mixed forms of central oversight 
in China’s strategic industries? For clarification, my purpose is not to measure the 
effectiveness of state regulation, rather to attempt to capture the complexities in 
China’s regulatory governance designed by the party-state.      
In doing so, I first focus on explaining why centralized regulatory structure 
commonly arises in China’s automobile and telecommunication service industries, 




hypothesized that state regulation over the auto industry is likely to be decentralized 
because of historically strong local components in terms of administration and 
ownership. As a second step, I further explore important factors that give rise to 
various patterns of central regulation across the sectors. Through deductive reasoning, 
I find three key explanatory variables and analyze how each has an effect on making 
soft, hard, and mixed forms of centralized regulatory oversight. They include: 
different sectoral characteristics, path-dependent institutional elements, and the role 
of foreign investors. Path-dependent institutional elements include governing 
structure and forms of ownership. 
In this chapter, I argue that central state regulation, as in the telecom service 
sector, is employed in China’s auto industry to maintain the party-state’s vested 
interests. While there are some other factors that encourage central oversight (i.e., 
multiplier effects on the national economy), the ultimate purposes of central oversight 
are to secure the party-state’s crucial state assets even though the party does not have 
an explicit ownership stake, and to create comprehensive state power at the core.  
Second, I argue that specific patterns of central control over the sectors are 
heavily conditioned by pre-existing historical institutional contexts. China’s telecom 
industry has evolved under a vertically centralized governing structure and 
ownership. As a consequence, the authority of local governments in managing local 
telecom businesses has been considerably constrained. In contrast, a long history of 
decentralization policies for the auto industry has allowed local governments to retain 
the property rights for local auto firms, offering local authorities substantial 




is inevitably loose due to the lack of formal authority to supervise, and I 
conceptualize this pattern as centralized soft regulation as discussed earlier. At the 
same time, although the overall sector exhibits strong local components, there are also 
two centrally-owned auto producers. The form of regulatory controls over central 
automotive firms shows great similarity to the telecom service firms: tight and direct 
central oversight of assets and personnel management through formal central state 
institutions. I call this type centralized hard regulation. Drawing on a cross-sectoral 
comparison, I suggest that such mixed ownership forms in the auto industry 
contribute to generating divergent regulatory patterns under central control.  
After introducing some factors of strategic importance that bring about central 
regulation in China’s automotive and telecom service industries, I explain the 
underlying political logic that has led the Chinese top leadership to centralize 
regulatory power. The chapter proceeds to analyze what gives rise to the varied 





II. Why Are Regulatory Controls Commonly Centralized? 
 
 
Often, it is taken for granted that the methods of state regulation for the auto and 
telecom industries are different simply because of inherent distinguishing sectoral 
characteristics. While automobile manufacturing is inclined to be driven by market-
oriented competition, telecom basic service is a natural monopoly that requires a 




facilitate competition. Moreover, the long history of a decentralized governing 
structure in the auto industry makes us readily assume that the mechanisms of state 
regulation for the auto and telecom sectors are inevitably different, given the highly 
centralized control and public ownership in the telecom service sector. Yet, as I have 
pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, “centralized regulatory control” is concurrently 
running across the two sectors, despite significant differences in sectoral and 
surrounding political-economic institutions.  Hence, in accounting for why central 
oversight arises in the automobile manufacturing and telecom service sectors in 
China, I indicate the strategic importance to the national economy and a desire to 
create a cohesive state power from the central government.  
 
 
Strategic Importance  
  
 
One of the main arguments in explaining the rise of centralized regulatory control 
across the two cases is their strategic significance in China’s political economy. Li 
Rongrong, the director of SASAC, points to the telecom industry as the commanding 
height that needs absolute state control because the sector relates to national security 
and the economy. The auto industry, as a pillar (zhizu) of the national economy, is 
also highly associated with the development of other sectors; relatively strong state 
control is also necessary. In effect, the strategic importance of the automotive sector 
has been increasingly growing since the early 1990s. The auto industry accounted for 




5.2 % in 2002, and 6.2 % in 2003.1 As a pillar industry, the position of auto 
manufacturing, as measured by the share of sales revenue over all industries, is also 
on a rising trend. It remained number 15 as of 1990, but ascended to 10th in 2000, and 
rose to 5th in 2003.2   
 




























































































Sources: Guojia Xinxi Zhongxin Zhongguo Jingji Xinxiwang [National Information Center, Chinese 
Economy Informatization]. 2003. Zhongguo Hangye Fazhan Baogao: Qicheye [China Industry 
Development Report 2003: The Auto Industry]. Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, p. 9. 
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2 China Industry Development Report 2003: The Auto Industry (Zhongguo Hangye Fazhan Baogao: 
Qicheye), (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2004), p. 9. 





The central state institutions (i.e., NDRC) have quickly supported the development of 
the auto industry, for its growth is closely associated with other sectors, such as the 
chemical, steel, machinery, and service sectors. Due to these strong “multiplier 
effects” on the national economy, the Central Party Committee and the State Council 
have attached great importance to auto manufacturing and have several times 
suggested making the auto sector the pillar of the national economy, a so called 
“comprehensive industry” (zonghe hangye).4 One even argues that the development 
of the automotive industry directly creates more opportunities for 10 auto-related 
sectors.5  
At the same time, strategic importance is even more remarkable in the telecom 
industry. The sector is referred to as “the crown jewel of China’s industries,”6 in that 
the central government has earned enormous profits from mobile service providers, 
and is hoping for similar profits from fixed carriers. According to a recent report from 
the National Bureau of Statistics, three out of four telecom service firms are included 
as the most profitable top ten companies, in terms of state assets, in China.7 The 
report says that “the total assets of these ten companies are valued at 6338,567 billion 
yuan, which is 769,866 billion yuan more than in 2004.”8 Three telecom service 
providers on the list are: China Telecommunication Corporation (China Telecom), 
                                                 
4 Chen Jianguo and Zhang Yuxian, 2004 “China’s Auto Industry Policy and Development Strategy,” 
(Woguo Qiche Chanye Zhengce he Fazhan Zhanlue), Jingji Lilun yu Jingji Guanli, 12, p 27 
5 Ibid 
6 The Economist, “Into the Crucible,” Vol. 361, Issue 8246 (November 3, 2001) 





China Mobile Communication Corporation, and China Network Communications 
Corporation (CNC).9       
Strategic significance is also reflected by the creation of large business groups 
and controls over the entry of foreign investors, although the degree of regulation is 
different across the sectors. First, the desire to make gigantic state-owned enterprises 
in key strategic industries has been indicated as one of the factors in leading the 
Chinese leadership to (re)centralize regulatory power since the mid 1990s.10 The 
emphasis on large state firms was unfolded by the ‘zhuada fangxiao policy’ in 1995 
and reaffirmed by the CCP 15th Congress in 1997.11 In theory, the zhuada policy was 
designed to rationalize the inefficient structure of state sectors, yet the kernel of 
strategy for corporatization of state firms is to formulate an oligopoly in the Chinese 
industrial economy. In practice, “a selected number of large state-owned enterprise 
groups have been given various preferential policies from the government,” for they 
are the most profitable and revenue-maximizing businesses in China.12 
For the auto industry, with its decentralized governing structure and 
fragmented market, the center has used “merger and acquisition to push the 
development of the targeted large corporate groups.”13 Since the central government 
has been unsuccessful in preventing local governments from establishing inefficient 
                                                 
9 The other firms are: the State Gird Corporation of China, China National Petroleum Corporation, 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation, China 
Everbright Group, Ping An Insurance Group, China Southern Power Gird Co., Ltd. Ibid. 
10 Pearson (2005); Chung (2003); Thun (2004); Lin (2006)  
11 In restructuring the inefficient state sector, the Chinese leadership promulgated “zhuada fangxiao” 
policy on September 1995, meaning that “grasping large firms while letting go of small one.” See more 
detail overview, Christopher A. McNally and Peter Nan-Shong Lee, “Is Big Beautiful?: Restructuring 
China’s State Sector under the Zhuada Policy,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 34, No. 9 (September 1998), 
pp. 32-8.     
12 McNally and Lee (1998: 32) 




small scale auto firms, the center rather indirectly encourages small local state firms 
to be merged into large firms. While the central leadership still favors the existing 
large auto producers (i.e., FAW or SAIC), the winner in China’s auto market is more 
likely to be determined not by the government, but by market-driven competition. For 
example, the recent rapid growth of Guangzhou Auto Industry Corporations or 
Beijing Auto Industry Corporations shows that a centralized regulatory power to 
support some targeted firms is not a necessary condition for China’s auto industry. 
Emphasis on the creation of enormous conglomerates is also salient in the 
telecom industry, aiming not only to prepare for incoming competition from global 
telecom service providers after the WTO entry, but also to promote the value of state 
assets, which ultimately serves to benefit the central government.14 Contrary to 
automobile manufacturing, the telecom service sector was monopolized by a single 
operator, MPT and China Telecom, until China Unicom emerged in 1993. Through 
successive market restructuring while new service providers were established, market 
entry and structure have been strictly controlled by the central state institutions, 
favoring a limited number of large-scale state-owned firms. Thereby, this state-led 
“orderly” competition has created an oligopoly where two fixed-line carriers and two 
mobile service providers dominate. As of 2004, China Mobile constituted 56.18% of 
market share by revenue; China Telecom was 25.36%; China Unicom was 9.3%; 
China Netcom was 7.93%; China Railcom was 0.62%; China Satcom was 0.33%.15 
Following the former premier Zhu Rongji’s Zhuada policy, the director of SASAC, Li 
Rongrong, explicitly has emphasized the creation of a handful of large-scale state-
                                                 
14 Interview with Zhang Xinzhu in Beijing, Chinese Academy of Social Science (Feb 2006) 
15 Daniel Roseman, “The WTO and Telecommunications Services in China: Three Years on,” The 




owned enterprises. Central ownership of telecom service firms has virtually made it 
possible for SASAC to implement decisive and coherent regulation. 
The Chinese central government, particularly in strategic industries, has kept 
close oversight for the entry of foreign investors, in order to maintain the ultimate 
levers of control over foreign investments. Central oversight has been used as the 
most powerful source of control since the reform and open policies.16 During the 
1980s, the Chinese central government actively attracted foreign capital, but the 
business of foreign-invested firms has been circumscribed by the center through 
various ways, including formal law and regulations, multiple approval procedures, 
and the rule of the state plan.17 Daniel Rosen also indicates that when the Chinese 
central authority issued the “Provisional Regulations for Guiding the Direction of 
Foreign Investment” in 1995, the government used “vague language” in the restricted 
category that confined the equity stake of foreign investors, and left room for the 
exercise of arbitrary power.18    
Automobile manufacturing in China is often perceived as having weak central 
regulation due to strong local governments, based on local ownership and fragmented 
foreign investments.19 Yet it should be noted that the ultimate decision on foreign 
partners and the scope of their business has always been made at the central level. 
Unlike cost-cutting investments where the center does not retain much control, the 
central government is capable of exercising effective control over foreign partners, 
                                                 
16 Thun (2006: 63) 
17 Margaret M Pearson,  Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China: The Control of Foreign 
Direct Investment under Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 
18 This regulation divided foreign investment into four types: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and 
prohibited. For details of regulation, see Appendix A “Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign 
Investment Industries,” Daniel H. Rosen, Behind the Open Door: Foreign Enterprises in the Chinese 
Marketplace (Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1999), pp. 23; 259-278. 




for the auto firms have “market-seeking investments that are more vulnerable to host 
government pressure.”20 Moreover, in organizing automotive joint ventures, the 
central government has the authority to approve foreign partners, aiming to make all 
major state auto enterprises have partnerships with at least two foreign companies. By 
doing so, the center may effectively leverage giant foreign auto firms, making them 
compete with each other.21 By making the best use of the domestic market access to 
foreign investors, the central government could support a small number of targeted 
firms to create joint ventures with foreign auto manufacturers. 
In the telecom service sector, China’s central control over foreign investments 
has been very straightforward, as seen in its explicit ban during the 1990s. Sharply 
contrasting with the state’s active efforts to attract foreign investments in the auto 
industry, the central government (i.e., MPT) issued two regulations prohibiting 
foreign investment or joint ventures in the telecommunication service sector.22 More 
than anything else, the central leadership had strongly contained any type of foreign 
investment in the telecom infrastructure so as to tightly control and monitor the flow 
of information to the public, which related to political and security concerns.  
Since the WTO agreement, while the market has been gradually opening up to 
foreign investors, allowing more scope and service, the Chinese government has 
continued to maintain central regulation for the business of foreign-invested telecom 
enterprises. Even though the allowed scope of foreign ownership in the telecom 
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service is specified in the WTO agreements with the U.S. and the EU, the Chinese 
central government (i.e., MII) issued a new “Regulations on Foreign-invested 
Telecom Enterprises” in 2001 with additional detailed provisions concerning the 
business of foreign-invested firms, such as geographic range or registered capital for 
business.23  While the above explanations constitute a significant part of “economic” 
causes for central oversight, they do not provide sufficient explanation for 
convergence on the centralized regulatory mechanism in China’s strategic industries. 
To be sure, there are “political” views for why the Chinese central leadership designs 
such a system of regulation, and I briefly discuss two key elements that drive to 
concentrate the regulatory power at the core.  
 
Political Needs for Central Regulation 
 
So far, I have examined some factors that are associated with economic 
consequences, but there are significant political goals in centralizing regulatory 
power. Drawing on findings from the field research, I propose that the ultimate 
purposes of central oversight for strategic industries in China are two-fold: 1) to 
protect crucial state assets that are tied to the vested interests of the party-state, and 2) 
to create comprehensive national power at the core, though the manners and sources 
of sectoral regulation are varied across issue areas. This indicates that, despite the 
fragmented political and economic authorities and bureaucratic struggles,24 the 
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Guiding (Regulations on Foreign-invested Telecom Enterprises) Issued on December 10, 2001; 
effective on January 1, 2002 
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centralized regulatory power over strategic industries mirrors a cohesive political 
logic emanating from the central government.25 
 
1. Protecting State Assets 
Some scholars have argued that market reforms in the socialist system necessarily 
lead to decentralized decision-making, and as a consequence, the party’s capacity to 
monitor and control the economic activities of society came to be increasingly 
constrained.26 Susan Shirk has pointed out that economic reform in China has 
accelerated the fragmentation in political and economic life and led to a major source 
of conflict, for the reform “redistributed resources and responsibilities from some 
economic sectors, regions, and bureaucratic organizations to others.”27 Shirk claims 
that this tension was the most outstanding in bureaucratic agencies in Beijing, not the 
local governments that could gain “increased control over material supplies, fiscal 
revenues, depreciation funds, and extra-budgetary funds.”28 In effect, China’s state 
asset loss has been continuously growing since the 1980s.29 According to the 1998 
investigation of the 32 largest state-owned enterprises, 28 firms revealed some 
problems, accounting for 87.5% of the total number of state firms.30 As a 
consequence of the price war in the early 2000s, profit loss was remarkable in the 
                                                 
25 I am indebted to Margaret M. Pearson for this insight. 
26 Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992); Jan Winiecki, “Obstacles to Economic Reform of Socialism: A Property 
Rights-Based Approach,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 507 (January 
1990): 65-71. 
27 Susan Shirk, “The Politics of Industrial Reform,” The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao 
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28 Shirk (1985: 218) 
29 X. L. Ding. 2000. “The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms,” The China Journal, No 43 
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telecom service firms. As I indicated in Chapter 4, Guangzhou Mobile in 2003 
exhibited 2.4 billion yuan profit loss, and Guangzhou Unicom had 60 million yuan 
decrease in profits.31 In the auto industry, China First Auto Works Group 
Corporations, a key central state firm, disclosed a net loss of 570 million yuan in the 
first quarter of 2005.32 FAW-VW was addressed as “the biggest money loser, posted 
almost 300 million yuan.”33 
For the Chinese party-state, the growing loss of state assets is an imperative 
issue, for it is directly associated with their vested interests. Moreover, by holding 
enormous state assets of major state firms in strategic key industries, such as the 
commanding heights or pillar industries, the party-state can continue to exercise 
economic control over the national economy, which ultimately becomes the grounds 
of political power. Some claim that although political change may occur in the future, 
“the CCP, with its abundant economic strength, would still win in an election.”34 
Therefore, the primary concern for the party-state in regulation is to protect crucial 
state assets through a centralized institutional mechanism.  
The party often organizes informal channels to keep control over state assets, 
for the party does not retain an explicit ownership stake.35 Moreover, since some 
large-scale major auto producers are locally-owned, the central party-state organizes 
an invisible supervising group called xunshizu in order to monitor the asset 
management of major local state auto firms, resulting from the party’s lack of formal 
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33 Ibid. 
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authority to supervise. The party believes that “its grip on the largest state-owned 
enterprises, either central or local, is a crucial lever for controlling the economy and 
bolstering its political power.”36 On the other hand, state assets of telecom service 
firms are tightly supervised by the central state institutions. Due to strong central 
ownership in the telecom service sector, local telecom firms are subordinated to the 
central firms, thereby state assets in both central and local firms are formally 
supervised by the central state institutions. As such, the underlying logic of 
centralized regulatory oversight is not simply an economic concern, but rather 
political, in order to hold on to control over crucial state assets. 
In fact, some scholars argue that the capacity of party-state control is 
increasingly limited because of “a significant gap between rhetoric and practice.”37 
The decentralized property rights and ineffective monitoring system have been 
pointed to as contributing to the rise of a decentralized predatory state in China.38 
However, I share the view of scholars such as Andrew Nathan and Maria Edin that 
the party has a plan and, responding to new challenges, continuously develops and 
restructures to keep up political and economic controls over economic affairs.39 By 
doing so, the central party-state may maintain its key control over local entrepreneurs. 
Although different institutional contexts have led to diverse patterns of regulation 
                                                 
36 Chris Buckley, “In China, Power to the Center: State Firms’ Agency Still Calls the Shots,” 
International Herald Tribune (June 1, 2005) 
37 Tony Saich. 2000. “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The 
China Quarterly 161 (March), p. 125; Merle Goldman and Roderick Macfarquhar,  “Dynamic 
Economy, Declining Party-State,” In edited by Merle Goldman and Roderick Macfarquhar. The 
Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Pei (2006) 
38 Pei (2006) 
39 Andrew J. Nathan, “Present at the Stagnation,” Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2006): 177-182; Maria 
Edin, “Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in 




even within the Chinese industrial economy, this study evidences that central 
oversight is commonly employed in the two industries. 
 
2. Creating Comprehensive National Power 
The other impetus to the rise of central regulatory power is the top leadership’s desire 
for making comprehensive regulating oversight at the core. In the existing literature, a 
number of scholars hold that the Chinese state is becoming fragmented and 
disjointed.40  This fragmented authority in economic decision-making is structurally 
affected by a bureaucratic bargaining and ranking system, and accelerated by fiscal 
decentralization.41 In the early stages of reform, Lieberthal and Prahalad have argued 
that any major foreign firms in China became influenced by five levels of fragmented 
bureaucracies, such as “the central planning authorities, the ministerial organization, 
the local government, the Chinese partner, and the Chinese managers and workers.”42 
They highlighted the importance of understanding the fragmented bureaucratic 
system for smooth and consistent business in mainland China. In comparing China’s 
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economic governance of the auto industry with South Korea, Yasheng Huang claims 
that both fragmented central authority and decentralized economic management have 
considerably confined the regulatory power of the State Planning Commission (SPC) 
(transformed into the NDRC in 2003).43 As I have discussed in Chapter 3, the former 
SPC was not independent from other ministries and equally ranked with provincial 
governments, therefore it did not retain the decisive and comprehensive authority to 
regulate the industry. Fragmented economic governance is also indicated in state 
holding corporations. Recognizing the problem of overlapping authority in regulating 
state firms, Christopher McNally claims that top executives in state sectors could not 
be effectively monitored, because “the authority was fragmented by a diverse set of 
party and state agencies, thereby no agency possesses sufficient incentives to 
monitor.”44   
Even after the extensive government reforms in 1998 and 2003, fragmented 
authority and bureaucratic struggles are still a dominant part of the Chinese political 
system. Yet there are explicit efforts from the top leadership to create comprehensive 
state power at the core. The automobile and telecom service industries present good 
relevant examples. As I have pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, the newly restructured 
comprehensive commissions, NDRC and SASAC, have tended to gain more 
integrated and enhanced regulatory capacity than before. Such strengthened oversight 
is particularly outstanding in the strategic industries of automobile manufacturing and 
basic telecom service. However, it should be noted that their relative power in central 
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oversight is different across sectors; the NDRC is the key regulatory body for macro-
control in the auto industry, while central oversight over the business of the telecom 
service sector is becoming extensively concentrated on the SASAC. By examining 
each assigned regulatory function and complementing my observation with numerous 
interviews in the field, I have learned that their relative power relations are 
distinguished across the sectors. For example, when I interviewed professionals in the 
automotive sector, the NDRC was always the most highlighted as the macro 
regulator. On the other hand, in the telecom service sector, I hardly heard about the 
role of the NDRC except for the service fee; all emphasis was put on the SASAC. 
Often, the capacity of central regulation from the NDRC in the automotive 
industry has been questioned due to the fragmented market structure as well as to 
strong local ownership and administration. It is also associated with a relative weak 
capacity of SASAC in the sector. With a view to strengthening macro-economic 
regulation, the NDRC in the auto industry has come to retain more authority and 
scope of regulation, as well as higher bureaucratic rank, than the former regulator, 
SPC. Thereby, all key projects, such as market entry or foreign investors, strictly 
require approval from the NDRC. Industrial policies for the sector that set 
development goals and strategies are also formulated by the NDRC. Indeed, auto 
industrial development policies still play the important role of navigator for both local 
state and private auto firms. On the other hand, SASAC holds substantial regulatory 
power in controlling the business of the telecom service sector and plays the key role 
of regulator. While the NDRC and the MII are together involved in setting prices and 




tightly exercises oversight over asset and budget management. SASAC also has the 
right to appoint top executives of the firms.  
  
III. Explaining Variations in China’s Industrial Regulation 
 
 
Unlike the conventional wisdom, the automobile manufacturing and telecom service 
sectors in China are under centralized regulatory controls. Yet there are variations in 
the manner and degree of central oversight across as well as within the sector. As I 
have detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, the form of central state control over the auto 
industry is characterized as “soft/invisible” regulation whereas the regulatory regime 
for the telecom service sector is characterized as “hard” regulation from the central 
authority. Moreover, since the forms of ownership in the auto sector are mixed with 
centrally-owned, locally-owned, and private firms, varied patterns of regulation 
emerge even within the sector.  
What gives rise to these variations? How can we explain these complex 
patterns of regulation in China’s strategic industries? While state control over 
industries across regions and sectors has been widely explored by scholars of China, 
previous studies have tended to focus on regulation at the local level. For example, 
Susan Whiting has argued that the actions of local officials, which are constrained by 
a cadre evaluation system and the fiscal system, have played a key role in 




China.”45 But what has rarely been tackled is how the forms of industrial ownership 
relate to the actual practice of central regulation. Also, Jean Oi has argued that the 
regulatory work by local governments on tax and revenues at the local levels has two 
features: “minimum compliance and protection of local interests.”46 According to 
Blecher and Shue’s findings, diversity in the regulatory structure is identified even in 
one county. Shulu county exhibits various types of regulation: “centralized and 
decentralized industrial structure, vertical and horizontal forms of ownership, 
organization, and administration.”47 
Given the variations and diversity at the local level, this study explores key 
variables that create the divergent patterns of central controls: soft, hard, and mixtures 
of both. As analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4, the decentralized auto industry shows 
mixed patterns, both soft and hard, while the hard regulation model is identified in 
China’s telecom service sector. I suggest three important factors that bring about 
variations: 1) sectoral differences, 2) path-dependent institutions (administration and 




One would expect that the forms of regulatory control over the auto and telecom 
industries are necessarily different due to inherent sectoral characteristics. While the 
former is a manufacturing industry that shows market-oriented competition, the latter 
is a typical natural monopoly industry that has been nationalized for security and 
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public interest reasons since the 1980s. Scholars in the field of Political Economy 
have emphasized that sectoral characteristics have caused variations in the state’s role 
and its policies. Peter Evans has argued that “sectors are more than just arenas for 
observing specific kinds of state involvement, because their techniques of production, 
forms of industrial organization, and modes of governance vary systematically.”48 
Therefore, the desired role and degree of involvement of the state in markets are 
surely varied across sectors. According to Evans, “sectoral characteristics define what 
roles of the state are likely to work.”49 Then, the question is why do sectoral 
characteristics make a difference? D. Michael Shafer has pointed to typical economic 
organizations embedded in sectors as the main forces for making producers or states 
respond distinctively. Shafer has argued that “sectoral characteristics influence the 
defining elements of stateness, absolute capacity, autonomy, and relative capacity.”50   
Drawing on a comparative case study of automobile and information 
technology industries in China, Thun and Segal have highlighted the importance of 
sectoral analysis at the sub-national level because different sectors may have different 
developmental needs and policies.51 This partly results from the fact that individual 
firms across sectors have different problems of “coordination and regulation.” 52 
According to Segal and Thun , both the information technology and the auto sectors 
need an active role by the state in the market, but in a different manner and purpose. 
In the IT sector, they argue that “governments must intervene in new markets in order 
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to provide venture capitals and define property rights.”53 On the other hand, the 
government in the automotive sector plays an interventionist role in “providing 
investment capitals and monitoring technology transfer.”  
Clearly, the importance of sectoral differences cannot be overlooked in 
analyzing the varied forms of regulation. Yet these differences are insufficient in 
explaining the complex systems of China’s industrial regulation due to the following 
two reasons: First, variations in patterns of regulatory control are found not only 
across the sectors but also within the industry, for individual firms in the sector have 
different ownership structures and political constraints, state-enterprise relationships, 
and central-local government relations. As China’s auto industry demonstrates, while 
the form of soft/invisible regulation rises in the large-scale local state firms, the 
patterns of regulation for the central state auto firms are very similar to the tight 
(hard) regulation in the telecom service sector. Hence the auto industry exhibits 
mixed forms of regulatory governance. Second, sectoral differences are powerful in 
explaining the rise of different patterns of regulation for the auto and telecom service 
industries, but they do not provide relevant explanations for why, despite sectoral and 
institutional differences, centralized regulatory control commonly operates in both 
sectors.     
 
Importance of Institutional Contexts  
 
In studying Chinese politics, it would be simplistic to characterize general patterns of 
governance due to “the complex patterns and variations across different parts of 
                                                 




China and across different issue areas.”54 The question is, other than sectoral 
differences, what makes these complexities in the Chinese industrial economy? In this 
section, I point to three key variables as the major sources of variations in the 
regulatory structure, and explain how each factor contributes to creating diversity 
within the central regulatory power. These variables are: 1) path-dependent histories; 
2) governing structure; 3) forms of ownership. Two indicators are employed to 
compare and contrast the governing structure: central-local government relations and 
inter-governmental relations at the center.  
 
1. Path-dependent Histories 
 
 
One of the major forces in creating various practices of central oversight is the 
different histories of regulation and ownership. While comparative historical analysis 
has been employed mainly in cross-national studies, the factor of history also plays an 
important role in generating the varieties of economic governance within a country. In 
China, while the automobile manufacturing industry has developed under the policies 
of decentralization and central-local shared forms of public ownership, the telecom 
service sector has been monopolized by the central government. Hence, heavily 
influenced by historically evolved institutional contexts, there are more complexities 
than those captured by a single type of regulatory model.  
The importance of history has been particularly emphasized by scholars of 
historical institutionalism. They argue that “contemporary political decisions are 
embedded in institutions - whether they be formal rules, policy structures, or norms – 
and because different historical configurations will lead to different institutional 
                                                 




structures, policy change is not easy.”55 Highlighting the effects of the self-
reinforcing process of history in social science, Paul Pierson argues that “we should 
turn to history because important aspects of social reality can best be comprehended 
as temporal processes. It is not the past per se but the unfolding processes over time 
that theoretically central.”56  
In part resulting from inherent sectoral characteristics, the central government 
has adopted distinct developmental strategies in dealing with the auto and telecom 
industries. This has contributed to creating different historical trajectories in 
developmental procedures. The two policies that stand out in the automobile 
manufacturing sector are: decentralized political and economic institutions, and the 
recent openness to foreign and private capital. By selecting localities having either 
comparatively advanced machinery and parts production, or strategic significance 
(i.e., Shanghai and inland Changchun), the central government has delegated 
substantial discretionary powers and property rights to local governments. The form 
of ownership is mixed: while two major firms are centrally-owned, most other 
passenger assemblers are local government firms. The first private auto company 
emerged in 1998 and for now is rapidly growing.57 Under this decentralized regime, 
the functions of comprehensive state institutions (i.e., NDRC and SASAC) and other 
central bureaucracies have been limited in regulating local governments unless central 
approval is required.  
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In contrast to the auto industry, the telecom service sector has a long history 
of strong central control and ownership. Before regulatory reform in 1998, China’s 
telecom regime was a state-monopoly system: MPT was regulator and operator. 
Through the reforms, the operator China Telecom is institutionally separated from the 
regulator MII, but the market structure, price, and competition are still managed, not 
by market forces, but by the central state institutions. All telecom service carriers are 
centrally-owned and tightly supervised by central state institutions. Moreover, 
provincial and municipal governments reserve no property rights to local telecom 
companies, which simply remain local units subordinated to the central firms. Private 
capital is not allowed to enter the basic telecom service market. Centralized 
ownership has in effect empowered central regulatory institutions, while local 
governments have had little capacity to manage telecom firms at the local level.  
 
 
2. The Governing Structure  
 
Given that economic regulation illustrates “an essential mechanism of public 
control”58  over business, reflecting broad state-industry relations, the patterns of 
regulation would be considerably affected by who has the right to control and 
supervise the business management of state sectors. The governing structure shows 
not only power relations among governmental agencies, but also government-
enterprise relations. Since power relationships among regulatory institutions in China 
are varied across issue areas, understanding the governing structure is particularly 
important. As the case of the automobile and telecom service industries evidence, 
                                                 




variations in regulatory power relationships is more complicated, for some are 
dominated by decentralized political and economic authority while others are tightly 
controlled by the centralized system. In addition, as I have pointed out earlier, the 
central NDRC is a key regulatory body in the automobile industry while SASAC, not 
the MII, plays a substantial role in controlling the business of the telecom industry. In 
other words, they all exhibit the importance of the governing structure marked by 
issue areas in capturing and understanding the complex forms of regulation. The 
effects of governing structure on the automobile manufacturing and telecom 
industries are well demonstrated in the following two dimensions: inter-governmental 
relations and central-local state relations across the two industries.59 
 
A. Inter-governmental (bureaucratic) relations  
 
In governing state sectors, regulatory power among government agencies is dynamic, 
and these different power relations have contributed to shaping diverse patterns of 
central oversight in China’s industrial regulation. Although comprehensive state 
commissions (i.e., NDRC or SASAC) at the core hold decisive authority in policy-
making for both industries, inter-governmental relations are different. I suggest that 
kuai-based leadership relations among governmental agencies are principal in 
automobile manufacturing, while a tiao-based hierarchical system leads the telecom 
service sector. The organizational dynamic of the Chinese polity is delineated as the 
                                                 





matrix of tiao/kuai relations: “the vertical bureaucracies are called line (tiao), while 
the horizontal coordinating bodies at various levels are called pieces (kuai).”60 
To begin with, the principal mechanism of regulation in the Chinese auto 
industry is centered on horizontally distributed power relations among local state 
institutions, although the key regulatory power lies at the center. This has been 
conducive to making the mode of central oversight over local auto business soft and 
invisible compared with controls over centrally-owned auto and telecom service 
firms. As Andrew Mertha has argued through the study of administrative and 
financial regulation and commodities management, “kuai-based leadership relations 
help local governments achieve a degree of independence from external influence and 
facilitate co-ordination between functional departments.”61 Significantly affected by 
pre-existing decentralized institutional arrangements, local governments have retained 
enterprise ownership and the rights to decide the distribution of resources (i.e., land) 
and to appoint high-level officials and the senior managers of local state firms. In 
regulating local auto businesses, this allows local governments to enjoy autonomy.62 
Although the local level Development and Reform Commission (DRC) and SASAC 
are structurally subordinated to local (provincial and municipal) governments, their 
functional interagency relations are less hierarchical, and the division of labor is 
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horizontally distributed: DRC makes policy-decisions for investment or production, 
and SASAC supervises the assets management of local auto state firms. 
As such, the sector shows that horizontally organized “leadership relations 
(lingdao guanxi)” between local authorities are more emphasized than “professional 
relations (yewu guanxi)” between central and local level comprehensive state 
institutions.63 Yet this does not imply that there is no vertical bureaucratic structure in 
governing the auto sector. I argue that the leading regulatory mechanism in the sector 
is kuai-based leadership relations across localities, which has an effect on creating 
soft/invisible control from the center. 
On the other hand, as the following figure shows, the regulatory structure for 
the telecom service sector is vertically organized in both government and business. 
Thereby, in governing the telecom business, tiao-based interagency relations are 
dominant. Regulatory oversight for local telecom enterprises is undertaken not by the 
local regulatory agency, as seen in rural industry,64 but by staff directly dispatched by 
the central regulatory institutions (i.e., MII or SASAC). In regulating the telecom 
service sector, vertically organized “leadership relations” between the MII and local 
Telecommunication Administrations, which are local branches of the central MII, are 
more principal than horizontally organized “professional relations” between local 
Telecom Administrations and regional governments. In contrast with the auto 
industry, this demonstrates that local governments in the telecom business may make 
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advising suggestions to local Telecom Administrations, but they are non-binding. 
There is also an implicit hierarchy among central regulatory institutions in the sector. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, while the MII remains a state-designated special public 
agency, substantial regulatory power is exercised by SASAC, controlling budgets, 
assets, investments, and personnel management. Since all telecom service providers 
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B. Central-Local State Relations: Decision-Making Authority 
 
When decentralization is defined as “the downward transferred decision-making 
power from some central point to either the production unit or some lower level of 
regional administration,”65 it is manifest that automobile manufacturing is one of the 
most decentralized industries, while the telecom service sector is highly centralized. 
Here I discuss how decision-making authority in a decentralized or centralized 
governing structure has an effect on the variations in the forms of industrial 
regulation in China. 
In the auto industry, local governments retain the right to distribute such 
resources as budget, tax, and land, as well as to appoint and determine the tenure of 
presidents of local auto firms and of provincial/municipal leaders.66 The power of 
local governments in the auto sector is further demonstrated in that the local DRC, 
which plays the role of gatekeeper providing local auto manufacturers with access to 
the central NDRC, is organized and staffed by local governments. These sources of 
regulatory power have led provincial/municipal governments to exercise substantial 
discretionary powers. To promote the development of their own auto companies, 
local governments often provide them with land at a cheap price.67 Senior executives 
and managers of central auto producers are directly appointed by the central SASAC, 
while the personnel of local auto companies are in the hands of local governments. In 
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effect, “through decentralization, a wide range of decision authority was transferred 
from the central government to the provinces and below for the sake of promoting 
local incentives.”68 As such, by examining decision-making authority in the auto 
industry, we can see how a decentralized governing structure affects the creation of 
the regulatory pattern. This decentralized economic and political power has allowed 
local governments to enjoy relatively high discretion, which leads to making the 
central regulatory oversight loose and invisible compared with the mechanism in the 
telecom sector. 
Policy-making, implementation, and supervision in the telecom service sector 
are tightly centralized. As a consequence of the strong legacies of the state-led 
monopoly system, only a limited number of telecom firms have been permitted to 
enter the market, and they are all centrally-owned state firms. As I pointed out in 
Chapter 4, such central ownership allows the central regulatory body, SASAC, to 
effectively control telecom firms’ budget, personnel, investment, and asset 
management, and its regulation is both expanding and tightening. China’s basic 
telecom service operates in a government-set price system, not by the market. Since 
local telecom firms are simply local units of the central telecom companies, they have 
to acquire approval from the central head office when they attempt to change telecom 
service fees or billing systems at localities. Local governments can reflect their voices 
in setting telecom prices through the price bureau, but the ultimate decision is made at 
the center, the NDRC and MII. Profits of local telecom firms are remitted to the 
central office, not local governments, and revenue after taxes is managed by the 
central SASAC. Personnel, ownership, and the distribution of resources are 
                                                 




implemented by the center, which also means that the discretionary power of local 
governments is very limited. Therefore, the pattern of regulation in the telecom 
industry is vertically centralized through formal channels. 
 
 
3. Forms of Ownership 
 
In China’s market-oriented reforms, forms of ownership are a key economic 
institution in generating diversity in state regulation. When ownership is defined as 
“the right to income and the right to control” of assets and business management, 
industries where both central and local state ownership co-exist (i.e., the auto sector) 
inevitably bring about variations in the system of regulatory governance.69 In the state 
sector, central state ownership means that the central government has the right to 
claim remitted profits, which go directly to the central budget.70 On the other hand, 
locally-owned state firms remit their profits to provincial or municipal governments 
for the local budget. Ownership composition in the Chinese industrial economy is 
divided into state-owned, collective (including TVE), private, and foreign-invested.71 
State ownership is again split into centrally-owned and locally-owned firms. Even 
though the ratio of state-owned enterprises to industrial output has remarkably 
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declined from 77% in 1978 to 33% in 1996,72 public ownership is still pre-dominant 
in state sectors, accounting for 38% of the whole industrial output in 2004.73 
Then, the question is whether and how the forms of ownership affect the 
patterns of regulation over key state sectors. In this regard, I argue that the level of 
ownership in the Chinese industrial economy is important, in that it determines who 
has the right to control and supervise the management of state assets. It also affects 
who appoints top executives of enterprises and decides the planning of production 
and investment.74 Oi and Walder have argued that “property rights in the Chinese 
economy have moved decisively away from traditional state ownership”75 toward the 
reformed, contracted, leased public assets, and private firms. Moreover, these forms 
of enterprise ownership vary across regions and sectors.76 Focusing on rural industry, 
the authors have uncovered two different property regimes marketed by the roles of 
rural officials: government-centered (corporatist) and entrepreneur-centered (littoral), 
and variations are further complicated across regions. Whereas rural industrial sectors 
show great progress toward contracted or privatized assets, Oi and Walder have noted 
that the “large-scale state sector still is dominated by the reformed public firm 
model,” where partial rights of control over business management are transferred to 
managers who are employed and closely monitored by the government.77 However, 
the model fails to explicate the varied forms of ownership within the large-scale state 
sector, either centrally or locally owned, and how they affect the variations in state 
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control. The automobile industry provides an outstanding example: although the 
reformed state firm, as in the telecom service sector, is dominant, there are also 
private and foreign-invested firms. In other words, while Oi and Walder have claimed 
that one type of property in the Chinese economy replaces another through the reform 
processes, I suggest that various forms of ownership, from traditional state firms to 
private ones, work together concurrently. This considerably affects the creation of 
complex patterns of state regulation across and within the sector.   
Furthermore, the existing literature on Chinese industry has tended to assume 
that the notion of state sector or state-run enterprise is likely to have highly 
centralized organization and administration.78 Belcher and Shue, focusing on one 
county, Shulu, found that “state-run enterprises took several forms, having centralized 
and decentralized and vertical and horizontal forms of ownership, organization, and 
administration, thereby not all of which were under tight central control.”79 Likewise, 
at the sectoral level, even though both the automobile and telecom service sectors are 
strategically significant state sectors and dominated by state firms, they exhibit 
diversity in the patterns of central oversight: soft/invisible, hard, and a mixture of 
both. 
Since state sectors are “the most compelling national objectives and vested 
interests,” most of them are centrally-controlled large SOEs. The 1997 Zhuada 
(“grasping the large”) policy evidences the central leadership’s idea that the controls 
of the central government will be focused on the designated large SOEs.80 They 
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largely consist of the commanding heights and pillar industries, and both automotive 
and telecom belongs to important state sectors, although there are private and foreign-
invested firms in automobile manufacturing. However, what makes regulatory 
mechanisms in China’s industrial economy nebulous are the central and local mixed 
forms of ownership and continued central control over decentralized state firms. To 
maintain central state controls over profitable large SOEs, both central and local 
government regulation apply. Yet due to the lack of ownership of local state firms, 
central control over local auto state firms is often invisible and looser than in 
centrally-owned state firms, which I conceptualize as soft/invisible regulation. This 
echoes what Christine Wong has commented, “Ownership does not necessarily 
translate into control.”81 As I find, the pattern of soft/invisible central regulation for 
the large local auto state firms clearly demonstrates the complexities. Moreover, 
although the ownership of Chinese state firms is separated into centrally-owned and 
locally-owned, “it would be simplistic to assume that central control extended only to 
centrally owned enterprises” because the central party-state still holds the levers of 
control via financial (i.e., asset management) and political (i.e., personnel) 
supervision over locally-owned state enterprises.  
Accelerated by the fiscal reform beginning in the 1980s, the policy of 
decentralization has been a notable feature of economic reform in China. The existing 
literature on decentralization has largely centered on 1) exploring how the increasing 
fiscal and managerial incentives for local governments have affected the central state 
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capacity and (re)shaped central-local relations,82 or 2) characterizing the role of local 
governments as corporate states, entrepreneurial states, bureaucratic entrepreneurs, 
and industrial firms.83 In rural industry, Jean Oi has argued that central regulation 
conducted by local regulators is likely to be conditioned by compatibility with local 
interests and the degree of supervision from the upper level.84 As such, although it is 
generally accepted that fiscal, administrative, and property decentralization does not 
necessarily mean the disintegration of central control over economic activities at the 
local level,85 the manner and source of central regulation for the business of 
decentralized state firms have never been captured and specified. As the case of the 
auto industry shows, the methods of central control over decentralized state firms are 
distinguished from the centralized sector (i.e., telecom). Most recently, some scholars 
have claimed that the central government has been recentralizing its regulatory 
control over state sectors.86 Focusing on the oil and petrochemical industries, Kun-
Chin Lin has pointed out the transformation of state regulation, shifting “from 
decentralized administrator control to centralized corporate shareholder control” so as 
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to break off the legacies from the planned economy.87 Jae Ho Chung has argued that 
Chinese leadership seeks to leverage central regulation over the public sector by 
recentralizing fragmented state-owned firms through large business groups.88 Yet the 
abovementioned studies still remain the dichotomous approach to regulation of 
China’s public sectors, either (re)centralized or decentralized control. None of them 
relevantly explains how the (re)centralized regulatory power is virtually exercised 
over decentralized state-owned firms, and how the patterns of regulatory oversight are 
distinguished when compared with highly centralized state industries.      
In addition, ownership composition of the auto industry is further complicated 
by emerging private producers and the number of foreign-invested firms with global 
auto producers due to the need for the integration of a global value chain. State 
control, both central and local governments, in private and joint venture auto firms is 
likely to be attenuated, because the asset and business management of private auto 
producers are relatively free from state oversight in terms of personnel and asset 
management. Major auto joint venture firms have to coordinate short and long term 
business plans as well as daily business with foreign partners. Given that China’s 
passenger car market is still dominated by foreign-invested state auto firms, state 
regulation in the auto industry is inevitably looser than in the telecom service 
industry. Therefore, variability in governing strategic industries in China is found not 
only across the auto and telecom industries, but also within automobile 
manufacturing, which demonstrates a mixed form of regulatory architecture from the 
center. In sum, such mixed forms of ownership as central and local state ownership 
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have considerably contributed to shaping various patterns of regulatory mechanisms 
under the rein of central oversight.  
 
 
The Role of Foreign Investors in State Regulation   
 
   
How does foreign investment have an effect on making regulatory patterns in China? 
The conventional wisdom is that more foreign-invested firms in state sectors are more 
likely to corrode the government controls. Focusing on institutional effectiveness, 
Yasheng Huang argues that the domination of foreign-invested firms has resulted 
from China’s institutional weakness, which turns out highly ineffective market 
fragmentations.89 In terms of managing foreign-invested state firms in the form of 
joint ventures, this argument would be valid because, as stakeholders, foreign-
investors have the right to participate in the decision-making process of business 
management. But in dealing with foreign investors in the sector, high inflows of 
foreign investment do not necessarily lead to decreasing state regulation. In 
particular, where competition among foreign investors is extensive in taking the 
initiative in the Chinese market, more foreign investment is likely to give the Chinese 
government more leverage to control foreign investors by encouraging competition.  
Drawing on the case of the auto industry, Eric Thun claims that even though 
foreign-invested joint venture auto firms take a dominant position in China’s auto 
market, this domination results from the government’s industrial policies, not from its 
institutional faults. The central government has always maintained the capacity to 
control the inflow of foreign investors, such as the rights to approve “the creation of a 
                                                 




new assembly joint venture, the partner, the terms of the deal, and the model that 
would be produced.”90 This regulatory power surely contributes to raising the 
leverage of the central government’s control over foreign investors. 
From the outset, the central government has taken a contrasting approach to 
the automotive and telecom service sectors. Auto manufacturing is one of the most 
progressively open to foreign capital, while foreign capital in the telecom service 
industry has been strictly prohibited, as seen from the 1993 and 1995 regulations.91 
Upon the WTO entry in 2001, the MII issued new regulations on foreign investment 
and allowed foreign telecom service providers to participate in China’s telecom 
service sector in the form of joint ventures.92 By expanding cooperation with foreign 
investors, the central government expected to “reduce cost, promote business volume, 
and improve service standards and quality of personnel.”93 But foreign-invested joint 
venture service providers have not appeared yet due to the ambiguous business 
environment and “numerous hidden regulatory barriers.”94      
Instead of establishing joint venture telecom service firms with foreign 
partners, China’s telecom SOEs tend to put more emphasis on promoting corporate 
governance by inviting experienced foreign professionals to sit on boards of directors. 
But the regulatory power of foreign board members in state firms significantly differs 
depending on whether they hold stakes. As part of the auto industry development 
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policy, China has been active in attracting foreign investment in order to exchange its 
enormous market with advanced foreign technology and managerial skills. Hence, the 
strong need for foreign investment in automobile manufacturing has led state 
regulation to be less strict and allowed foreign board members to hold stakes. 
Shareholding foreign investors in the sector retain the right to participate in major 
business projects. As a result, this has an effect on relaxing regulatory control. This 
logic is also relevant in accounting for how strict prohibition and its concomitant lack 
of foreign investment in the telecom service sector have created the pattern of hard 
regulation in the sector. Yet even though the telecom market entry has been gradually 
opening up to foreign investors, I argue that it does not necessarily lead to relaxed 
soft regulation as seen in the automobile firms, because the telecom service is an 
infrastructure industry intimately tied to political and national security concerns.    
For example, FAW-VW, a major JV auto firm, and China Netcom, a major 
telecom service provider, are both centrally-owned large state firms. While the 
functions of the boards of directors in both firms are important in business 
management,95 their composition is different, affecting the methods of central state 
regulation. FAW-VW’s board consists of seven Germans out of sixteen members, and 
the vice chairman of the board is German, while the chairman is the president of 
FAW Group, Zhu Yanfeng. In addition, there is the board of management (jingying 
guanli weiyuanhui), which is composed of three Chinese and three German 
executives. As such, foreign investors in FAW-VW as stakeholders have the right to 
participate in decision-making and business management. This implies that even 
though FAW-VW is a central state firm, state regulation can be held in check by its 
                                                 




foreign partners. According to one senior manager in FAW-VW, “because VW owns 
50% of stake, we have to negotiate and cooperate in managing assets and personnel. 
But, sometimes it is very difficult to make an agreement with German partners 
regarding technology development or export/import plans, and human resources. 
They demand more and more autonomy in managing the firm.”96 Since FAW is a 
very important symbol of China’s auto industry, and its good shape is very important 
to the central government, the relationship between FAW and the central government 
is fairly intimate.97   
Conversely, no joint venture telecom service firm has been created, even 
though the Chinese central government in 2001 issued a regulation allowing foreign 
investment in telecom service firms. As mentioned earlier, some providers have made 
an effort to improve corporate governance by inviting senior foreign experts, but their 
voices remain “advising” as independent non-executive members; they do not have 
substantial authority in governing the business of the firms. The function of the board 
of directors becomes more formalized, and Chinese senior executives are willing to 
learn from Western practices of corporate governance.98 But, again, foreign non-
executive members have no formal right to participate in policy-making. Through the 
party committee in state firms, the party-state exercises regulatory control of telecom 
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IV. Chapter Conclusion 
 
Despite inherent sectoral characteristics, as well as a range of market-oriented 
restructuring programs, China’s regulatory governance of the telecom and automobile 
industries suggests that strategic state sectors are under central state oversight. 
However, the patterns of centralized regulation are divergent across the sectors. The 
factor of ownership is particularly important in that even though the automotive and 
telecom service industries have evolved under very different historical and 
institutional environments, central state firms in both sectors show similar patterns of 
central regulation in order to protect the party-state’s crucial state assets. Findings 
from this comparison confirm my hypotheses in Chapter 1 that pre-existing 
institutional arrangements significantly affect the creation of diverse forms of 
regulatory governance. The concepts of centralized soft and hard regulation as 
specific forms of regulatory governance highlight the complex nature of the Chinese 

















Since the 1990s, the Chinese top leadership has taken a number of steps to remake the 
states’ institutional foundation toward a market-oriented economy. This has included 
a wide range of administrative, corporate, and regulatory reforms as well as entry into 
the WTO. How do such institutional changes affect economic governance, 
particularly in   strategic industries? Given substantial variation in ownership and 
governing structure (i.e., central-local state relations), how do regulatory forms vary 
between sectors?   
This research project has investigated the sources and types of complexities in 
industrial regulation. Taking two strategic industries as crucial cases, I have explored 
the patterns of economic governance in the automobile manufacturing and telecom 
service sectors in China. In doing so, I have accounted for the historical development 
and the structure of government authority of each case. I found that, despite 
significant differences in sectoral characteristics, both industries have centralized 
regulatory power. At the same time, the form of central control varies between, as 
well as within, the sector.  
The findings presented in this study make two significant contributions to the 
study of regulatory politics, particularly in the context of the Chinese political 
economy. First, the conventional model of regulation needs to expand empirical cases 




overall picture of the system of economic governance. As the two cases in my 
research strongly demonstrate, there are substantial variations in the forms of 
ownership and central-local state relations across issue areas. This finding has been 
overlooked in existing analytic frames.  
Second, as the telecom service sector demonstrates, a focus on the 
independent regulator model, fails to explain who exercises the de facto regulatory 
control over enterprises when its independence is constrained by both government 
and business. My research suggests that, by relaxing the conventional analytic frames, 
we discover that the newly re-organized and enhanced comprehensive state 
institutions play a substantial role as the “watchdog” of strategic industries. As their 
regulatory power has grown, the independence of specialized regulatory bodies tends 
to become constrained. The case studies presented here demonstrate that the MII in 
the telecom sector is considerably restricted by the newly emerged comprehensive 
national power SASAC. The central NDRC oversees the automobile sector through 
the authority to approve key investment projects, formulate industrial policy, and to 
oversee its implementation. One study also finds that the regulatory power of State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) in the power industry has triumphed over 
by the NDRC.1 The conventional independent regulator model does not adequately 
explain the empowerment of supra-ministerial bodies (i.e., NDRC or SASAC) as new 
regulator; nor does it address the political goals of the central leadership. In fact, 
government restructuring programs and the creation of various regulatory 
commissions do not lead to limited (youxian) or decentralized government. Despite 
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persistent legacies of fragmented authority and bureaucratic infighting, 
comprehensive national power at the core is newly restructured and strengthened by 
integrating key policy decisions. Studies of economic governance in China’s 
industrial economy should, therefore, explore the growing regulatory power of 
comprehensive state bodies, and their impact on the forms of regulation. In doing so, 
we can identify more relevant mechanisms of regulation and the sources of variations 
in regulatory practices. The findings of this study present a foundation for such 




Centralized but Soft, Hard, and Mixed Forms of Regulation 
 
This dissertation’s central focus concerns the political logic of centralized but varied 
patterns of regulatory practices in China’s two strategic industries, the automobile and 
telecom service industries. As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, I agree with the 
scholarly view that China’s changing mode of economic governance is characterized 
as a (re)centralized regulatory state, where the function of government is more 
oriented to guiding a macro-economic developmental direction than a micro-level 
intervention.2 Yet the forms of central regulation are varied, marked by issue areas 
due to the differences not only in sectoral characteristics, but also inside institutional 
environments, such as the level of ownership (central vs. local), the structure of 
governmental authority, and the role of foreign investors. Hence, rather than relying 
on the conventional idea of an independent regulator model, I have attempted to 
disaggregate the concept of a regulatory state that has been treated as unitary in order 
                                                 




to better capture the complexities appearing in the varied patterns and sources of 
regulation in the Chinese industrial economy. The model of soft and hard regulation 
developed in this dissertation provides a complementary framework to the 
independent regulator model so as to explicate the mechanism of industrial 
governance, where the public ownership is still dominant under the reins of the party-
state in China. 
 Before carrying out the field research, I hypothesized that the system of 
regulation for the auto industry is decentralized due to strong local governmental 
authority and ownership, while the telecom service sector is under central control. 
Initially, I planned to investigate why these different patterns of state regulation, 
centralized versus decentralized, occurred despite similar institutional underpinnings. 
As the research proceeded, however, it turned out that regulatory power in both 
industries is centralized, although the pattern and degree of central oversight is 
different. Then, why is centralized regulation concurrently arising? As I have 
extensively discussed in Chapter 5, two components are notable: 1) the strategic 
importance to the national economic welfare, and 2) the political need to protect state 
assets tied to the vested interests of the party-state and to create a cohesive central 
power at the core. To begin with, in terms of economic concerns, it is clearly stated 
by the director of SASAC that central regulatory control over such industries is 
indispensable, for they are associated not only with national security and the 
economy, but also with the development of other sectors.3 Central regulatory control 
resulting from strategic significance is also evidenced by the government’s efforts to 
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foster large state-owned corporations and to rationalize the market by controlling the 
number of firms and the entry of foreign investors.  
 In terms of political concerns, I have found that the ultimate goal of central 
oversight is to secure crucial state assets through formally or informally 
institutionalized channels. Close and tight controls over state assets are imperative for 
the party-state, for a solid economic foundation serves as the grounds for not only 
political power, but also continued control of society.4 As such, while I did not expect 
a significant role of the Party in shaping the regulatory regime, it turned out to be a 
key element giving rise to central oversight. In fact, I had assumed that each industry 
had one type of regulatory mechanism, prior to the research. While sectoral 
characteristics were anticipated to have an effect on creating different practices of 
regulation, it was not expected that varied forms of regulation would be employed 
within one sector. As my findings have demonstrated, however, not sectoral 
characteristics alone (i.e., manufacturing or natural monopoly), but the forms of 
ownership within an economic industry significantly contribute to creating variations 
in the patterns of regulation, since the levels of public ownership (central or local) 
influence the manner and sources of central oversight.  As hypothesized in Chapter 1, 
although the varied forms of regulation are facilitated by differences in the historical 
evolution of industrial development, central-local state and inter-bureaucratic 
authority relations across industries, the findings reveal that the forms of ownership 
particularly play a decisive role in making the varied central regulation patterns. 
 At the same time, while the level of state ownership (central or local) is a 
significant element, in that it affects who has the right to supervise crucial state assets 
                                                 




and appoint top executives of major state enterprises, it fails to account for why the 
centralized system of regulation arises despite such dissimilarities. It is also important 
to note that the above variables are closely interrelated: the history of industrial 
evolution has been associated with shaping the governing institutional structure, such 
as central-local state relations or forms of ownership across localities and issue areas. 
For example, hierarchical relations among bureaucratic agencies in China’s telecom 
service sector are not irrelevant to historically evolved centralized government 
authority and regulatory policies. The policy of decentralization in developing 
automobile manufacturing has led to allowing local governments to exercise 
discretionary power, which makes central regulation relatively loose compared with 
the highly centralized telecom service sector. 
Given China’s rapid integration into the global economy, I also considered the 
influence of foreign direct investment on shaping the system of regulation. Yet its 
significance is recognized differently than I expected. I assumed that more foreign 
direct investments in the leading economic industries would 1) push further to 
improve corporate governance, conforming to the globally advised type of regulatory 
regime that emphasizes privatization and transparent governance, and 2) check 
government controls over business. Findings show that the increase of foreign 
investments does not simply corrode state regulation. Rather, it evidences the power 
of central regulatory institutions in strategic economic industries by controlling the 
entry and partners of foreign investments and requiring the approval of the central 
government, regardless of the nature of the industrial market and the system of 




in the patterns of central oversight, which I did not anticipate prior to the research. By 
holding the rights to state assets as shareholders, foreign investors are allowed to 
participate in the major business decisions of state firms. Thereby, to some extent, 
more foreign investments contribute not only to improving corporate governance and 
maintaining central regulatory power, but also to creating the varied forms of central 
oversight. Hence, less foreign direct investments, as seen in the telecom service 
sector, has led the central state institutions to exercise more tight oversight. In sum, 
soft, hard, and their mixed, variegated forms of central regulation are identified 
between, as well as, within the sectors. The forms of regulation are diverse not simply 
because of sectoral differences, but rather because of the mutual interactions of path-
dependent history, central-local state relations, forms of ownership, and the role of 
foreign investment. The findings show that the level of public ownership and the role 
of foreign investors exert a particularly significant impact on creating variations in 
governing China’s strategic industries.    
 Recalling the introduction of a model of soft/hard regulation in Chapter 2, soft 
regulation is one pattern of a central regulatory mechanism identified in China’s 
decentralized but strategic industries. Due to strong local components in terms of 
administration and ownership as well as the important role of foreign investors, I find 
that the pattern of central regulatory power in China’s automobile manufacturing is 
soft and invisible through informal channels. What is important here is, given that the 
literature of decentralization has not tackled the fact of soft/invisible central 
regulation, the case of the auto industry provides an excellent example to show how 




SOEs. In other words, the policies of decentralization do not necessarily imply the 
lack of central regulatory power in China’s state industries. Moreover, two major 
central state auto firms, even though local state ownership is dominant, show similar 
patterns of hard regulation, as in the telecom service sector, in that central state 
institutions tightly supervise the management of assets and personnel. In spite of the 
same auto industrial sector, the mechanism of regulation is different depending on the 
level of ownership. Hence, soft and hard mixed forms of state regulation surface in 
China’s auto industry.  
 On the other hand, I find that the pattern of regulation in the telecom service 
sector conforms to hard regulation when compared with automobile manufacturing. 
Under central state ownership, the business of telecom service firms is tightly 
supervised and monitored by central regulatory bodies. Unlike in the auto industry, 
local governments have no binding authority for local telecom firms, which are 
simply the local unit of central headquarters. Most importantly, substantial regulatory 
power is exercised not by the MII, which is a formally state-designated regulator, but 
by SASAC as the owner of crucial state assets. In other words, while the MII plays 
the role of “regulator” by encouraging and supervising market competition in the 
sector, as I have pointed out in Chapter 4, its regulatory function is considerably 
constrained, not only by an ongoing sticky relationship between government and 
business, but also by the growing power of the comprehensive state commission, 
SASAC. While some highlight the MII’s regulatory function and its separation from 
business as operator,5 the sector is strictly controlled by the rising supra-ministerial 
regulator SASAC above formally designated regulator MII. As such, if the MII’s 
                                                 




independence is constrained, a model of soft/hard regulation then further attempts to 
uncover exactly who exercises substantial control over the business of telecom 
service, rather than simply analyzing the case through the conventional frame. 
 Soft/hard regulation in China’s industrial economy is also identified by the 
manner of policy implementation and rule-making power. In the regime of hard 
regulation (i.e., the telecom service and central auto state firms), rule-making 
authority is monopolized by central state institutions, such as the NDRC and SASAC; 
the implementation of price, market entry, and industrial policies is strictly monitored 
by the central authority. On the other hand, rule-making authority in the system of 
soft regulation (i.e., local auto state corporations), is shared between central and local 
government bodies, though the ultimate decision is made by the center. By creating 
this leeway, strong local components contribute to making the implementation of 
central policies and regulation loose and soft compared with a tight/hard regulatory 
system. As such, even though key strategic industries are commonly under central 
oversight, variations in the practice of regulation can be found. This also calls for the 
importance of understanding the domestic context. Despite vigorous efforts for 
market liberalization and regulatory and corporate reforms, the strongly lingering 
legacies of the Communist institutions, party and state ownership, gives rise to 
distinctive regulatory governance compared with other countries in the world.    
 Then, are the findings of this study surprising considering how most people 
think about China?  What is astonishing, I suggest, is not the finding of the 
centralized regulatory mechanism itself, but the unveiling of the manner of how and 




regardless of the nature of the market and governing structure. When compared with 
the system of regulation in the centralized telecom service sector, central oversight 
over the business of decentralized state auto corporations is loose and invisible, at 
least in terms of formalized routes. Furthermore, as the model of soft/hard regulation 
demonstrates, the mixed forms of central regulation are identified even within one 
sector, as well as, across industries. This also reflects that while the model of 
independent regulator portends convergence of economic governance, the creating 
and practice of regulatory institutions in China is a highly complex process due to 
“substantially different systems of governance and market characteristics,” which 
Margaret Pearson calls “a tiered economy.”6 Finally, while the telecom service sector 
in most countries has been nationalized and currently is under centralized regulatory 
power, what is interesting in the study of China is where the substantial regulatory 
power comes from. As I have discussed in detail in Chapter 4, I found that the de 
facto regulator is SASAC, not the MII that existing literature has focused on 
analyzing. This implies that we may better capture complex dynamics by relaxing the 
conventional analytic frame that centers on a state-designated public agency.    
 
Is the Chinese Regulatory Regime Unique? 
 
This dissertation has identified the diverse patterns and sources of regulation in 
China’s two very different strategic industries. Comparing the automobile 
manufacturing and telecom service sectors, this study has demonstrated that, 
regardless of the differences in market characteristics, the mechanism of regulation in 
                                                 




China’s key strategic industries is centralized in order to protect the vested interests 
of the party-state and create comprehensive national power at the core. It also implies 
that the wide range of political and economic institutional changes ensuing from 
administrative and corporate reforms since the 1990s have never led to limited 
government; rather a cohesive central oversight arises. However, the forms of central 
regulation are varied. In this regard, I have proposed a model of soft/hard regulation 
to better characterize the diverse practices of the regulatory power from the center, 
and to help understand the politics of regulation in China’s most strategic industries. 
Even though central regulatory oversight is commonly operating in the auto and 
telecom service businesses, the increasing activities of foreign investors and private 
manufacturers in the auto industry have made the manner and degree of central state 
control inevitably soft, thereby distinguishing it from the telecom service industry, 
where property rights are wholly-owned and tightly supervised by the central state. 
Hence, for the auto sector, I suggest the concept of “soft regulation” when compared 
with the pattern in the telecom service sector. The model also shows that “diversity” 
in regulatory patterns is identified not only across industries, but even within a sector, 
where different systems of administration and forms of ownership are operating. As 
such, while it is often said that we are living in an era of the regulatory state, we can 
recognize various practices of regulation marked by issue areas. If so, is China’s 
regulatory practice unique compared with other countries in the world? What makes 
the Chinese regulatory state distinctive?  
 Drawing on the findings from the comparative case study of two strategic 




take a step back and explore who has “substantial” authority to control the 
commanding heights, China’s telecom service sector demonstrates that the de facto 
regulator does not always coincide with the formally designated public agency in 
practice. This implies that the independent regulator model that existing literature has 
relied on to analyze economic regulation may not be the best framework for 
investigating and understanding how the Chinese central leadership exerts control 
over strategic state sectors. As the telecom service sector evidences, while the 
conventional approach has focused on the independence of the formal regulator, the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII), I found that the sector is significantly 
controlled not by the MII, but by the State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC).  
 Second, and related to the first aspect, even though there are official state-
designated public agencies, above them, the newly reformulated comprehensive state 
institutions at the core, such as the NDRC and SASAC, play a key role of “watchdog” 
as regulator in practice. Given their powerful control over the market place of the 
commanding heights and pillar industries, which generate much of the government’s 
revenues, such re-centralized state power is never minimal, simply favoring 
consumers’ interests.  
 Third, the complex nature of China’s regulatory regime, which is colored by 
diversity in bureaucratic organizations and state-business relations across industries 
and localities, shows that no one single model may appropriately capture the overall 
dynamics of Chinese state regulation. Rather, there is much variation in the patterns 




previous studies have tended to focus on characterizing the national approaches to 
regulatory reform,7 my findings suggest that we need to consider and compare other 
areas of the economy in order to better understand the whole picture of regulatory 
governance. 
 Fourth, despite a global wave of market-oriented regulatory reform coupled 
with privatization, state ownership continues to be the salient form of economic 
institution in China. In the U.S., regulation “leaves ownership of industry in private 
hands,” strongly believing that “the market works well under normal circumstances 
and should be interfered with only in specific cases of market failure.”8 On the other 
hand, “public ownership of key industries such as gas, electricity, and telecom 
service, has been the main mode of economic regulation in Europe. It was supposed 
to give the state the power to impose a planned structure on the economy and to 
protect the public interest against powerful private interests.”9 While regulation 
through public ownership has been a central feature in Europe, expert agencies are 
gradually replacing the regulatory functions of “departments of government under the 
direct control of political executives.”10   
Rather than privatization, China’s central government has been making a great effort 
to improve corporate governance through transforming the organizational form of 
state-owned enterprises. According to the Company Law that came into effective in 
1994, the traditional form of state firms in China is under transformation into three 
types of corporate enterprises: limited liability companies, state-owned limited 
                                                 
7 Vogel (1996); Majone (1996); Eisner (2000) 
8 Majone (1996: 10) 
9 Majone (1996: 11) 




liability companies, and shareholding limited companies.11 While some argue that 
“despite repeated denials of the top leadership, the shareholding system reform is a 
form of privatization in the sense that it provides a channel through which state assets 
are transferred to private hands,”12 others perceive that the shareholding company is 
established as a controlled subsidiary under the direct leadership of the parent SOE.13 
Since the state in the traditional form of the SOE is the sole owner, the shareholding 
enterprise system is ultimately designed not to privatize property rights over state 
assets, but to enhance the value of state assets under continued state control. 
Moreover, the central leadership intends that such corporatization contributes to 
raising the finances of state firms by allowing non-state investors to own equity. As 
Donald Clarke has clearly pointed out, the major goals of regulation are not only to 
enhance pro-competition for the increase of national revenue but also to “reinforce 
the state’s grip on key economic sectors.”14 That is, without losing its vested interest, 
the Chinese party-state has been attempting to harmonize state ownership with 
market-oriented regulatory reforms and appears to believe that the system of 
regulation can be enhanced through corporatization, not privatization.15 
 Finally, the deeply penetrated Party organizations in both government and 
business add another distinctive feature to the practices of regulation in the Chinese 
political economy. As Sebastian Heilmann accurately pointed out, despite its 
significance, “the practice of Communist Party control and the role of secretive Party 
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organs in economic regulation”16 have been the least touched by scholars from both 
mainland and abroad, in analyzing China’s regulatory reforms. To some extent, the 
Chinese regulatory regime shows more similarities with the Japanese system than 
with the European or the American experience, in the sense that the government still 
is deeply engaged in the business of industries, with strategic goals of growth rather 
than market efficiency. The Party, as the most powerful political institution, however, 
plays a key role in making China’s regulatory state distinguished from the Japanese 
system. Consistent with the global trend of regulatory reform, the Chinese state, in 
theory, has established independent regulators in key economic sectors and 
emphasizes the policy of separating government ministries from enterprises (“zhengqi 
fenkai”). At the same time, the personnel of not only regulatory institutions but also 
regulated state firms are controlled by the Department of Organization of the CCP. 
Thereby, neither regulatory bodies nor major state firms are free from political 
control of the Party. This also reveals that despite ongoing programs of market-
oriented reform, a sticky triangular relationship among the government, enterprises, 
and the Party continues to remain central in the newly emerging economic 
governance. 
 
China’s Construction of a Regulatory State: Implications 
 
Building a regulatory state in China is a gradual and complex process of removing or 
downsizing the bulk of “old” state institutions and establishing new ones. In order to 
best secure the political and economic interests of the party-state, some areas of the 
                                                 




Chinese economy encourage competition reflecting consumer interests under relaxed 
state control, while the business of “commanding heights” and “pillar” industries is 
tightly supervised by central authority favoring state-owned oligopolies. As this study 
has shown, the regulatory regime over even key strategic sectors is varied due to 
different levels of public ownership and different roles of foreign investors in such 
state-owned firms and industries. As Andrew Nathan pointed out, “the American 
model or Western model has very low appeal in China.” While his remark focused on 
the political dimension, it also seems to be relevant in viewing economic regulation.17 
More importantly, we should recognize how the Communist Party’s multi-pronged 
strategy, which entails controlling the management of crucial state assets and 
personnel decisions in both government and state firms, has been affecting the color 
of the regulatory state in China. Given the complex nature of the Chinese state and 
economy, any argument for one single model is incomplete for understanding the new 
mechanism of market governance that the party-state continuously designs in both 
formal and informal ways. This study provides the following implications for China’s 
emerging regulatory system.  
 First, despite extensive government and corporate reforms since the 1990s, the 
continued legacies of Communist institutions, such as the party-state and public 
ownership, have significantly contributed to creating distinct features of China’s 
regulatory state in governing key industries. As the case studies of the auto and 
telecom service sectors evidence, the party maintains levers of control over personnel 
in state firms and government. The dominance of state ownership is particularly 
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remarkable in key strategic sectors where the party’s vested interests are closely 
associated. Moreover, through deep penetration of the party committee in government 
and state firms, the party can effectively exercise supervisory and rule-making powers 
over major policy decisions, and control cadre management.  
 Second, this dissertation shows how/why central regulatory power is 
employed in a substantially decentralized industrial sector in China. Given that 
existing literature on China’s political economy has rarely dealt with the manner and 
source of central regulation in the decentralization of the economy, this study offers 
an explanation for central control over decentralized state sectors and argues that 
strong local components do not necessarily imply a lack of central regulation. 
Therefore, we need to further study the patterns of central regulation for the 
decentralized economy.  
 Third, streamlined government restructuring and state-enterprise separation 
from administrative and corporate reforms are readily premised to reduce the role of 
the government in business. Yet this dissertation proves that central regulatory power 
in China’s industrial economy is rather revamped through enhanced comprehensive 
oversight by formal or informal channels. In other words, institutional rationalization 
never does lead to a limited modern state. Although corporate reforms have 
contributed to diversifying the shareholders in state-owned enterprises, the state 
remains at the core as the dominant owner in state sectors. 
 Finally, not only to better illustrate and explicate the mechanisms of China’s 
regulation, but also to identify who (which state institution or regulator) exercises 




expand empirical cases into non-strategic or strategic but decentralized industries, and 
2) to relax the analytic framework that has heavily focused on specialized public 
agencies and their independent function. By defining regulation as “the use of public 
authority to set and apply rules and standards,”18 we can better understand various 















                                                 












1. What is the role of auto industry policy (AIP) in China? And, what is the goal of
 the Chinese government to make AIP? Do you think auto industry policy in Chi








2．Do you think the central government have the same approach/strategies in 





a. Exactly same：完全相同 
b. Almost same：大致相同 
c. Different：不同  
d. Other (specify)：其它的 
 





3．In China’s auto industry, the relationship between the central and local 
government is different across localities. Then, what does the “national” auto industry 







3-1 For example, when the national auto industry policy (AIP) conflicts with 
the interests of local governments (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Tainjin), 






4．Which governmental institution does play a key role in regulating China’s auto 
industry?  
 




5．What are the main functions of the National Development Reform Commission 
(NDRC) /the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 














7. When there is the conflict between the center and local govt. about foreign partner 









































































1. Ministry of Information Industry (MII, 信息产业部) is the key “regulatory” body.
 What is the prime central body in governing China’s telecom sector? Has there b
een any conflict or tension between the government agencies? 
 
A. 国务院 (State Council) 
B. 中国国家发展改革委员会 (National Development Reform Commission) 
C. 信息产业部 （MII） 







2. For telecom reform, the MII is supposed to be “independent” from both governme
nt and enterprises (particularly China Telecom), so called “政企分开”.  







3. Many Chinese scholars discuss “中国电信产业政策.” What does it exactly mean?
  
What is your definition of China’s telecom industry policy? And, how is it 




4. Which government institution (i.e., NDRC, SASAC or MII) is the key governmen








5. In the telecoms reforms in China, there are several policies, such as industry polic
y, competition policy, enterprise policy. Which government institution is mainly i




6. When the government creates telecoms industry policies, is it allowed telecoms en
terprises, business associations, or consumers to participate in and reflect their opi




7. How is the relation between government and telecoms enterprise?  
 
A. Between 国家资产管理委员会 and 电信企业 
B. Between 发改委 and 电信企业 




8. China’s telecom sector has been developing and reforming rapidly. What is the m
ajor contribution to such rapid development? Government’s strategic telecom ind
ustry policy (strong state support)? Or the successful business of telecom enterpris





9. The State Council has the final authority to decide or guide the price in the teleco
ms market. This may restrain ‘market competition,’ because the price is set up by 








10. Do you think there is the regulatory governance (监管治理) in China’s telecoms i
ndustry?  


















e. Exactly same：完全相同 
f. Almost same：大致相同 
g. Different：不同  
h. Other (specify)：其它的 
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